Are analysts recommendations associated with management's

earnings forecasts? / Vahid Biglari by Biglari, Vahid
    
ARE ANALYSTS RECOMMENDATIONS 
ASSOCIATED WITH MANAGEMENT S 
EARNINGS FORECASTS?   
VAHID BIGLARI   
SUBMISSION OF THESIS FOR THE 
FULFILMENT OF THE DEGREE OF 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY   
FACULTY OF BUSINESS AND ACCOUNTANCY 
UNIVERSITY OF MALAYA 
KUALA LUMPUR  
2013  
II  
UNIVERSITI MALAYA 
ORIGINAL LITERARY WORK DECLARATION  
Name of Candidate: Vahid Biglari                    (I.C/Passport No:  P95425618)                                       
Registration/Matric No: CHA090019 
Name of Degree: Doctor of Philosophy 
Title of Thesis: Are Analysts Recommendations Associated with Management s Earnings 
Forecasts? 
Field of Study: Financial Reporting 
I do solemnly and sincerely declare that: 
(1)  I am the sole author/writer of this Work; 
(2)  This Work is original; 
(3)  Any use of any work in which copyright exists was done by way of fair dealing and for 
permitted purposes and any excerpt or extract from, or reference to or reproduction of 
any copyright work has been disclosed expressly and sufficiently and the title of the 
Work and its authorship have been acknowledged in this Work; 
(4)  I do not have any actual knowledge nor ought I reasonably to know that the making of 
this work constitutes an infringement of any copyright work; 
(5)  I hereby assign all and every rights in the copyright to this Work to the University of 
Malaya ( UM ), who henceforth shall be owner of the copyright in this Work and that 
any reproduction or use in any form or by any means whatsoever is prohibited without 
the written consent of UM having been first had and obtained; 
(6)  I am fully aware that if in the course of making this Work I have infringed any 
copyright whether intentionally or otherwise, I may be subject to legal action or any 
other action as may be determined by UM 
Candidate s Signature        Date:   9th August 2014                                                         
Subscribed and solemnly declared before, 
Witness s Signature                                                       Date:  
Name:   
Designation:  
III  
ABSTRACT 
The opportunistic and efficiency views of the forecasts undertaken by managers are 
completely different. In the efficiency approach, it is believed that by providing accurate 
forecasts, management provides correct information to the market, thereby restricting them 
to do earnings management. Therefore forecasts are truthful. In contrast, the opportunistic 
view of forecasts is that management s forecasts consist of biased signals. Managers will 
use earnings and Forecasts Management (FM) as tools to create positive earnings surprises 
that will lead to temporary stock price appreciation or preventing stock price depreciation. 
This research shows that as indicated by the companies growth capabilities the Analysts 
Recommendations (AR) can explain the difference in behaviours of managers under these 
two views. This research highlights the managers decision in reporting pessimistic forecast 
to produce positive Forecasts Errors (FEs) when a company s shares are recommended to 
sell (hereafter called sell companies), and generate optimistic forecast when a company s 
shares are recommended to buy (hereafter called buy companies).  
Previous researches show that buy (growth) companies conduct income increasing earnings 
management in order to meet forecasts and generate positive forecast Errors (FEs). This 
behavior however, is not inherent in sell (non-growth) companies. By referring to the 
existing framework in the literature, this research hypothesizes that since sell companies are 
pressured to avoid income increasing earnings management, they are more capable and 
inclined to pursue income decreasing FM in order to produce positive FEs. 
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Using a sample of 2576 firm- years of companies that are listed on the NYSE on 
years 2009 and 2010, the study discovers that sell companies conduct income decreasing 
FM to produce positive FE. However, the frequency of positive FEs of sell companies is 
not higher than that of buy companies. In addition, in the sell companies group, the 
companies that have positive forecasts errors issue higher pessimistic forecasts. Such 
pessimistic forecasts lead to higher positive forecasts errors. However, in the buy 
companies group, the companies that have positive forecasts errors do not issue higher 
pessimistic forecasts. Such pessimistic forecasts do not lead to higher positive forecasts 
errors. Consistent with the efficiency perspective, the study suggests that even though buy 
and sell companies are highly motivated to avoid negative FEs, they exploit different but 
efficient strategies in order to meet their respective forecasts.  
The findings of this research adds to the previous researches by proving that not only the 
buy companies (which are supposed to be growth companies) engage in income increasing 
earnings management to realize positive forecast error, but sell (non-growth) companies 
engage in negative forecast management to accomplish similar goals. Furthermore, the 
findings help us understand the complexities behind informative and opportunistic forecasts 
that fit under efficiency versus opportunistic theories in the literature.  
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ABSTRAK 
Pandangan oportunis dan kecekapan pandangan ramalan yang dilaksanakan oleh pengurus 
adalah berbeza. Dalam pendekatan kecekapan, ia dipercayai bahawa dengan menyediakan 
ramalan yang tepat, pengurusan menyediakan maklumat yang betul kepada pasaran, dengan 
itu menyekat mereka untuk melakukan pengurusan perolehan. Oleh itu ramalan yang benar. 
Sebaliknya, pandangan oportunis ramalan adalah bahawa ramalan pengurusan terdiri 
daripada isyarat yang berat sebelah. Pengurus akan menggunakan pendapatan dan 
Pengurusan Ramalan sebagai alat untuk membuat kejutan pendapatan yang positif yang 
akan membawa kepada kenaikan harga saham sementara atau mencegah saham susut nilai 
harga. 
Kajian ini menunjukkan bahawa seperti yang ditunjukkan oleh syarikat-syarikat Cadangan 
'keupayaan pertumbuhan penganalisis boleh menjelaskan perbezaan dalam tingkah laku 
pengurus di bawah kedua-dua pandangan. Kajian ini menekankan keputusan pengurus 
'dalam melaporkan ramalan pesimis untuk menghasilkan Ramalan positif Kesilapan apabila 
saham syarikat adalah disyorkan untuk menjual (selepas ini dipanggil syarikat sell), dan 
menjana ramalan optimistik apabila saham syarikat adalah disyorkan untuk membeli 
(selepas ini dipanggil membeli syarikat). 
Kajian lepas menunjukkan bahawa membeli (pertumbuhan) syarikat menjalankan 
pendapatan meningkatkan pengurusan perolehan bagi memenuhi ramalan dan menjana 
Kesilapan ramalan positif. Kelakuan ini bagaimanapun, tidak wujud dalam menjual (bukan 
pertumbuhan) syarikat. Dengan merujuk kepada rangka kerja sedia ada dalam penulisan, 
kajian ini berdasarkan analogi bahawa sejak syarikat-syarikat menjual didesak untuk 
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mengelakkan Pendapatan pengurusan pendapatan yang semakin meningkat, mereka lebih 
mampu dan cenderung untuk mengejar pendapatan berkurangan FM untuk menghasilkan 
Fes positif. 
Kajian lepas menunjukkan bahawa membeli (pertumbuhan) syarikat menjalankan 
pendapatan meningkatkan pengurusan perolehan bagi memenuhi ramalan dan menjana ralat 
ramalan positif. Kelakuan ini bagaimanapun, tidak inUsing sampel 2576 firma - tahun 
syarikat-syarikat yang disenaraikan di NYSE pada tahun 2009 dan 2010, mendapati kajian 
yang menjual syarikat menjalankan pendapatan berkurangan pengurusan ramalan untuk 
menghasilkan ralat ramalan positif. Walau bagaimanapun , kekerapan Kesilapan ramalan 
positif syarikat menjual tidak lebih tinggi daripada syarikat-syarikat membeli . Di samping 
itu, dalam kumpulan syarikat-syarikat menjual, syarikat-syarikat yang mempunyai ramalan 
ralat positif mengeluarkan ramalan yang lebih tinggi pesimis. Seperti ramalan pesimis 
membawa kepada yang lebih tinggi ramalan positif kesilapan. Walau bagaimanapun, dalam 
kumpulan syarikat-syarikat membeli , syarikat-syarikat yang mempunyai ramalan ralat 
positif tidak mengeluarkan ramalan yang lebih tinggi pesimis. Seperti ramalan pesimis 
tidak membawa kepada yang lebih tinggi ramalan positif kesilapan. Selaras dengan 
perspektif kecekapan , kajian menunjukkan bahawa walaupun membeli dan menjual 
syarikat-syarikat yang sangat bermotivasi untuk mengelakkan ralat ramalan negatif, mereka 
mengeksploitasi strategi yang berbeza tetapi cekap untuk memenuhi forecasts.herent 
masing-masing dalam menjual (bukan pertumbuhan ) syarikat. Dengan merujuk kepada 
rangka kerja sedia ada dalam penulisan, kajian ini berdasarkan analogi bahawa sejak 
syarikat-syarikat menjual didesak untuk mengelakkan Pendapatan pengurusan pendapatan 
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yang semakin meningkat, mereka lebih mampu dan cenderung untuk mengejar pendapatan 
berkurangan FM untuk menghasilkan Fes positif. 
Hasil kajian ini menambah kepada kajian terdahulu dengan membuktikan bahawa 
bukan sahaja syarikat-syarikat membeli (yang sepatutnya syarikat-syarikat pertumbuhan) 
terlibat dalam pendapatan meningkatkan pengurusan perolehan untuk merealisasikan ralat 
ramalan positif, tetapi menjual (bukan pertumbuhan) syarikat-syarikat terlibat dalam negatif 
ramalan pengurusan untuk mencapai matlamat yang sama. Tambahan pula, penemuan 
membantu kita memahami kerumitan di sebalik ramalan bermaklumat dan oportunis yang 
patut di bawah kecekapan berbanding teori oportunis dalam kesusasteraan.     
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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Financial analysts research macro- and microeconomic conditions together with 
corporate fundamentals to make business, sector and industry recommendations. They also 
frequently suggest a course of action, such as to buy or sell a company's shares based on its 
total present and expected potency. Three main categories of analysts are those that work 
for ' sell side ' investment companies, those that work for ' buy side ' of investment 
companies and those who work for investment banks. 
Buy side analysts and analysts who work for investment banks evaluate and 
compare the quality of securities in a given sector or industry for an in-house fund whilst 
sell side analysts create reports with specific recommendations such as: buy, sell, strong 
buy, strong sell or hold. These recommendations convey a great deal of weight in the 
investment industry plus analysts acting inside buy-side firms. 
In making their recommendations, analysts will often use financial reports to form 
expectations regarding a companies future profit making capabilities. However, since 
analysts do not usually possess all the pertinent information on a particular company, the 
company s management is at a distinct advantage when it comes to forming expectations. 
In other words, analysts could normally only access general public information. To obtain 
company specific information, the analysts should heavily rely on the information that are 
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disclosed by management. On the other hand, the management has access to both insider 
and outsider information, their projection of future forecasted profit is arguably more 
accurate than of analysts and investors in the stock market (2012; Watts & Zimmerman, 
1990). When the stock market expectation differs from the management s expectation,  
they (the managers) will usually adjust that discrepancy using financial disclosures 
(Abarbanell & Lehavy, 2003a; Dutta & Gigler, 2002). 
In accordance with the study conducted by Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003b) this 
study considers buy stocks as the stocks that are having expected future growth whilst the 
sell stocks as companies that have low expectation of future growth. It is expected that 
although both buy companies and sell companies1 are likely to meet the expectations of the 
investors, they follow different strategies to accomplish this aim. This will be explained in 
the following section. 
1.2 Background of the study 
Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003b) assume that the companies that analysts 
recommend to buy (hereafter buy companies) are growth type companies that will enjoy 
high profitability. They show that the management of these companies manage their 
earnings upwards to meet forecasts and produce positive Forecast Errors (FEs).  
                                                 
1 Buy companies are growth type companies and sell companies are non-growth type companies (Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003).   
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In contrast, the incident is not apparent in the companies that analysts recommend to 
sell (hereafter sell companies). According to Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003b), the reasons 
for such observation are that firstly, sell companies stock prices are less susceptible to 
earnings news, making their earnings management ineffective in influencing investors 
decisions. In other words, management of sell companies cannot effectively manipulate and 
increase their profit to boost stock prices. Also secondly, sell companies have insufficient 
sum of available accounting reserves and pre-managed earnings to achieve any relevant 
earnings target (Abarbanell &Lehavy, 2003b). This implies that sell companies do not have 
the sufficient resources to effectively manage earnings. 
With regard to the circumstances where managers manage earnings to meet or beat 
the forecasts, Dutta and Gigler (2002) suggest that both buy and sell companies have strong 
motivations to avoid negative Forecast Errors (FEs) or/and produce positive FEs. They 
propose a contractual model in which the managers utility is mainly based on whether the 
reported earnings meet or miss the forecasts. Dutta and Gigler s (2002) theoretical model 
utilizes both forecasts and earnings management to produce positive FEs. 
According to Dutta and Gigler (2002), sell companies suffer from communication 
restriction as their financial resources are limited. Lack of resources will render the sell 
companies unable to communicate the full scope of their rich information set to investors 
through the manipulation of reported earnings. Therefore, the communication restrictions 
bind sell companies. For this reason, sell companies are expected to have different 
approaches in conveying information to investors compared to buy companies. 
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On the other hand, issuing high forecasts of earnings help the buy companies in the 
process of their financial reporting. By having issued high forecasts, they can efficiently 
manage earnings to meet those forecasts (Dutta and Gigler, 2002; Abarbanell and Lehavy, 
2003b). Issuing high forecasts however, does not help the sell companies in the process of 
their financial reporting, as market punishment could occur as a result of companies 
missing their forecasts (Burgstahler & Eames, 2006; Dutta & Gigler, 2002; Matsumoto, 
2002). Since the sell companies cannot efficiently manage earnings, they are expected to 
inevitably issue low forecasts2. 
Such different expectation for the buy and sell companies is consistent with several 
empirical researches. For example, Barua et al. (2006) confirm that, for the companies that 
generated profit, compared to the companies that experienced loss, before the earnings 
management, it is more likely that their pre-managed earnings are less than both analysts 
forecasts and prior year period s earning as earnings benchmarks. However, it is more 
likely for the companies that generated profit to conduct income increasing earnings 
management and report profits above the benchmarks. Similarly, Kasznik (1999) theorized 
that it is likely that earnings be managed to an upper forecast than to a lower forecast. 
Using accruals to gauge earnings management, he found that managers face asymmetric 
                                                 
2 
The term forecast management has been broadly used in the literature. There are many papers that used this term. Among these papers 
are  (Bernhardt & Campello, 2007); (Burgstahler & Eames, 2003); (Copeland & Marioni, 1972); (McVay, Nagar, & Tang, 2006).   
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incentives to conduct earnings management. To explain more, Kasznik (1999) found that, 
managers are more expected to manage their earnings upward rather than downward. This 
strategy is pursued because the managers intend to meet forecasts and produce positive 
earnings surprises. 
1.3 Problem Statement 
The reason why managers try to beat the forecasts is that by beating the forecasts 
the market value of the company can be influenced. In explaining such behaviour, prospect 
theory assumes that decision-makers stem value from gains and losses regarding wealth 
reference points, rather than from fixed levels of wealth (that is, final outcome)3 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Such wealth reference points include the managers 
earnings forecasts (Burgstahler & Eames, 2006; Matsumoto, 2002). According to 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) the value functions are steepest around the wealth s 
reference points. In addition, prospect theory advocates that the individuals' value functions 
are concave in profits and convex in losses with respect to the reference points. This 
reflects increasing marginal sensitivity to the gains and losses that happens around the 
reference point. In addition, the value function is also steeper for losses than for gains, 
which is referred to as loss aversion. This is shown in Figure 1-1. 
                                                 
3 The theory states that people make decisions based on the potential value of losses and gains rather than the final outcome, and that 
people evaluate these losses and gains using certain heuristics. 
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expectation of the net present value of the expected future cash flows (Choi, Myers, Zang, 
& Ziebart, 2006, p. 239), beating expectations will most definitely increase share price.  
Due to the fact that the management s compensation is either in the form of cash 
bonus on any increases in share price, options or shares in the firm (Choi et al., 2006, p. 
224), the increase in share price will greatly benefit the management. This is in line with 
the Positive Accounting Theory of Watts and Zimmerman (1990) which assumes that in 
an agency setting, all actions by all individuals, including managers (agents), are primarily 
driven by self-interest.  
Consistent with self interest in Positive Accounting Theory (Graham, Harvey, & 
Rajgopal, 2005), the Agency Theory (Deegan & Unerman, 2006) also shares the view that 
in the management s share based compensation or option-based compensation, if the 
management s interests are aligned with the increase in stock prices, then the management 
(agent) will be motivated to raise the investors (principle) interests (Choi et al., 2006, p. 
224). However, this approach is criticized because it may tempt managers to pass 
inaccurate information to stockholders and other stock market participants, with the 
intention of increasing stock prices (Watts & Zimmerman, 1990). In this regard, Deegan 
and Unerman (2006) and  Choiet al. (2006, p. 226) state that the Positive Accounting 
Theory assumes that since all actions by all individuals are driven by self-interest, if 
management is rewarded on the basis of accounting numbers, then they will have an 
incentive to manipulate such numbers to their own end.  
As a response to the concerns on the conflict of interest between the management 
and investors, there have been some efforts in codification strict rules to place the 
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management's benefit to be in line with the investors interests among these efforts is the 
enactment of Sarbanes Oxley4, 2002 (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). As Arping and Sautner 
(2007) state, Sarbanes Oxley is one of the most significant corporate disclosure and 
governance improvements in US history. The primary objective of Sarbanes Oxley, (2002) 
(SOX) is to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate 
disclosures . 
However, numerous studies showed that generally, the management will not fully 
reveal accurate information to the market. For example, Xin (2005) confirmed that 
management manipulate the reported earnings to meet the analysts forecasts, and Barua et 
al. (2010) also showed that the management engage in earnings management to meet 
benchmarks. Burgstahler and Eames (2007) proposed that managers sacrifice long-term 
growth and permanent value increasing opportunities to avoid short term negative FEs.5 
This view of forgoing long-term growth and permanent value increasing 
opportunities to avoid short term negative FEs fits the Watts and Zimmerman (2006) 
opportunistic perspective and is consistent with criticisms on aligning the managers 
interest with an increase in stock prices that is advocated by Jensen and Meckling (2007). 
                                                 
4Sarbanes Oxley act was enacted in United States on 2002; it improved standards for all U.S. public company boards, management and 
public accounting firms. It includes topics such as auditor independence, corporate governance, internal control assessment, and 
enhanced financial disclosure. 
5FEs can have a vast influence on a company's stock price. Several studies propose that positive FEs not only produces an immediate hike 
in a stock's price, but also to a gradual increase over time (Kinney, Burgstahler, & Martin, 2002; Skinner & Sloan, 2002). Hence, it is not 
surprising that some managers are known for regularly beating earning forecasts. This can even happen at the expense of having less 
long-term growth such as cutting R&D costs in order to increase the earnings and meet the forecasts. 
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The theories of forecasts management6 associated with this view have primarily modelled 
the forecasts as an opportunity that the managers will use to pre-empt litigation concerns, 
influence their reputation and produce positive FEs while simultaneously affecting stock 
prices (Burgstahler & Eames, 2006).  
For example, Baik and Jiang (1978) state that the company uses the earnings 
estimates to dampen the market expectations. They find that managers successfully reduce 
the expectations to an achievable level. In fact, by pre-empting bad news that results from 
negative FEs management reduces the expected cost of litigation. 
Similarly, Das et al. (2012) state that since stock prices are susceptible to managers 
forecasts, the management is likely to report a higher forecast.  On the other hand, stock 
price is highly susceptible to the managers FEs (Baik & Jiang, 2006; Das, Kyonghee, & 
Sukesh, 2008). Thus, the more negative the FE is (reported earnings is less than predicted 
earnings), the more it is conceived as a sign of bad news, and such bad news will most 
definitely lead to a dramatic fall of stock price (Bartov, Givoly, & Hayn, 2002; Kasznik & 
McNichols, 2002). In order to prevent such incident, the management is inclined to engage 
in practices like deliberately decreasing the forecasts, which is called producing downward 
                                                 
6 The word forecast management is a well-established term in the literature. Several seminal papers like  (Bernhardt & Campello, 2007), 
(Burgstahler & Eames, 2003), (Copeland & Marioni, 1972), (McVay et al., 2006) use the term forecasts management. Forecast 
management is the action through which the management reports their expectation of EPS at higher or lower levels than their actual 
expectation.   
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biased forecast, whilst increasing the reported profit, in order to beat forecasts and create 
positive FEs (Brown & Caylor, 2005; Gong, Li, & Xie, 2009; Kasznik, 1999a). 
In summary, the opportunistic view of Forecast Management (FM) is said to take 
place when the forecasted earning vary from the actual management expectation; that is, 
when an agent fraudulently communicate private information. Such opportunistic view, 
however, fails to correspond to the revelation principle (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; 
Demski, 1998; Dye, 1988; Evans & Sridhar, 1996) and expectation adjustment hypothesis 
(Graham et al., 2005). This will be explained in the subsequent paragraphs. 
The Revelation principle states that any feasible equilibrium results of any feasible 
mechanism, however complicated, can be reproduced by a truth-telling equilibrium results 
of a mechanism under which the agents are required to state their private information (Dye, 
1988). In other words, when the revelation principle is valid, any balance that comprises 
non-truthful reporting (i.e., ones where forecasts management is happening) can always be 
ruled by one where truth telling is brought (Evans & Sridhar, 1996).  
Based on this principle, in the agent-principle model of the firm, in order for a 
rational communication strategy to be stimulated for an agent, the managers, acting as an 
agent, should reveal the correct private information to the market. Dye (1988, page 200) 
observes that "when the manager can communicate all dimensions of his private 
information to the shareholders, the Revelation Principle does indeed apply, and so no 
internal demand exists for manipulative reporting."  
According to the expectation adjustment hypothesis (Deegan & Unerman, 2006; 
Graham et al., 2005, p. 231), when the stock market expectation differs from the 
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management s expectation,  they (the management) will usually adjust that discrepancy 
using financial disclosures. This corresponds with the efficiency perspective which states 
that managers, acting as agents, are predicted to adopt the most efficiently reflective 
accounting methods to reflect their own performance (Farrell, 2005). 
Deegan and Unerman (2005) state that a great deal of positive accounting 
researches adopted the efficiency perspective. This perspective proposes that managers will 
choose to use a particular accounting method because it will most efficiently provide a 
record of how the organization actually performs. The managers will use forecasts to pass 
insider information to outsiders. In fact, by forecasting earnings, information asymmetry is 
reduced, leading to a reduction in the company s cost of capital (Lev and Penman, 1990). In 
this regard, Jensen and Meckling (2007) argue that the practice of providing true financial 
statements actually leads to real cost savings, as it enables organizations to attract funds at 
an overall lower cost. As a result of true and reliable financial reporting, external parties 
will have more reliable information about the resources and obligations of the organization, 
enabling the organization to attract funds at a lower cost that would otherwise be possible, 
which will increase the overall value of the organization (Xin, 2007). When the company s 
financial position is satisfactory, their inclination to convey a more positive information to 
shareholders will increase, and this will increase the management s prediction s frequency 
(Arya, Glover, & Sunder, 1998). Hence, issuing earnings prediction restricts the 
management s ability to conduct earnings management, i.e. they cannot manage earnings in 
a desirable direction. In fact, earnings forecasts actually lead to less earnings management 
(Cotter, Tuna, & Wysocki, 2010). This view is under efficiency perspective which will be 
broadly explained in chapter 2. 
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The opportunistic and efficiency views of the forecasts undertaken by the managers 
are completely different. In the efficiency view, it is assumed that by providing accurate 
forecasts, the management provides accurate information to the market, hence, restricting 
them to conduct earnings management. Thus, the forecasts are true. In contrast, the 
opportunistic view of forecasts is that the management s forecasts is made of biased signs. 
The managers will use earnings and forecasts management as means to make positive 
earnings surprise that will produce a short-term stock price increase, or inhibit its decrease. 
By using a framework that revelation principle holds, this research shows that as 
indicated by the companies growth capabilities, the analysts recommendations explain the 
difference in the behaviours of managers within both views. The research hypothesise that 
the management s decide to conduct FM to generate positive FE in certain circumstances 
but eschew FM when those circumstances are absent. More specifically, this research 
determines how the analysts recommendations of strong buy and strong sell can explain 
the manager s forecast management behaviour. 
When the company s financial situation is satisfactory and the company has growth 
capability (buy companies), management s inclination to convey positive (true) information 
to shareholders will increase, and this will increase the management s prediction s 
optimism ; (Hui, Matsunaga, & Morse, 2009; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Consistent with Dutta and Gigler s (2002) model, for buy companies, the forecasts 
convey the management s true expectation to the market that is followed by income 
increasing earnings management. However, for the sell companies, the forecasts do not 
convey true (or optimistic) information to the market, but, it is used to dampen the market 
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expectation so that the management can benefit from a positive stock price shock, which is 
the result of positive FE. 
This research highlights the factor relating to the companies growth status that 
influence the management s decision to report pessimistic forecast to produce positive FE 
when company s shares are recommended to sell, and generate optimistic forecast when 
company s shares are recommended to buy. More specifically, this research determines the 
ability of analysts recommendations (in terms of buy or sell recommendations) in 
explaining the reason behind FM.  
The importance of the problem is that while studies that consider opportunistic 
view of forecasts do not comply with the revelation principle, this thesis is going to address 
this problem using the model developed by Dutta and Gigler (2002) as a basis, in which the 
revelation principle is adhered to.  
In the agent-principal model, the revelation principle is of immense significance in 
the search for answers. The researcher have to only explore the group of equilibria 
characterized by inducement compatibility. That is, if the researcher needs to apply certain 
results or property, he might bound his exploration to procedures in which agents are set to 
disclose their private information to the principal that ensures that effect or property. If no 
such open and straight system occurs, no system can affect this result/property.  
In the agent-principal model, the principal intend to state their activities on the basis 
of information privately comprehended to the agent (management). For example, the 
principal want to know the right expectation about company s future performances. He is 
not able to study everything merely by referring to the agent released information, since it 
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is in the agent interest to misrepresent the truth. Fortunately, when the revelation principle 
is hold, the principal may create a game whose rules can impact agent to play the way that 
the information is not distorted. 
In the absence of revelation principle, the principal's dilemma would be hard to 
resolve. He would be required to to study all the feasible games and select the one that best 
effects other players' tactics. Moreover, the principal would have to draw conclusions from 
the management reports that can show false information to him. According to the revelation 
principle, the principal should only care about games where agents honestly report their 
private information. 
In Dutta and Gigler s (2002) model, the managers forecast is considered as a form 
of voluntary disclosure. Forecasts management is said to occur when the management 
issues forecasts that deviate from their actual expectation. This research considers the 
agent's private information regarding economic earnings and his capability to express them 
via earnings forecasts. Like the agency models of Christensen (2001) and Dye (2009), the 
true revelation of the self-reported information (earnings estimates) is implemented through 
reported accounting earnings. In this context, the reported accounting earnings thus serve a 
confirmatory role in disciplining the manager's earnings estimates. This modelling method 
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has a apparent advantage: it does not need a infringement of the Revelation Principle7 in 
order to make a need for forecasts management, and this is what most of opportunistic 
forecast management literatures failed to achieve. 
1.4 Research Questions 
Following the model developed by Dutta and Gigler (2002), in which forecast is 
considered as a tool for conveying true information and using the agency setting to 
characterise the association between the company s shareholders and the manager, the 
association between the companies growth capability and forecasts management will be 
tested. Following the study in Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003b) the companies growth 
capability is represented by analysts recommendations. The analysts recommendations 
come in the form of buy and sell recommendations to the investors in the stock market. 
That is, the analysts may recommend the investors to either buy or sell the stocks of the 
companies. It is assumed that the companies that the analysts recommend their stocks as 
buy (buy recommendations or buy companies) are the companies that have high growth 
capabilities and the companies that analysts recommend to sell (sell companies) are the 
companies that does not have high growth capabilities.  
                                                 
7As mentioned earlier, the revelation principle is important in finding solutions to the agent-principal model. By using this principal, if 
the researcher desires to apply some effect or property, he can limit his quest to mechanisms in which agents are eager to disclose their 
private information to the principal that has that effect or property. If no such direct and straightforward mechanism exists, no mechanism 
can apply this outcome/property. 
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Thus, the research questions of this study consist of the following questions: 
(1) Do the managers in sell companies manage the forecasted earnings downwards to a 
greater extent than buy companies? 
(2) Do the managers in sell companies have higher positive FEs than buy companies? 
(3) Do the managers in sell companies manage the forecasted earnings downward to 
achieve positive FEs?  
(4) Does the management of buy companies conduct income decreasing FM to achieve 
positive FEs? 
1.5 Objective 
The major objective of this research is to examine the effects of analysts 
recommendations (which represent the growth and non-growth companies) on the 
managers decisions towards FM. By understanding the factors influencing the managers 
behaviour towards FM, this research contributes in explaining the different views regarding 
the optimistic and pessimistic forecasts in previous studies. Accordingly, this research is set 
to determine whether the analysts recommendations can explain the reason behind the 
differences in the strategies that the managers choose in relation to forecasted earnings. 
More specifically, the aims of this research are as follows: 
(a) To examine whether management of sell companies tend to actively engage in 
managing the forecasted earnings downward compared to management of buy 
companies.  
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(b) To examine whether management of sell companies are more likely to achieve 
positive FEs than management of buy companies. 
(c) To examine the effect of the analysts recommendation on the managers 
decisions of producing downward biased forecasts to reach positive FEs. 
1.6 Significance of the Research 
In a literature review of FM, Hirst et al. (2008) concluded that predict 
characteristics appeared to be the least well-understood element of earnings estimates-both 
in terms of theory and empirical research - even if it is the element over which management 
has the highest control. 
Getting an improved grasp of the selections that the management make once they 
decide to issue an earnings forecast is an important direction for both theory development 
and empirical research (Beyer, Cohen, Lys, & Walther, 2010; Hirst et al., 2008). Therefore, 
chances exist for theory improvement on the selections that the managers make in relation 
to forecast qualities. As a result of less theories, it is no wonder that compared with the 
huge works on forecast predecessors and outcomes, relatively less studies assess how 
managers select the features of their earnings estimates. The absence of theory could 
explain why the studies that has been directed on forecast charactristics are relatively recent 
(at least relative to research on forecast antecedents and consequences) (Beyer et al., 2010; 
Hirst et al., 2008). Therefore, the reason this research is conducted is that while existing 
theories emphasizes informative characteristic of the forecasts, these theories have been 
followed by a mixed empirical findings about the nature of the forecasts. By considering 
the analysts recommendations as the factors that explains the managers behaviour towards 
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forecasted earnings, this research extends the understanding on the nature of forecasts and 
the role played by the analysts recommendations in influencing this behaviour.  
1.7 Scope of the study 
In the weak efficient markets, insider accounting information might affect the stock 
price before it is publicly released to the market. Therefore reported information does not 
significantly reflect the stock prices. However, in the efficient market, release of new 
accounting information affects the market expectation about the future performances 
(Epstein & Schneider, 2008). This creates an opportunity for the managers to manipulate 
the accounting information in an attempt to influence market expectations. Since the 
efficiency of U.S. market has been frequently confirmed by several researches (Fama, 
1998; Hirst et al., 2008; Li & Ding, 2008), this study focuses on the U.S. stock market. The 
semi-strong efficiency of the U.S. stock market provides a desirable sample to examine the 
management desire to manipulate the outsiders expectation, thus, the market chosen for 
sampling is New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).  
1.8 Summary 
This chapter explained the incidence of FM, as well as the views on forecasts 
management namely the efficiency and opportunistic perspectives. Following that, the 
chapter explains analysts recommendations as a factor that could explain the mixed 
findings thus far. I explained the research objective as determining whether the analysts 
recommendations can explain the reason behind the differences in the strategies that the 
managers choose in relation to forecasted earnings. Based on this research objective, I 
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explained the research questions. Finally I explained that the scope of the study is the US 
market.   
1.9 Chapter organization 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows.  The next chapter, Chapter 2 
discusses the history of forecasts management in U.S. along with the theories and empirical 
researches.  Chapter 3 explains the theoretical framework, hypotheses, and research 
methods used in the study.  Chapter 4 presents and discusses the empirical results.  Chapter 
5 concludes the overall results, acknowledges limitations inherent in the scope of study and 
research design and identifies additional potential issues for future research. 
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Chapter 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses some of the previous empirical findings on opportunistic and 
informative views of forecasts. The theories to support the opportunistic and informative 
views on managers forecasts are presented to explain why the companies that have 
different analysts recommendations are expected to behave differently toward issuing 
optimistic or pessimistic forecasts.  
Namely, revelation principle and the expectation adjustment hypothesis will be used 
to support informative forecasts, while also using the prospect theory and transaction cost 
theory to explain the management decision to meet forecasts and produce positive earnings 
surprises that have been documented in the literature. Furthermore, Dutta and Gigler s 
(2002) theoretical framework will be used to explain the behaviour of buy and sell 
companies.  
After explaining the theories, the chapter further highlights the main factors that 
affect the reliability of managers forecasts. Finally, this chapter concludes by highlighting 
some of the findings in the literature that support the presumed relationship of stock price 
and forecasts management.  
2.2 Voluntary Disclosure 
The SEC compels publicly traded companies to reveal specific information to the 
society. Instances of such compulsory disclosure are annual reports and earnings 
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announcements. Besides compulsory disclosures, companies voluntarily reveal material 
news to the society. An example of a voluntary disclosure is managers estimates of 
earnings. Previous literature documents several incentives for voluntary disclosure. 
Ajinkya and Gift (1984) examine if managers voluntarily predicted earnings to 
amend the market's anticipation of the company s future earnings. They present that 
managers willingly disclose private information, both good news and bad news, to the 
public to reduce the information asymmetry between management and investors. They 
further demonstrate that market responds to managers ' estimates and amend its anticipation 
of company s future earnings consequently. 
Trueman (1986) creates a model presenting that managers willingly issue forecasted 
earnings to indicate their ability to forecast future revenue. Trueman claims that the market 
assesses a company based on its manager s ability to predict future economic changes and 
the ability to amend the company s production plans for the future variations. This gives 
managers with inducements to reveal both good news and bad news immediately to 
increase the company s value, if there is no harm for creating an earnings forecast. 
Nagar et al. (2003) investigate whether stock price-based compensation produces 
motivations for managers to immediately reveal private information to the market. They 
claim and realize that managers with higher levels of stock price-based compensation are 
more possible to issue earnings projections, since stock mispricing could have a undesirable 
effect on their wealth. In addition, they realize that executives disclose both good news and 
bad news for the market immediately, since the market responds to good news predictions 
positively and interprets silence as bad news. 
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2.3 Managers Earnings Forecasts 
An extensive managers forecast literature has examined various issues relevant to 
managers forecasts. These studies have tested the elements of managers forecast 
accuracy, precision, venue, and timing, and consequences of managers forecasts for 
analysts, investors, and security prices. 
Baginski et al. (1993) show a relationship between the accuracy of managers 
earnings forecasts and their level of certainty. Managers who have a higher degree of 
certainty about earnings issue more accurate earnings forecasts. Likewise those incidents 
and environmental issues that contribute to uncertainty result in less accuracy and precision 
in managers earnings forecasts (Baginski, Hassell, & Wieland, 2011). 
Previous researches have focused on the association of managers prediction to 
financial analysts forecasts adjustments (Baginski & Hassell, 1990; Brushko, 2013), equity 
valuation (Baginski, 1987; Demers & Vega, 2013; Emami, Amini, & Emami, 2012; Knauer 
& Wömpener, 2011), auditor quality (Dhaliwal, Lamoreaux, Lennox, & Mauler, 2014; 
Knauer & Wömpener, 2011; Stein, 1998), earnings management (Kasznik, 1999b), and the 
influence on other companies in the industry (Baginski, 1987). 
Studies have examined the effect of prior managers forecast accuracy on investor 
expectations (Baginski, 1987; Hirst, Koonce, & Miller, 1999) and managers forecast as 
warnings in the face of earnings surprise (Kasznik & Lev, 1995). Hirst et al. (1999) provide 
evidence that investor expectations are influenced by prior managers forecast accuracy. 
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Most earnings projection studies fit into a three-stage model of voluntary disclosure 
developed by King et al. (1990). The first decision that managers need to make is whether 
to voluntarily reveal earnings projections or other information. The second choice in their 
model is whether to grant private forecast through analysts or used public channels. 
Communicating information with only analysts is precluded by Regulation Fair 
Disclosure thus this option and decision point is no longer a concern. The last decision in 
their model, tertiary choices regarding public forecast disclosure, is concerned with the 
details of the disclosure such as precision, venue, timing, and ancillary information. 
Early papers (Patell 1976, Ainkya and Gift 1984) showed that managers earnings 
forecasts move markets, i.e., are new information to the markets. Like other disclosures, 
both voluntary and compulsory, managers' earnings forecasts decrease information 
asymmetry and, consecutively, reduce investor uncertainty and ultimately lower the costs 
of capital to the company. 
The impact of management earnings forecasts to lower the costs of capital is of 
particular importance to companies (Hurwitz, 2012). Companies that have the greatest 
information asymmetry can benefit the most by reducing that asymmetry. On the other 
hand, the accumulation of the information required to make predictions is expensive. 
Arguably, the non-growth companies may be motivated to issue conservative and less 
optimistic earnings forecasts. This is because of the deficiency of the resources they have to 
manipulate the earnings in order to meet the forecasts.  
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2.4 Necessity of Managers Forecasts in Relation to Market Expectations 
It has been argued that the disclosure of managers forecasts of future profits or cash 
flows would be very advantageous to investors along with managers. The advantages are 
explained as follows: 
2.4.1.1 Importance of managers forecasts for security pricing 
Since investment decisions by management are made in the context of the 
expectations which they hold of the profitability of future operations, the disclosure of their 
forecasts would represent the essential information needed by investors. 
The release of company forecasts would supply investors with the advantage of 
management's knowledge of company operations, and its opinions of the future outlook for 
such operations. Market efficiency does not imply clairvoyance. Therefore, since much 
information concerning a company's future prospects and plans is not made public, it may 
be assumed not to be impounded already in share prices. Therefore, it may be argued that 
the publication of company forecasts would result in more efficient share prices (Cohen, 
Marcus, Rezaee, & Tehranian, 2011). Such stock prices will reveal more accurately the 
future outlooks of the company, and the worth of the company's shares. Patell (2006) 
examined the reaction of share prices to the voluntary disclosure of forecasts of annual 
earnings per share by 336 companies, and found that, on average, there was a significant 
share price reaction in the week when forecasts were disclosed. In fact, share price will 
adjust to the information content of the managers forecasts. Therefore, it can be said that, 
the public disclosure of information (like forecasts) which are relevant to investors' needs 
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might help prevent abnormal returns accruing to privileged individuals having access to 
inside information. 
2.4.1.2 Managers forecasts as performance benchmark 
A large body of accounting literature has established that analysts forecasts are 
important earnings benchmarks. Studies show that the market rewards firms for meeting or 
beating analysts earnings expectations (Bartov et al., 2002; Lopez & Rees, 2002). Another 
stream of accounting literature documents that voluntary managers forecasts, despite 
credibility concerns, cause analysts and the market to revise their expectations. In 
particular, evidence suggests that managers often use their disclosures intentionally to guide 
analysts expectations down (Cotter, Tuna and Wysocki, 2006; Baik and Jiang, 2006; and 
Li, 2008) if they believe these expectations are unattainable (Versano & Trueman, 2013). 
Libby and Tan (1999) study analysts reaction to short-horizon managers guidance 
with respect to bad news only and find that when managers provide guidance, analysts 
expectations of future earnings are higher than they would be without the guidance, thus 
implying that guidance has a positive impact on analysts forecasts.  
In a related study, Dhole, Mishra et al. (2010) evaluate the relative importance of 
managers forecasts and analysts forecasts as performance benchmarks especially when 
analysts and managers appear to disagree. They find that when managers forecasts and the 
subsequent analyst forecasts are different, although the market might view both the 
benchmarks as being important, the market s expectations are shaped more significantly by 
managers forecasts than by analysts forecasts. Finally they conclude that, the market treat 
managers forecasts as important performance benchmarks (Dhole et al., 2010). 
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Similarly, Caylor, Lopez and Rees (2007) find, in the context of analysts forecasts, 
that reporting a positive earnings surprise at the earnings announcement date is not 
necessarily the best disclosure strategy. Their results support Kahneman and Tversky s 
(1979) prospect theory. Moreover, Dhole, Mishra et al. (2010) state that  managers may act 
to meet or beat their own expectations, rather than the more recent analysts forecasts 
(Dhole et al., 2010). 
Similarly Pinello (2004) conjectures and finds evidence that analysts forecasts do 
not truly capture investors expectations, thus leading some credence to the claim that 
analysts forecasts are not the only performance benchmark. Similarly Das et al. (2010) 
find that the consensus analyst forecast routinely disagrees with managers forecasts. They 
find that this disagreement causes investors to discount the earnings surprise by as much as 
37%.  
Thus, it is believed that the disclosure of corporate plans and managers forecasts 
would provide investors with a better basis for assessing managerial performance. The 
market appears to treat managers forecasts as important performance benchmarks. In 
addition, the market s expectations appear to be shaped significantly by managers 
forecasts (Dhole et al., 2010). 
2.5 Managers Forecasts Beneficial to the Firm 
2.5.1 Returns Based Benefits of Managers Earnings Forecasts 
The previous discussion has indicated that managers earnings forecasts may lead to 
price changes in line with the news enclosed in the forecasts. While this suggests that 
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managers may use forecasts as a means to reveal their opinions, Ajinkya and Gift (1984) 
formalize this by suggesting an expectations adjustment hypothesis that claims managers 
use forecasts to change market expectations in the direction of their own beliefs in the 
events where expectations vary greatly. They examine the theory with analyst expectations, 
managers earnings forecasts and market returns. Their results verify the expectation 
adjustment hypothesis, offering proof for the idea that a major advantage of forecasting is 
to bring the market expectations in line with managerial expectations.  
Das, Kim and Patro (2008) further examine the capability of managers earnings 
forecasts to line up market and management expectations by considering returns shapes in 
periods following the forecasts. They provide evidence of a drift succeeding managers 
earnings forecasts that proposes the market does not properly accredit the information on 
the time of the forecasts. Nevertheless, they obtain firm support that the managers earnings 
forecasts were useful at decreasing the market reaction to the earnings surprise that 
happens at the time of the earnings announcement. 
Along with the Skinner and Sloan s (2002) proof of great negative market responses 
near earnings surprises, the current research shows managers earnings forecasts can benefit 
managers to keep away from market consequences.  
Likewise, Coller and Yohn (1997) emphasize on the period after release of 
managers earnings forecasts, but their research explores information asymmetry by means 
of bid-ask spreads. They realize that spreads grow up for to two days after the forecasts, but 
then fall and stay lower until the related earnings announcement. Therefore, along with 
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altering mean expectations, managers earnings forecasts seem to decrease asymmetry 
among market participants. 
A number of further researches also look at how managers earnings forecasts may 
alter the patterns of upcoming returns or other returns related elements. These researches 
try to develop the earlier discussed literatures by investigating formerly recognized returns 
events and then indicating ways wherein forecasts may influence the information 
environment and consequently the outline of returns. Choi, Myers, Zang and Ziebart (2008) 
indicate that the present period market returns are more reflective of upcoming performance 
for companies that report forecasts. They find this relation is greater for companies that 
report short-term/quarterly forecasts even after conditioning on reporting broader range of 
forecasts. Thus, not only can managers earnings forecasts pull understanding forward 
but it can be seen that reporting a longer term forecasts over different prospects seems to 
produce a greater insight for the market. 
Li and Tse (2008) choose a different method by investigating whether managers 
forecasts can influence the returns pattern produced by the post-earnings announcement 
drift . They find that announcing managers forecasts concurrent with reporting earnings 
considerably decreases the drift especially if the company has a history of previous 
accurate forecasts. Managers forecasts reported alone are less actual and in fact, produce 
an earnings flow themselves. Li and Tse (2008) presume that the way managers forecasts 
are reported with other information or reported separately makes a significant difference in 
their effect on returns flow.  
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Finally, Pownall and Waymire (1989) indicate the companies that report forecasts 
experience a smaller amount of information transmit from information events of other 
companies in their industry. This shows that reporting managers forecasts lets managers to 
guide the market more distinctly on the information belonging to their company, rather than 
to have the company considered as a harmonized part of the industry. 
In sum, these returns based papers indicate that managers forecasts can have an 
extensive effect on how investors see the firm. These effects are consistent with managers 
forecasts facilitating the market to recognize the broader range effects of present firm 
performance and at decreasing asymmetry among investors. Clearly, these abilities imply 
the managers forecasts are able to give important aids for managers trying to grow an 
updated set of investors.  
In spite of this sound proof, it is worthy to indicate that not all returns based 
researches realize a positive effect for managers forecasts. For instance, Rogers et al. 
(2009) investigate the effect on options volatility. They show that overall there is trivial or 
no effect. However, for managers forecasts that include negative news volatility may 
grow in line with the managers forecasts leading to market ambiguity. This is in line 
with Bushee and Noe (2000) who investigate the effect of disclosure on the whole (not only 
managers forecasts) and show that heightened quantities are related to greater consequent 
volatility and with catching the attention of investors who frequently churn the stock 
analyst associated benefits of providing managers earnings forecasts. 
Whereas majority of papers have aimed on investigating managers forecasts effect 
on share prices, there is also a literature that investigates the association between managers 
 30  
forecasts and analyst forecast errors. Because of the significant role of analysts in steering 
market expectations and as an audience for disclosure on the whole, it is helpful to extend 
an insight of how managers forecasts affect managers interactions with analysts. 
Cotter, Tuna and Wysocki (2006) indicate that it is more probable that managers 
provide forecasts when analyst are optimistic and when the analyst forecast diffusion is 
low. That is, managers forecasts are used to discontinue a strong analyst consensus of 
higher performance than management expects. They show that analyst react by rapidly 
adjusting their earnings expectations downward. Like a number of the returns based 
researches; this is another example that indicates how managers forecasts can be applied to 
help managers in adjusting poorly informed market views. However, it indicates that 
managers forecasts can offer an supplementary lever through also influencing analysts 
insights. 
In related research, Hutton (2005) compares companies that provide forecasts to 
those that do not. She shows that there are a number of motives managers give such 
forecasts, such as an earnings process that is fundamentally complicated or a great level of 
analyst following. All of the motives are in line with managers believing the necessity to 
capture the company s expectations when there is a set of concerned parties and the 
information is hard to forecast, in line with a management effort to effectively manage the 
company s information environment.  
Analyst forecasts are more precise for companies that guide, proposing that 
generally the practice leads to improved information in the market. In addition, the 
anticipations are more pessimistic, showing managers might be intentionally biasing the 
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forecast to raise the probability that they will meet or beat forecasts. Whilst such partiality 
is less than suitable from the essence of a completely informed market, it is probably a 
logical managerial reaction to the significant penalization to missing earnings expectations 
(Cheong & Thomas, 2013; Skinner & Sloan, 2002). Once more, this proof indicates 
managers efficiently utilizing forecasts to take the reins of the company s information 
setting. 
2.5.2 Litigation Linked Advantages of Disclosure 
Managers earnings forecasts are frequently regarded as a possible reason for 
lawsuit and experts often maintain that their advisors recommend not in favour of reporting 
any forecasts. Along with these circumstantial claims, the previous researches have 
established that managers earnings forecasts are more probable in areas with lower legal 
risk (Johnson, Kasznik and Nelson, 2001; Baginski, Hassell and Kimbrough, 2002).  
In spite of the proof of litigation risk preventing managers earnings forecasts, 
researches particularly investigating the role of litigation and managers forecasts indicate 
the managers forecasts may be a useful tool in handling lawsuit threat. Managers are 
expected to issue short term forecast to deter bad earnings news (Skinner, 1994; Soffer, 
Thiagarajan, and Walther, 2000). Although there is diverse evidence about whether the 
forecasts decrease the possibility of being called in a litigation (Francis, Philbrick and 
Schipper, 1994; Field, Lowry and Shu, 2005) they do decrease the extent and possibility of 
a pay-out when there is lawsuit (Skinner, 1997). Collectively, these studies propose 
managers forecasts show a significant role in lawsuit. In addition, they are additional 
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support of managers by means of management FEs control the firm s reporting setting and 
of its associated financial outcomes.  
In addition, the study conducted by Cornerstone Research proposes that lawsuits are 
caused by significant share price declines (Cornerstone, 2008). The discussion of 
management FE studies in earlier sections of this chapter has indicated it can produce more 
up-to-date and well-ordered market expectations of performance. This proposes that 
management FEs can prevent lawsuit by decreasing the likelihood of a significant stock 
price drop. 
2.6 Credibility of Managers Earnings Forecasts 
Credibility is a main issue in defining the market influence of managers earnings 
forecasts. Jennings (1987) indicated the market and analysts reactions to managers 
earnings forecasts are greatly linked. Namely, once analysts amend their own forecasts to 
be harmonious with managers earnings forecasts, the market is more expected to react as if 
the managers earnings forecasts are credible. This proposes some reliable, efficient 
procedure for verifying the basic reliability of managers earnings forecasts. 
Prior researches have demonstrated that managers who provide more accurate 
information are rated as more credible (Tan et al. 2002). Hirst et al. (1999) found that 
forecast form affected investors confidence in earnings forecasts, especially when 
managers were viewed as accurate in their prior forecasts. Moreover, prior research has 
shown that market and analyst reactions are stronger for firms that provide more accurate 
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forecasts (Baginski et al. 1993; Pownall et al. 1993; Bamber & Cheon 1998; Hutton & 
Stocken 2007; Ng, Tuna & Verdi 2008). 
2.6.1 Investor Reliance on Managers Forecasts 
There have been several studies which provide evidence concerning the relation 
between disclosure forthcomingness and management s reporting reliability in the short-
term (Libby and Tan 1999; Tan et al. 2002, Mercer 2005). All of these studies have found 
evidence which suggests that managers who provide more forthcoming disclosures are 
rated as more credible than managers who are less forthcoming. For example, Libby and 
Tan (1999) find that investors assessments of manager s integrity are higher when 
managers provide warnings about unexpected earnings. Similarly, Tan et al. (2002) found 
that in the short-term, managers who provide more accurate disclosures are regarded by 
analysts as more forthcoming, having greater integrity, and are regarded as more 
competent. Mercer (2005) found that in the short-term, managers who provided more 
forthcoming disclosure were rated by investors as more credible than those who did not. 
The next section describes manipulating the forecasts to affect the stock prices. 
2.6.2 Managing Forecasts to Affect Stock Prices 
Apart from manipulating forecasts to alleviate the litigation pressure from investors 
(section 3-5-2), another reason why managers engage more in forecast management is to 
manipulate stock prices. Kasznik and McNichols (1998) and Bartov et al. (1988) found that 
meeting expectations is beneficial for a firm s stock price, even after restraining the effect 
of earnings news in the season, and the day of reported earnings. One of the findings of 
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their research is that the earnings management that is done in the performance year, which 
is along the season or the year, has slighter effect on profit than the earnings news, which is 
revealed at the time of reporting earnings (Downing and Sharpe 2003). 
Furthermore, Das, Kyonghee, & Sukesh (1997) suggested that earnings 
management and expectation management, whether used together or interchangeably, will 
produce increase in stock prices. Beyer (2000) also showed that there is a great relation 
between forecasts, earnings and stock prices. He further showed that the balancing price for 
the company is a function of the management s forecast, reported earnings and the square 
of management earnings forecast error. Moreover, he shows that a firm's stock price is 
more sensitive to a firm s real earnings than to its management s forecast. Finally, he 
showed that after controlling for reported earnings and the degree of earnings surprises, at 
an earning reporting date, if the company has positive earnings surprise, the stock price will 
be higher than compared to the case in which the company has negative earnings surprises 
(Payne & Robb, 2000). 
In accordance with this view of earnings forecast leading to a decrease in the 
company s cost of capital, Frankel and McNichols and Wilson showed that when the 
company accesses the capital market, managers are more tempted to forecast earnings. 
Furthermore, Coller and Yohn (2002) discovered that stock ask and bids spread will 
decrease significantly in 21 days around the management earnings forecast date (Pinello, 
2004).  
Ahmed et al. (2005) documented that market participants, to some extent, are aware 
of managers intention to reverse unsatisfactory news in favour of optimistic news, which 
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agrees with the facts stipulated above. They found no evidence that investors systematically 
overvalue extreme accruals, and no evidence that the companies that avoid losses or income 
decrease has more extreme accruals than the others. Also Cormier & Martinez (1997) 
documented that in the year in which the company s reported earning is manipulated, 
French investors did not readjust the market value of the firm and reported earnings. This 
can weaken the market incentives that are behind earnings management. 
2.6.3 Information Surprise 
The surprise of the information contained in the forecast is the difference between 
the investor s current level of belief based on the information set currently held and the new 
information in the forecast. Surprise is a measure of the amount of information asymmetry 
among management and investors. 
Surprise also represents the maximum belief revision management expects to 
generate with its disclosure, since the purpose of its disclosure is to bring investors 
expectations in line with its own. Management s expectation that it can change beliefs is 
supported by studies in psychology that have found that a portion of a subject s opinion 
change is a function of the difference between the current beliefs a subject has and the 
beliefs advocated by a communicator (Hovland & Pritzker, 1957). Greater opinion changes 
occur when the difference between the subject s beliefs and the communicator s advocated 
message is larger. Surprise has also been referred to as the degree of conformity. 
The next section explains the information surprise that occurs when the 
management beats the previously reported forecast. 
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2.6.4 Importance of Positive earnings Surprises 
Reasons for empirically observed valuation consequences of positive earnings 
surprises have been pondered but left unsolved. Bartov et al. (2002) pose two likely reasons 
for the premium to meeting or beating forecasts. First, investors may be react excessively to 
occurrences of meeting or beating the forecast. In this case, Bartov et al. argue that a 
market adjustment should be perceived in following periods. However, they find no proof 
of a turnaround of the premium in following periods and thus reject investor overreaction as 
a possible justification.  
Bartov et al. (2002) instead argue for the alternative explanation that the firm s 
achievement in meeting or beating the forecast is informative in regard to upcoming firm 
performance. To support their argument, Bartov et al. document positive associations 
between meeting or beating the forecast and metrics of future firm performance (including 
return-on-assets, return-on-equity, and occurrence of losses, market-to-book-ratio, profit 
margin, and earnings growth). Bartov et al. claim that investors are sensible in the 
allocation of a premium to firms that meet or beat forecasts because the firm s present 
achievement is revealing with regard to upcoming performance. In making this implication, 
however, the writers suppose that investors are conscious of this practical consistency. 
Similarly, by considering annual numbers, Kasznik and McNichols (2002) claim 
that if firms that meet or beat the latest prediction have greater incomes in upcoming years 
and investors predict this, a reward to meeting or beating the forecast may solely be 
attributable to greater anticipated upcoming earnings. While Kasznik and McNichols 
(2002) verify that firms that meet or beat expectations have considerably greater earnings 
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forecasts and recognized earnings than firms that do not succeed to meet expectations, their 
results also imply that the market reward is incremental to the greater upcoming incomes 
that could reasonably be anticipated by shareholders based on past incomes. Caylor et al. 
(2003) present additional proof that the premium to meeting or beating the forecast can be 
only partially explained as a sign of upcoming performance. 
Bernhardt and Campello (2002) also speculate as to the rationality of investor 
reaction. They conclude that investors are systematically misled by expectations 
management and cannot distinguish between firms that manage forecasts down and those 
that do not. Their findings suggest that downward (upward) forecast revisions cause 
investors to underestimate (overestimate) earnings resulting in positive (negative) abnormal 
returns upon the announcement of earnings. In support of Bernhardt and Campello s claim 
that investors are fooled by expectations management, Bartov et al. s (2002) results suggest 
that firms that meet or beat forecasts through expectations management are associated with 
only a slightly lower premium than those that meet or beat forecasts via genuine means. 
Thus, market values are consistently greater for firms with positive earnings surprises even 
when the earnings target is achieved by dampening expectations (Kross, Ro, & Suk, 2011; 
Palmrose, Richardson, & Scholz, 2001). 
Management s earnings forecasts choice might weaken its fiduciary responsibility 
to its stockholders since accurate reporting might not be management s single incentive in 
reporting a forecast. Previous research advocates that management s choices to report 
earnings guidance are linked to its self-interest (Matsumoto, 2002) and could indicate its 
incentive to influence the overall market response to earnings news (Baginski, Hassell, & 
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Waymire, 1994; Bartov et al., 2002; Shivakumar, 2010; Zolotoy, Frederickson, & Lyon, 
2012). This proof is in harmony with concerns that have been raised that manager s 
preannouncement choices are one of the earnings games managers consider with the 
purpose of avoiding reporting earnings lower than estimated earnings (Brown & Pinello, 
2005; Campello, 2010; Cohen et al., 2011; Koch, Lefanowicz, & Shane, 2012). While the 
ethical literature identifies the ethically charged quality of earnings management (Arel, 
Beaudoin, & Cianci, 2011; Chen, Kelly, & Salterio, 2011; Kaplan & Ravenscroft, 2004; 
Merchant & Rockness, 1994), there has been less credit or knowledge of the ethical 
features of managements guidance choices. 
The next section will discuss the researches that consider the importance of meeting 
or beating forecasts. 
2.7 Importance of Meeting or Beating Forecasts 
Information in financial statements can facilitate investors investment decisions. 
One of the most critical items in financial statements is earnings. Prior literature has 
investigated the information content of earnings at earnings announcement and established 
that earnings convey new information to the market. Ball and Brown (1968) conduct a 
seminal study that examines the role of earnings in the stock market and find a positive 
association between unexpected earnings and abnormal returns. The line of research that 
followed explored the relation between earnings and market reactions in terms of the 
magnitude of earnings surprises and examined whether the magnitude of earnings surprises 
varies across firm characteristics, such as earnings persistence, market risk, growth and so 
forth (Kormendi and Lipe, 1987; Easton and Zmijewski, 1989; Collins and Kothari, 1989). 
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The underlying reasoning behind this line of research hinges on valuation models; that is, 
investors have expectations about firms future performance and earnings surprises provide 
incremental information for investors to revise their beliefs. For example, if earnings 
surprise is positive, the investors may expect a firm to generate higher cash flows than they 
previously believed. In such case, the investors would revise their expectations on this 
firm s future cash flows upward, which results in a positive market response to this firm. 
On the other hand, if a firm announces lower earnings than the investors expected, the 
investors would lower their expectations about this firm s future cash flows. In such case, 
the market would react negatively to this firm. Indeed, the extant literature indicates that the 
sign of earnings surprise is an indication of firms future performance. Bartov et al. (2002) 
provide evidence that firms that meet or beat expectations have higher growth in sales, 
return on equity and return on assets than firms that fall short of forecasts. Kasznik and 
McNichols (2002) show that future earnings are higher for firms that meet or beat forecasts 
than for firms that miss expectations. In addition, Feng (2004), using a signalling model, 
finds that firms that meet or marginally beat forecasts outperform firms that beat or miss 
forecasts by a larger margin in the future performance. She argues that this finding, given 
earnings management is costly to managers, is a result of managers signalling their private 
information to the market by meeting or slightly beating expectations. 
On the other hand, missing to meet the expectations could put the management in 
the danger of litigation. As a result, managers with bad earnings news tend to pre-disclose 
information to reduce the risk of litigation because it spreads the stock price shock over 
multiple dates (Skinner, 1994; (Kasznik & Lev, 1995)).  
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Consistent with this issue, Trueman (1997) indicates that good news information is 
expected to be more accurate than bad news information. He argued that bad news 
disclosures have both a constructive impact of lessening the likelihood of litigation and a 
undesirable effect of diminishing the company's share price, therefore the manager balances 
these effects by selecting an incorrect disclosure. However, since there are only positive 
consequences of good news, the manager favors full disclosure. Consistent with this 
rationale, Skinner (1994) indicates that bad news disclosures is likely to be qualitative 
whereas good news disclosures is likely to be point or range estimates. Since managers 
forecast is a kind of information disclosure, both studies are in line with my hypotheses that 
bad news managers forecasts are more pessimistically biased than their good news 
equivalents. Hurwitz (2001) contend that optimistic good news managers forecasts entice 
litigations, but pessimism in bad news managers forecasts assists in reducing rather than 
increasing litigation risk. As a result, managers may issue more credible (less optimistic) 
forecasts to reduce expected litigation costs and to restore investor confidence (Zhu, 2010). 
2.8 Disadvantages of Forecasts Management 
2.8.1 Managerial Opportunism and Managers Earnings Forecasts 
While Krehmeyer, Orsagh et al. (2006) and the related papers mainly concentrate on 
managers earnings forecasts effect on myopia, the empirical literature has also considered 
whether managers utilize forecasts as a mean for self-improvement both via planned trading 
or influencing options prices. In general, literature proposes that there are concerns of 
managers opportunism around managers earnings forecasts. Insider trading likely 
represents the main capacity for managers opportunism.  
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In relation to this, Penman (1982) indicates that managers plan their trades in the 
vicinity of forecasts in a way that is in accordance with trying to advantage from their 
insider information concerning the future disclosure. Utilizing larger samples with more 
recent data, researches have been capable to improve this awareness to indicate that 
management speculation is expected to happen through deliberately planning trades to 
follow managers earnings forecasts and that managers are more expected to be engaged in 
buys that seem opportunistic than in opportunistic sales (Noe, 1999; Cheng and Lo, 2006). 
Along with open trading in the market, some researches show that managers might 
use their power to plan when a forecast happens in a self-interested approach. Aboody and 
Kasznik (2000) find that bad news forecasts occurs before option award periods while good 
news forecasts are normally suspended until the award has happened. Apparently, such 
scheduling would raise the ultimate anticipated worth the option will give to the manager. 
In an analogous way, managers seem to boost the usage of good news forecasts if they are 
taking part in selling in a secondary stock offering, albeit there is no indication of raised use 
of managers forecasts to assist secondary offerings in general (Frankel, McNichols and 
Wilson, 1995; Marquardt and Wiedman, 1998). 
2.8.2 Fraud and Managers Earnings Forecasts 
The Krehmeyer, Orsagh et al. s (2006) study and many observers highlight the 
likely role of extreme market expectations pushing managers on the way to committing 
counterfeit. These spectators mention that if such a relation be existent and if managers 
earnings forecasts raise more attention on short term market prospects, then the forecasts 
might be part of the cause to these huge frauds. Several of these persons contend that the 
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high costs of cheatings such as Enron or WorldCom basically eliminate any of the overall 
benefits from managers earnings forecasts that were explained in the earlier sections of 
this chapter.  
Unfortunately, the research findings can add a small amount of hard evidence to this 
discussion. These substantial deceptions are fairly uncommon in numbers. However, their 
huge costs leave such deceptions being crucial. In addition, every single fraud has exclusive 
features that make it unlike from previous frauds. Therefore, it is difficult to accumulate a 
large collection of data that affords clear study plan. Moreover, even after the event it is 
difficult to settle on what triggered a deception or even the real degree of the fraud.  
For instance, although there were a lot of writings on Enron and much debate, the 
degree and roots are yet subject of dispute (see for example, Salter, 2008). 
The best related big sample empirical evidence that can be considered is Kasznik 
(1999) which indicates that managers are expected to manipulate earnings (via accruals) 
with the intention of meeting the expectations determined in a managers forecast of 
earnings.  
Although these companies did not carry out the enormous aforementioned frauds, 
they definitely have attempted a slimy incline that is not advantageous for everyone 
included in the markets. All over again, there is the caution that these managers may be 
reacting to an ex-ante market attention on short term performance for their companies, and 
therefore would manipulate to some kind of target. 
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Further than scholar suggestion, one can also ponder the opposing claim that 
managers earnings forecasts let managers to better manage expectations concerning their 
firm and therefore may help to decrease the stress to meet some outer market prospects. 
Literature earlier considered in this chapter indicates that managers can amend market 
expectations through the use of forecasts. This expectations adjustment presents an 
substitute to financial manipulation (Matsumoto, 2002).  
In the next section, I explain the literature which relate to manipulative forecasts. 
2.9 Manipulative Forecasts 
In the opportunistic view in literature, managers deliberately manipulate forecasted 
and reported earnings. That is, managers intentionally conduct forecast management to 
misguide external stakeholders. 
McGee, who is the head of quantitative research at Merrill Lynch, expresses the 
whole scenario through this short sentence in Wall street Journal "Investor-relations people 
have been making sure the hurdle of expectations remains low so their companies can clear 
it easily".8 
The underlying issue that is also behind McGee s concern is that the management 
may prefer short-term profitability, as opposed to a long term one. Stein (2009) illustrates 
                                                 
8 McGee, S. 1997. As stock market surges ahead, 'predictable' profits are driving it. Wall Street Journal, May 5. 
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the idea that short-sighted managers care more about operation and the share prices of their 
business in the short-range, even at the cost of long-term profits. In addition, Stein (2009) 
states that due to their benefit agreements, managers tend to be less diversified, and a 
significant part of their revenue and wealth is frequently in the form of share and share 
options. Since they face liquidation requirements, they are more concerned about the 
company s stock price in the short range. Moreover, even when managers do not want to 
sell some of their shares in near future, managers cash compensation, such as bonuses, in 
every period might be a function of the share price by the end of that period. 
There have been some regulations to date that address these concerns. For example, 
Gong et al. (2003) states that one of the significant effects of Sarbanes Oxley (2002) 
(SOX), that was ratified after the scandals of Enron and WorldCom, was to limit the 
earning management of U.S. companies, with Bartov and Cohen (2009) mentioning that as 
a result of the SOX (2002) regulation, the intention to meet or beat analysts expectations 
decreased in the post SOX period.  
2.9.1 Managing Forecasts and Reported Earnings to Produce Positive Earnings 
Surprises 
Despite the regulations that are imposed to limit manipulative disclosure, 
researchers express concerns over managers using their forecasts to strategically manage 
the analysts consensus forecasts (Hochberg, Sapienza, & Rgensen, 2009). For instance, 
Frost (1989), Koch (2002) and Rogers and Buskirk (1997) claimed that Several stimulus 
elements is capable of inducing managers to intentionally tailor their prediction of earning 
to inflate market expectations. Also Graham et al. (2007) state that managers are worried 
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about the stern market response for losing investors and analysts earnings anticipations, 
and are eager to make minor or moderate economic forgoes to meet those anticipations.  
Similarly Brown & Caylor (2002) and Dechow et al. (2009) reported that since the 
mid-1990 s, managers are generally worried about meeting or beating analysts consensus 
earnings forecasts. Other Survey-based studies in Britain (Brown & Caylor, 2005) and the 
United States (Bundy, 2007) also show that meeting expectations is considered a 
fundamental target for the management. Cotter, Tuna, & Wysocki (2003) tries to clarify the 
management s attempt to meet the analysts forecasts in a different way, by explaining that 
since the management try to manage the analysts forecasts downward, bad-news forecasts 
are positively associated with the analysts optimism. 
On the other hand, Burgstahler and Dichev (1998) found that the management 
manipulate reported earnings in order to make a slight positive threshold. Degeorge, Patel 
and Zeckauser (1996) extend Burgstahler and Dichev (1998), finding both of the zero 
forecast error and previous year earnings as important benchmarks that the management 
wants to surpass. The analysts consensus forecasts may be considered a target as well.   
Similarly, since the charges of missing forecasts are expected to be higher for 
overrates than for underestimates, Kasznik (2006) and Xin (2012) stated that in order to 
avoid negative earnings surprises and consequent market s severe negative reactions, 
managers can manage earnings expectation downward, while managing reported earnings 
upward. They argued that in recent years, as a result of strict regulations, managers shifted 
from doing earnings management to doing expectation  (forecast, guidance) management. 
In fact, recently, managers may use both income increasing earnings management or 
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downward expectation management to avoid negative earnings surprises. The Kasznik 
finding is in contrast with Dutta and Gigler (2002), who state that through the collective 
roles of forecasts and earnings, more accurate information is effectively conveyed to the 
market. 
Other studies also show that managers forgo long-term growth and long-term 
appreciation to avoid short-term negative earnings surprises (Cotter, Tuna, & Wysocki, 
2006; Das et al., 2008; Kasznik, 1999a). This is consistent with the anecdotes that 
managers are aware of the analysts expectations, and sometimes go out of their way to 
avoid missing benchmarks (Sun & Xu, 2012). 
More recently, Bennett & Bradbury (2001) found that companies that are right 
above the benchmarks have normal receivables, inventories and provisions.  However, they 
increase cash from customers and decrease inventories. Other studies (Payne & Robb, 
2000) highlighted the fact that the management manipulates earning to reduce their forecast 
error in the earnings announcement date. Finally, they concluded that in companies with 
irregular cash flows, the stock price is highly sensitive to their forecasted earnings, and the 
management tend to reveal the forecast for such companies, and consequently reduce 
forecast error through earnings management (Payne & Robb, 2000).  
Other researchers suggest that companies engage in real actions to meet the 
benchmarks (Bennett & Bradbury, 2010; Beyer, 2009; Brown, 2001; Bundy, 2007). Barua 
et al. (2006) stating that the tendency to meet a benchmark in a profitable or non-profitable 
company is the result of different accruals of management activities. Similarly, Das, Kim 
and Patro (1997) found that the Expectation management has an important impact on the 
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earnings management, but the opposite does not hold. That is, there is recursive relationship 
between the expectation management and earnings management. Moreover, Dutta and 
Gigler (2002) showed that the management generally tends to manage earnings to meet 
expectations, and will particularly tend to manage earnings with regards to their forecasts. 
2.9.2 Forecasts Management Instead of Earnings Management 
Certain researchers place emphasis on the forecast management, rather than on 
earnings management. For example, Kross et al. (2011), suggest that meet or beat firms 
are more likely to issue bad news forecasts. In addition, Dechow et al. (2009), Coulton et 
al. (2006), Beaver et al. (2005) and Durtschi & Easton (2005) doubted whether the 
experienced kink in the distribution of earnings is solely caused by earnings management. 
They further state that forecast management could also be used along with earnings 
management.   
For example, Gong et al. (2003) indicated that when the mandatory (such as accrual 
reporting) and voluntary (such as management earnings forecast) reporting of a manager 
are under the influence of the management s subjectivity, similar to the mandatory reported 
information, voluntarily disclosed information may contain bias, and such biases will 
potentially reduce the value of the information of voluntary disclosure.  
Similar to Gong et al. (2003), (Beaver, McNichols, & Nelson, 2006) finds that the 
management s forecast contains significant error in relation to historical return of the stock. 
They suggest that the management cannot incorporate information about past stock prices 
into their forecasts. However, Hirst et al. (2012) consider stock prices as an antecedent of 
forecast management. They believe that stock prices influence the management s incentive 
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towards issuing a forecast. Managers with strong incentives tied to the firm s stock price (a 
forecast antecedent) are viewed as issuing self-serving forecasts (Correia, Flynn, Uliana, & 
Wormald, 2010). However, various levels of managerial incentives, such as equity-based 
compensation, occur through firms and time. Specially, equity-based compensation 
accounted for less than 20% of a CEO s compensation in 1980, but rose to nearly 50% by 
1994 (Durtschi & Easton, 2005), and grew even higher to nearly 60% by 2003 (Beaver et 
al., 2006). 
Consistent with Beyer s (1998) finding that the stock market is, on average, more 
susceptible to reported earnings than to the analyst's forecasts, Bergman & Roychowdhury 
(2005), Cotter et al. (2003) and Matsumoto (2008)  argue that the recent fad in forecast 
pessimism is frequently explained as the result of the management s wish to use their 
earnings forecasts as a way to walk-down market earnings prospects.  Managers purposely 
report pessimistic forecasts that, in turn, cause market participants to dial down their 
expectations. Even though this behaviour generates bad-news from the managers forecasts, 
it later produces an simpler benchmark to meet or beat when the actual earnings are 
reported (Hirst et al., 2008). Such a view is more consistent with opportunism than to 
informative forecasts, because in this view, the management s forecast does not convey the 
management s true expectation to the market. Bergman and Roychowdhury (2005) finds 
that for short-range forecasts that are optimistic in nature, managers incline to walk-down 
analyst forecasts to realized earnings.  The next section presents the theories that are behind 
the opportunistic perspective.  
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2.9.3 Theoretical Arguments: Producing Positive Earnings Surprise 
As mentioned earlier in section 1.1, the Positive Accounting Theory assumes that 
all actions by all individuals, including the management (as agent), are driven by self-
interest. Since the management s compensation is either in the form of cash bonus on any 
increases in the share price, options, or shares in the firm (Farrell, 2005), the increase in 
stock prices is in the management s best interest. According to the prospect theory and 
transaction cost theory, the management increase stock prices by beating expectations. This 
phenomenon is best illustrated by explaining the prospect theory and transaction cost theory 
in the next two sections. 
2.9.3.1 Prospect Theory 
According to Kahneman and Tversky (2007), the prospect theory assumes that 
decision-makers stem value from gains and losses with regard to wealth reference points, 
rather than from certain levels of wealth. The Prospect theory can be used to justify why 
managers produce downward biased forecasts to create positive earnings surprises. The 
reason is that investors compare the reported earnings to a reference point, and that 
reference point could easily be the earnings forecasts.   
In addition, the prospect theory suggests that the individuals' value functions are 
concave in profits and convex in losses (S-shaped). In other words, the value functions are 
sharpest around the wealth s reference points (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997).  Making the 
earnings forecasts as reference points will clearly demonstrate why it is important for 
managers to actually reach forecasts. This is because the value of the function is steepest 
around the forecasts. Therefore, for a given rise in wealth, the related growth in value is 
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highest when the rise in wealth moves the individual from a loss to a gain, in relation to the 
reference point.   
The Prospect theory has been confirmed by several empirical studies in the field of 
forecasts management. For example, Rogers and Stocken (2010) found that the market 
behaves as if good news are less credible than bad news. Similarly, Williams (2002) argues 
that good news forecasts are not as reliable as bad news forecasts. Hutton et al. (2003) also 
contend that bad news forecasts are fundamentally more realistic than good news forecasts. 
Keeping in mind that investors consider bad news from negative earnings surprise 
as credible and consequently adjust the stock price downward, the management of both buy 
and sell companies prefer to avoid negative earnings surprises. This is consistent with 
Burgstahler and Dichev s (1997) argument on managerial opportunistic behaviour theory, 
which is about the motivation to the manager in avoiding income decreases or losses. 
Consistent with this theory, Burgstahler & Dichev (1997) reported that the management 
uses cash flow from operations and fluctuations in working capital to accomplish the 
manipulation of earnings and avoid negative earnings surprises. This is consistent with the 
assumptions of the transaction cost theory, which will be explained in the next section, 
when investors use heuristics to determine terms of transaction with the firms; by avoiding 
negative earnings surprises, the companies will face lower costs when transacting with 
stakeholders. 
2.9.3.2 Transaction Cost Theory 
The expectation for the behaviour of the companies to meet forecasts (esp. sell 
companies) is consistent with the assumptions of the transaction cost theory, where it 
 51  
attempts to justify why firms exist, and why they enlarge or outsource certain operations. 
The transaction cost theory assumes that firms attempt to decrease the costs of trading 
capitals with the surroundings, and that firms also try to minimize the administrative costs 
of exchanges internally. Firms are hence balancing the costs of trading capitals with the 
surroundings compared to the administrative costs of performing operations internally. 
The theory perceives organizations and marketplace as diverse potential forms of 
forming and managing economic dealings. When the external contract costs are greater 
than the firm s internal administrative expenses, the firm will expand, as the company is 
able to do its actions at lower costs, than if the operations were done in the market. 
Conversely, if the administrative expenses for organizing the action are greater than the 
exterior operation costs, the firm will be downscaled. According to Ronald Coase (1979), 
every firm will enlarge provided that the firm's operations can be done at lower cost in-
house, than by e.g. contract out the operations to outside suppliers in the market. 
According to Williamson (1996), a transaction cost occurs "when a good or a 
service is transferred across a technologically separable interface". Thus, the transaction 
costs occur whenever a service or product is being moved from one phase to another, where 
new groups of technical skills are required to create a service or product. Thus, if firms 
perceive the high environmental insecurity, they might select not to outsource or 
interchange capitals with the surroundings. 
The Transaction cost theory is built on the next two postulations (Burgstahler & 
Dichev, 1997). 
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The first assumption is that companies with greater incomes incure lower costs in 
transactions with stakeholders (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997). Cornell and Shapiro (1937) 
suggest that the worth of stakeholders' inherent rights (which is exactly connected with the 
market value of the company) is susceptible to the news regarding the company's financial 
situation. More explicitly, Bowen et al. (1981), discusses motivations to report greater 
earnings with regard to customers, employees, lenders, suppliers, and other stakeholders. 
Examples of encouragements to report greater profits include customers who are eager to 
give a better price for goods as the company is expected to award inherent guarantee and 
service obligations. Suppliers propose finer conditions, since the company is more probable 
to pay for present buys and likewise since the company is more expected to have greater 
upcoming buys. Creditors will suggest superior conditions since the company is less 
probable to either avoid or postpone loan payments. Moreover, precious staffs are less 
probable either to leave or to request higher wages in order to stay. 
The second notion is that interested parties use heuristics to decide the conditions of 
dealings with the company. The use of heuristics rises as a reaction to information costs in 
financial models (Cornell & Shapiro, 1987). When it is expensive for stakeholders to 
process complete information concerning incomes for all of the companies with which they 
cope with implicitly and explicitly, some stakeholders use heuristic cut-offs like earnings 
forecasts. Although the focus for such information processing heuristic theory is on the 
stakeholders, since the stakeholders focus on reported earning, forecasts and stock price to 
form their expectation for companies future profitability and growth, this provides enough 
incentives for the management to create positive forecast error and increase stock prices. 
Consistently, Matsumoto (2008) state that as easily accessible from several sources (e.g., 
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First Call, Zacks, I/B/E/S), earnings surprises are a straightforward, valid heuristic on 
which to found trades, and institutional investors are expected to respond sturdily to 
negative earnings surprises. The fact that the management of both buy and sell companies 
like to have positive forecast errors is in line with the information processing heuristic 
theory. Therefore, earnings forecasts are considered as important benchmarks for managers. 
2.9.4 The use of Prospect Theory and Transaction Cost Theory to Explain 
Management Incentive to Produce Positive Earnings Surprises 
Applying prospect theory to the investors task of judging firm value, the earnings 
expectation immediately preceding receipt of an earnings signal is the relevant reference 
point (Pinello, 2004). For example, the relevant reference point when evaluating a revised 
forecast would be the earnings expectation immediately prior to receipt of that revised 
forecast (i.e., the initial forecast). By contrast, the relevant reference point when evaluating 
actual earnings would be the most recent expectation (i.e., the revised forecast).
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Individuals are loss averse because their dislike for losses exceeds their like for equivalent 
gains. Losing $10 yields more displeasure than gaining $10 yields pleasure.  
2.10 Forecasts Management Decreases Information Asymmetry (Efficiency 
Perspective) 
In contrast to the view that managers deliberately manipulate forecasted and 
reported earnings and intentionally conduct forecast management to misguide external 
stakeholders, there is an informative view in literature in which managers issue forecasts to 
alleviate information asymmetry.  
In the informative view of forecasts management, management will manage 
earnings in order to reduce information asymmetry. In fact, by doing so, the management 
discloses more information to the external stakeholders. Hui, Matsunaga and Morse (1983) 
state that using forecasts as a voluntary information disclosure tool is an important 
component of the firms informational environment. 
Likewise, Hirst, Koonce, and Venkataraman (2012) proposed that since 
management earnings forecasts passes the manager s insider information to the 
stockholders, it reduces the information asymmetry and precludes costly stockholder 
litigation against the firm. Therefore, it increases the firm s stature as a disclosure of 
transparent information (Irani & Karamanou, 2003). Further, Dutta and Gigler (2002) state 
that in previous theories of earnings management, the reported earnings were modelled in 
such a way that it was perceived as a message from the management to communicate the 
true earnings to the shareholders in the principal agent context.  
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In addition, Lennox and Park (1995) argue that the managers theoretically use 
earnings forecast to reduce information asymmetry. Other studies also showed that the 
managers forecast reduces the information asymmetry either between the manager and the 
investors, or between different groups of investors.  For instance, Ajinkya and Gift (2005) 
found that the management predicts earnings with the purpose of manoeuvring the 
investors expectation about future profits towards management s belief. 
Kasznik and Lev (1995) used the degree of earning surprise as a gauge for 
information symmetry. They found that when negative earnings surprise is larger, it is more 
likely that managers predict bad news. However, he found no relation between positive 
earnings surprises and managers forecasting of good news. Consistent with Kasznik and 
Lev s result, Hui, Matsunaga and Morse (1983) concur that since managers forecasts can 
replace conservatism, such a replacement can be considered as a sign of usefulness to 
managers forecasts. They interpreted their result as managers transferring information to 
the stockholders either by conservatism, or by managers forecast. Similarly Hui et al. 
(2009) documented that accounting conservatism acts as a substitute for management 
earnings forecasts. However, in their recent study by differentiating between informative 
and non-informative forecasts, Jaggi and Xin (2006) found that conservatism serves as a 
substitute only for informative management earnings forecasts that reduce information 
asymmetry and not for non-informative forecasts that do not reduce information 
asymmetry. 
Clarkson, Dontoh, Richardson and Sefcik (1995) and Jog and McConomy (2012) 
investigated why some Canadian companies that have Initial Public Offerings (IPO) 
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forecast future earnings in their prospectuses, while others do not. Their results showed that 
voluntary forecast is a sign of good news, and is conveyed as such to the participants. 
Voluntary forecasts, that includes managers forecast has an important effect on 
information asymmetry.  
2.10.1 Relationship of Forecasts and Future Earnings Management 
Some researchers regard issuing forecasts as restricting management to be incapable 
of conducting earnings management. For example, Dutta and Gigler (2002) showed that, if 
the management is asked to make a forecast, it will inadvertently hamper their ability to 
conduct earnings management.  They argue that because of the collective roles that 
forecasts, along with manipulated reported earnings play in conveying extra information on 
management expectation to stockholders, it might not be in the best interest of the 
stockholders to restrict earnings management. In addition, Dutta and Gigler (2002) show 
that issuing forecasts has endogenous benefits to stockholders in restricting earnings 
management, and there is an endogenous cost for the manager to miss the forecasts. Finally 
Dutta and Gigler (2002) propose an optimal contractual based framework, in which the 
forecast causes restriction on earnings management,  there is an endogenous benefit of 
voluntary forecast for shareholders. Furthermore, in that framework, there are endogenous 
costs for managers for not reacting to forecasts. 
In contrast to Dutta and Gigler (2002) that shows forecasts and consequent earnings 
management having a collective role of conveying extra information on management 
expectation to investors, Athanasakou, Strong and Walker (1992) found that there is no 
positive relation between abnormal income increasing working capital accruals and the 
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probability of meeting or beating the analyst s forecasts. That is, the management do not 
manipulate earnings to concur with previously forecasted profit. The finding that there is no 
relationship between forecasts and earnings management contradicts Dutta and Gigler s 
proposition that forecasts and earnings management plays a collective role in conveying 
management expectation to the investors.  
Lennox and Park (2006), Pinello (2004), Hurwitz (2012)  and Hirst et al, (2008) 
highlighted that by issuing forecast, the management reduces information asymmetry. 
However, after issuing forecasts, the extent to which the management uses accruals to 
convey its subjective information to shareholders is under the effect of the nature of 
activity, the type of industry and available accounting choices under Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) (Irani & Karamanou, 2003).  Finally, Diamond and 
Verrecchia (2003), Lennox & Park (2006) and (Pinello, 2004) stated that the reduction in 
information asymmetry will lead to an increase in liquidity and the reduction of the cost of 
the capital (Lennox and Park 2006). The next section presents the theories that support this 
view. 
2.10.2 Efficiency Perspective (Theoretical support) 
2.10.2.1 Expectation Adjustment Hypothesis 
After explaining the theories that justify the behaviour of sell companies, I now turn 
to the theories that justify the behaviour of buy companies. Firm managers forecast 
earnings for several reasons: The expectations adjustment hypothesis posits that 
managers issue forecasts in order to align the investors beliefs with their own (Graham et 
al., 2005; Hassell & Jennings, 1986). This is the underlying theory of benevolent (truthful) 
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forecasts. Managers may also forecast to decrease information asymmetry in the market 
(Athanasakou, Strong, & Walker, 2009). While the management s ability to forecast 
accurately is a function of the quality of the firm s information systems, their willingness to 
align investor expectations more closely with their own depends on the management s 
incentives to forecast accurately (Hutton & Stocken, 2009). This shows that the 
management s incentive is imperative in forecast accuracy. 
Presuming that the management pursues to line up market expectations with their 
own expectations (see Ajinkya & Gift, 1984), it is precisely correct when the management 
conveys extreme news. A favourable forecasting reputation results from a favourable track 
record, which is most helpful for enhancing forecast credibility, and as it will be explained 
later in the next chapter, the buy companies are supposed to be the companies that have 
strong financial position and high expected future growth, and I hypothesize that the 
expectation adjustment hypothesis is true for buy companies, making it consistent with the 
revelation principle. 
2.10.2.2 Revelation Principle 
The Revelation principle posits that any likely balanced result of any viable mechanism, 
however complicated, can be reproduced by a truth-expressive equilibrium result of a 
system under which the agents are inquired to state their private information (Hirst et al., 
2008). In other words, once the revelation principle is valid, any equilibrium that contains 
on-truthful reporting (namely one in which opportunistic forecasts management is taking 
place) can always be weakly dominated by one where truth telling is induced (Beyer et al., 
2010).  
 60  
The Revelation principle was first introduced by Gibbard (1991) and were later 
expanded by Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin (1990), Holmstrom (1973), 
and Myerson (1979). The revelation principle, which states that there is no loss of 
generality in restricting the analysis to truth telling and full disclosure equilibrium, was 
invoked to address asymmetric information, in which the truth is instrumental in the 
implementation of efficient allocation (Gibbard, 1973; Holmstrom, 1977). 
Based on the revelation principle, for any principle agent model, any equilibrium of 
a rational communication strategy for economic agents can be simulated by an equivalent 
incentive-compatible direct-revelation mechanism. In other words, the revelation principle 
states that any equilibrium outcome of any mechanism, however complex, can be replicated 
by a truth-telling equilibrium outcome of a mechanism under which the agents are asked to 
report their private information to the principal (see, for example, Myerson (1979)). Hence, 
when the revelation principle holds, the performance of any mechanism under which 
managers engage in manipulated reporting can be replicated by a mechanism under which 
the managers will report truthfully. 
Based on this principle, in the agent-principle model of the firm, in order for a 
rational communication strategy to be stimulated for an agent, the management, acting as 
an agent, should reveal the correct private information to the market. Dye (1988, page 200) 
observes that "when the manager can communicate all dimensions of his private 
information to the shareholders, the Revelation Principle does indeed apply, and so no 
internal demand exists for manipulative reporting."  
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The revelation principle s assumptions are related to communication, the contract 
form, and commitment. It assumes that communication is not blocked (it is costless to 
establish communication channels that allow the agents to fully report their private 
information), the form of the contract is not restricted, and the principal can commit to use 
the reports submitted by the agents in any pre-specified manner. 
Interestingly, many researchers that have focused on inaccurate reporting have 
started to build models that guarantee the revelation principle does not hold. Although this 
does not ensure the non-truthful equilibrium will be optimal, it will at least open the 
possibility. 
However, literature on earnings and forecasts management show that there are 
violation to the assumptions of the revelation principle. There have been three distinct 
approaches where researchers have combined elements intended to evade the revelation 
principle. Some of these violations and their consequences are elaborated in the subsequent 
sections. 
The most straightforward way to circumvent the revelation principle is to 
exogenously limit the agent's capability to convey their information. On the other hand, 
several models set limitations on the principal's ability to utilize the information, such as by 
needing the principal utilize an agreement with a pre-defined form (for instance, piece-wise 
linear). Lastly, the researchers have loosened the assumption that there is pre-obligation as 
to in what way the agent's report will be utilized. These three ways of violation of the 
revelation principles are explained in the following paragraphs. 
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Inability of the agent to communicate well - Communication limits and costs may link 
either to the restrictions on the manager's ability to provide, or restriction on the ability of 
the manager to properly convey their information. When any sort of communication 
constraint exists, it is likely that non-truthful reporting occurs (Beyer et al., 2010). The 
violation of the communication assumptions will also occur if there are immediate costs of 
reporting the "truth". For instance, assume the "unmanaged" earnings number includes 
noises that the manager can perceive. However, it is expensive to take measures to 
eliminate the noises. The principal can only perceive the final report, but not the initial 
earnings number, or whether the manager has interfered to remove the noise (Beyer et al., 
2010). Verrecchia (1986) indicates that it is advantageous to allow the managers 
themselves choose when to eliminate the noises. Essentially, it is very expensive for the 
principal to persuade the manager to continually suffer the cost of noise removal. 
The other kind of communication constraint is that the agent cannot completely 
convey the rich dimensions of their information. Managers often see very rich information 
sets that would be extremely hard and expensive to convey. Furthermore, the principal will 
usually not have the specialized capability to realize various aspects of the agent's 
information set. When these kinds of constraints exist on the manager's ability to provide 
information, the revelation principle fades almost by definition. Now, the reporting problem 
contains an aggregation dimension as well as a misstatement dimension. 
Dye (1988), Evans and Sridhar (2009), and Demski (1998) emphasis on settings in 
which the Revelation Principle does not hold because the agent is unable to fully 
communicate their private information.  
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According to Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003b) sell companies face constraints in 
manipulation of the profit as they don't seem to have new markets and high potential return. 
In addition the sell company s stock price sensitivity to earnings news is not high. Such 
commitments limit the sell companies to communicate the full dimensions of their 
information set to the market. Therefore, as shown in Dutta and Gigler (2002), and 
Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003b), due to the limitations of the resources that the sell 
companies have, they suffer from communication constraints. The limitations of the 
resources come in the form of a lack of new products, new markets, and the lack of 
lucrative investment opportunities. This is most logical as the lack of resources will render 
the sell companies unable to communicate the full dimensionality of their rich information 
set to investors through the manipulation of reported earnings. For this reason, sell 
companies are expected to have different approaches in transmission of information to 
investors compared to buy companies. 
Inability to pre-commit to how the information is used - The pre-obligation 
assumption is vital to the revelation principle due to the principal's assurance of "under-
utilize" the information is what gives the agent a motivation to disclose the reality. If an 
agent deems the information will be exploited against them, it turns out to be more 
expensive (may be too costly) to motivate them to disclose the reality. One approach in 
which the pre-commitment assumption has been loosened is by presuming there are other 
groups who refer tithe agent's report who cannot pre-commit on how they will actually 
exploit it. For instance, this third party could be an auditor who is appointed to give an 
opinion regarding the agent and his reports. Baiman et al. (1987) analysed a model, in 
which they showed that the equilibrium could not be achieved if the agent permanently tells 
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the reality and for the auditor to work hard to examine the agent's report. In other words, if 
the auditor is persuaded the agent's report is reliable; he has no motivation to waste time 
and money to do auditing. In theory, the third party could also be another employee of the 
firm, arrival, the labour market (in setting the value of the agent's outside employment 
opportunities in the future) or even the stock market (in setting the value of the agent's 
stock-based compensation), and the revelation principle would not be relevant in this case. 
As some examples of violation of the pre-commitment assumption, Demski and 
Frimor (1979), and Christensen, Demski, and Frimor (2002) examine the models in which 
the Revelation Principle fails due tithe principal's inability to commit. 
On the other hand, Arya et al. (2008) states that the principal is unable to make 
long-term commitments. Therefore, the principal engages in ex-post opportunistic actions 
that are detrimental from an ex-ante perspective. In such settings, the earning management 
is beneficial as it restricts the amount of information that the principal receives at the 
renegotiation stage. When the communication between the management and the investor is 
merely based on reported earnings, and since the principal finds it desirable to induce 
earnings management to discipline their ex-post opportunistic behaviour, the revelation 
principle applies. Furthermore, as I will explain in section 3.11, Dutta and Gigler (2003) 
mentioned that if the communication is based on both reported earnings and forecast of 
future earnings, the principal can make commitments and their communication is 
unrestricted. Therefore, earnings management can be beneficial as it reduces the cost of 
eliciting truthful forecasts from the manager. 
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Restricted Contract Form The violation of the revelation principle may also happen 
when the researcher exogenously limits the structure of the compensation contract. For 
example, Demski and Dye (1999) analysed a one-period example, in which the agent is 
accountable for events that shape both the mean and the variance of the end-of-period cash 
flows. At the beginning of the period, the agent observes private information regarding the 
mean and the variance, and s/he discloses both of these parameters to the principal. 
Nevertheless, the contract is constrained to a linear function of the end-of-period cash flow, 
with a penalty term that is proportionate to the square of the deviation of the recognized 
cash flow from the forecasted mean. They clearly showed that the manager's report 
continually undervalues the estimated cash flow. That is, in their model, the manager 
attempts to build slack into his forecast. On the other hand, the reporting models that 
employ optimal contracts such as Antle and Fellingham (1997) or Kirby et al. (1991), the 
manager's forecast is unprejudiced, and it is the principal who gives the slack to the agent 
as an inducement for the agent to provide an honest forecast. 
Demski and Frimor (1999) indicate that the revelation principle can be 
circumvented; however, the principal can create a plausible two-period contract, supposing 
that the principal and agent can renegotiate their stipulations in the second period. In these 
models, the agent predicts that the principal will use their report against them afterwards, 
and this makes reporting the truth extremely costly for the agent involved. 
Whereas exogenously stipulating the form of the contract can be useful in 
understanding the reporting motivations entailed in that structure, it asks for the question of 
why the compensation is structured in such as way. Currently, I have especially trivial 
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knowledge as to why the compensation contracts have the form they do, why the elements 
are piece-wise linear, or why bonuses are lumpy , i.e., the highest bonus is paid if the 
performance surpasses a level, and no bonus at all is paid albeit the performance barely 
misses this threshold. Occasional empiricism proposes that contracts with these features are 
very widespread, and that these elements have an important effect on the managers 
motivations. The linear contracting framework is unable of giving understandings into these 
matters; and a more common (ideally, an optimal) contracting framework is necessary. 
Dutta and Gigler (2002) suggest a new contractual model in which the management utility 
is mainly based on whether the reported earning meet or miss the forecasts. 
2.10.2.2.1 Relationship of Truth Telling and Revelation Principle 
The existence of truth telling mechanisms is not the same as stating that the 
revelation principle holds. In order to emphasize this point, if the revelation principle holds, 
then there are mechanisms for eliciting the truth, yet the existence of these mechanisms 
does not mean that the revelation principle will actually hold. What I am trying to show is 
that there is a scope for forecasts management inside games, where the truth revealing 
equilibrium can be shown to exist using standard mechanisms associated with the 
revelation principle. In this research, like of Ronen and Yaari (1979), the revelation 
principles holds in a sub-game but probably fails to hold in the complete game. On the 
other hand, the revelation principle states that there is no loss of generality in restricting the 
analysis to a game in which the arbitrator designs an incentive-compatible mechanism (a 
mechanism that elicits full, truth telling messages). The intuition is that the arbitrator can 
induce the privately formed players to fully report the truth (Dasgupta et al., 1979).  
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As Dye writes, the revelation principal is a nemesis to the study of opportunistic 
reporting . This is because economic explanations for opportunistic reporting require one 
or more of the assumptions of the revelation principle to be explicitly violated (Dye, 1988).  
Consistent with Dutta and Gigler s (2002) model, which is explained in the next 
section, the revelation principle might be true for buy and sell companies. The reason is 
that, for buy companies, the forecasts convey the management s true expectation to the 
market that is followed by income increasing earnings management. However, for the Sell 
companies, the forecasts do not convey true (or optimistic) information to the market, but, 
it is used to dampen the market expectation so that the management can benefit from a 
positive stock price shock, which is the result of positive earnings surprise. 
In this section, two opposing views of Earnings and forecasts management were 
proposed. These views are informative versus delusive earnings and forecasts management. 
As Hirst et al. (2012) confirmed, interaction tests are probably useful in reconciling 
contrasting views in the literature. Including a theoretically motivated conditioning, or 
moderator, variable in the relationship between forecasts and earnings management will 
often allow the researchers to identify where the effect holds or where it does not (or where 
it holds in a different way). 
2.11 Model Suggested by Dutta and Gigler (2002) 
Dutta and Gigler (2002) provide a theoretical model that explains and integrate both 
pessimistic (opportunistic) and optimistic (efficiency) forecasts behaviour of companies. 
Dutta & Gigler (2002) theoretical model is about the effect of earnings forecasts on 
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earnings management, and the implication of their model to this work is explained as 
follows. 
Dutta & Gigler (2002) define at least two types of earnings, economic and 
accounting earnings. Economic earnings is the real increase in the value of the company 
while Accounting earning is the earning that is reported in the financial statements. They 
suggest that since reported accounting earnings are not the same as the true economic 
earnings, the management tries to convey additional information about true economic 
earning to the market via forecasts. 
They assume two types of firm s outputs. One is high output and the other is low 
output. Firm s output = and 
Assuming that both predicted and reported earnings influence the management s 
compensation, they develop the following framework.  
They consider as denoting the manager s compensation in the state when 
they issue forecast and realized accounting earning is . For is used to denote 
, where represents management s utility. 
In the presence of forecasts, Dutta and Gigler (2002) propose optimal 
communication contracts, in which the managers who report low economic earnings are 
shielded from the risk associated with the accounting earnings. That is, the optimal 
communication contract sets equal to . On the other hand, the optimal contract 
penalizes a manager who reports a high economic income when such a report is followed 
by low accounting income (i.e. > ). This penalty must be sufficiently large to ensure 
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that the low type manager (i.e., the manager who observes ) does not mimic the 
high type (i.e., the manager who observes = ), by issuing a high forecast and 
subsequently manipulating earnings. On the other hand, this penalty cannot be too large; 
otherwise the high type manager will have incentives to engage in earnings manipulation. 
According to Dutta and Gigler (2002) in optimal communication contract: 
 
The proposition stated in equations 2-1 and 2-2 is used as the bases of theoretical 
framework in the hypothesis development section. 
To see how Dutta and Gigler s (2002) proposition is used as a basis for my 
theoretical framework, I should first consider the communication restriction that exists for 
sell companies (assumption of revelation principle does not hold). The reason is that 
according to Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003b); first, due to the lack of resources, sell 
companies cannot conduct earnings management and consequently, will not convey insider 
information to the market via doing earnings management and second, even if they conduct 
earnings management due to low stock price sensitivity to earnings news (Demski & 
Frimor, 1999) of sell companies , they cannot significantly increase the stock price through 
earnings manipulation. Therefore, sell companies cannot efficiently manage earnings and 
communication restrictions binds them. On the other hand, issuing high forecasts help the 
buy companies in the process of their financial reporting, because according to equation 2-1 
and 2-2, having issued high forecasts, they can efficiently manage earnings to meet those 
forecasts ( ). Issuing high forecasts however, does not help the sell companies in the 
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process of their financial reporting, because considering market punishment that results 
from missing forecasts (equations 2-1 and 2-2), and since they cannot efficiently manage 
earnings, they will inevitably issue low forecasts.  
This view of Dutta and Gigler (2002) is implicitly consistent with several empirical 
researches. For example, consistent with Dutta and Gigler (2002), Barua et al. (2006) 
confirms that before the accrual management for the companies that generated profit, 
compared to the companies that experienced loss, it was more likely that their pre-managed 
earning are less than both analysts forecast and prior period s earning, and it is also more 
likely for them to report profits above the benchmarks.  
Equation 2-2 (on page 69) is also consistent with Matsumoto s (2008) belief that the 
managers are likely concerned that a negative earnings surprise will lead to significantly 
lower stock prices, and adversely affect their performance evaluation. Similarly, Puffer and 
Weintrop (2003) find that the probability of a CEO s turnover increases with the shortfall 
of actual earnings from the analysts' expectations. 
The next sections will discuss different views of growth and non-growth firms.  
2.12 Different Views of Growth and Non-growth Firms 
Previous studies suggested that various incentive elements can motivate managers 
to tailor their forecasts to inflate market expectations (Frost, 1997; Fuller & Jensen, 2002; 
Stein, 1989). For example, Frost (1989) investigated the disclosure policies of UK firms 
whose audit reports where modified.  He illustrated that the disclosure statements of the 
firms that are under stress are often not credible, and the market usually discounts them. 
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Similarly, Koch (2002) examined the relation between financial distress, bias in managers 
forecasts, and the credibility of voluntary managers forecasts. His findings show that in 
companies that are financially distressed, the managers forecasts are biased, and are less 
credible than firms that are not financially distressed. Similarly, Rogers & Stocken (2010) 
examine the association of financial distress with managers forecast bias, and discovered 
that distressed firms are generally more biased in their forecasts. 
Stein (2009) mentions that the disappointing results that selling companies usually 
deals with increase the risk of termination of the management s contract, and that might be 
the possible reason for doing earnings and forecasts management. In addition, facing the 
possibility of a takeover increases the managers interest in the short-term stock prices 
(Linck et al., 2009). Other researches also show that litigation risk does indeed influence 
issuing forecasts. For instance, Cao and Narayanamoorthy (2005) finds that when faced 
with high ex-ante litigation risk, managers of firms with bad news are more likely to issue 
earnings guidance. However, regardless of ex-ante litigation risk, managers with good news 
are least likely to issue earnings guidance.  
Brown, et al. (2005) discovered that a higher litigation risk is associated with more 
forecasts by both good-news and bad news firms. After controlling for litigation risk, 
however, they find that bad-news firms are significantly more likely to issue a forecast 
relative to good-news firms. This finding is consistent with Kasznik and Lev (1995), who 
also discovered that bad-news firms are significantly more likely to issue warnings relative 
to good-news firms. 
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In addition, poor performing management is likely to deal with stock price decline, 
and as a result, board of directors and investors put tremendous pressure on them (Puffer & 
Weintrop, 1991). Under such circumstance, the management faces a high contract 
termination risk. For instance, DeAngelo (1988) suggests that poor earnings performance is 
an obvious signal of management inefficiency. It can weaken the stockholders support and 
culminates in the termination of the management job itself. Similarly, Weisbach (2007) 
documents that stock returns and earnings changes is a reliable indicator of a CEO s 
resignation. Warner et al. (1988) also finds an inverse relation between the stock 
performance and the probability of a management change.    
Consequently, in order to alleviate the pressure from investors and the board of 
directors, and to mitigate the higher turnover risk when information indicating poor 
performance is released, managers may engage in producing downward biased forecast and 
income increasing earnings management to create positive earnings surprises. This is 
consistent with results documented by Frankel, McNichols and Wilson (1988), who found 
that firms seeking more external financing tend to issue managers forecasts more 
frequently, and Miller (1988), who discovered that, companies that have a higher 
probability of growth are more likely to disclose their information to the market. Similarly, 
Ajinkya et al. (1995), and Rogers & Stocken (2010), claim that managers of firms with 
higher growth opportunities may be more optimistic about the future prospects of their 
company. However, non-growth firms are not optimistic about future prospects of their 
companies. This notion makes us expect that sell companies, which are usually non-growth 
companies (Abarbanell and Lehavy 2003b), are pessimistic about the future prospects of 
their companies, and will issue pessimistic forecasts. 
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their issued forecasts. In addition both of the buy and sell group companies are expected to 
have positive forecasts errors. 
2.13 Summary 
In a nutshell, this chapter explained empirical findings with regards to two different 
views about optimistic and pessimistic forecasts that are in the literature. It is extensively 
shown using Duta and Gigler s (2002) framework, it is expected that consistent with the 
expectation adjustment hypothesis and in the context that revelation principle holds, 
through the issuing of optimistic forecasts, buy companies try to convey information to 
outsiders. However, in the sell companies, since they do not possess sufficient resources to 
convey information through manipulation of the reported earnings and consistent with 
Dutta and Gigler s framework, in order to avoid undesirable consequences of big negative 
earnings surprises in terms of litigation and loss of reputation, they are expected to produce 
downward biased forecasts and issue pessimistic forecasts to create future positive earnings 
surprises.  
This research tries to highlight the factor relating to the companies' growth status 
that influences the management's decision to report pessimistic forecast to produce positive 
FEs when companies' shares are recommended to sell, and generate optimistic forecast 
when the companies' shares are recommended to buy. More specifically, this research tries 
to determine the ability of analysts' recommendations (in terms of buy or sell 
recommendations) in explaining the reason behind FM. 
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The next chapter will explain background of regulations about managers forecasts 
in the United States. 
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Chapter 3. BACKGROUND OF REGULATIONS ABOUT 
MANAGERS FORECASTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the background of managers forecast in the United States. I 
explain the chronological development of the regulations related to managers forecasts in 
the United States. 
3.2 Background of Managers Forecasts in the United States 
Policy-makers and regulators have long been concerned with the reliability of 
managers forecasts. In the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
historically prohibited the inclusion of forward-looking statements in SEC filings because it 
argued that the market forces were insufficient to induce managers to provide accurate 
forecasts (Penman 1980; Pownall and Waymire 1989). However, at some points in time, 
there were some regulations that were in favour of encouraging the management to issue 
frequent forecasts.  
The Private Securities Litigation Reform (PSLR) Act (1995) provides a statutory 
safe-harbour to shelter managers from litigation arising from the situation where the 
reported Earnings per Share (EPS) fail to meet the managers forecast of EPS and hence 
produce negative forecast error. In order to subject the manager to penalties under the 
antifraud conditions of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the SEC 
proclaimed Rule 10b-54, a plaintiff must be able to establish that a manager's forecast was 
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made with the actual knowledge that it was actually false or misleading, that is, the 
management has been willingly doing forecasts management. It is more onerous for 
plaintiffs to successfully litigate when it is more difficult to detect misrepresentation 
(Castura, Litzenberger, Gorelick, & Dwivedi, 2010). 
Although Penman (1980); Pownall and Waymire (1989) discuss that firms typically 
viewed the safe-harbour provision that sheltered them from litigation arising from 
unattained forward-looking statements in SEC filings as being inadequate, Johnson et al. 
(2001) found that from the point of view of the managers, it lowered the expected litigation 
costs associated with unattained forecasts. As Kim & Shi (2010) highlighted, the PSLR Act 
of 1995 created a safe harbour for forward-looking information. This law protects firms 
from litigation arising from unattained projections. In passing this law, the regulators were 
attempting to encourage the release of prospective information in what they believe to be 
Informative disclosures that will eventually help investors interpret a company s economic 
prospects, and are believed to reduce the cost of capital.  
Following the enactment of the PSLR Act of 1995 which lowered the expected 
litigation costs associated with unattained forecasts when accompanied by appropriate 
cautionary language (Rogers & Stocken, 2005), investors, policy-makers, and regulators 
were concerned about the reliability of this forward-looking information (e.g., Grundfest 
and Perino 1997; Johnson, Kasznik, and Nelson 2001). As a result of these concerns, SEC's 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg. FD) was passed on October 23, 2000.  
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3.2.1 Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) 
This section first explains the background of regulation fair disclosure and then 
explains the effect of regulation fair disclosure on the forecasts.  
3.2.1.1 Background 
Before the 1990s, most individual investors followed the progress of their stock 
holdings by receiving phone calls from their broker, by reading annual or quarterly reports 
mailed to them by the company, by reading news in newspapers or financial publications, 
or by calling the company with questions. Most investors relied primarily upon full service 
brokers, such as Merrill Lynch, for trading advice. 
During the 1990s, Internet usage became widespread and online discount brokers 
allowed individual investors to trade stocks online at the push of a button. At the same 
time, these investors began using the Internet to research stocks and make timely, more 
informed trading decisions. By 1999, individual investors became more aware of quarterly 
analyst conference calls, where a company's management would disclose the results of the 
quarter and answer analyst questions about the company's past performance and future 
prospects. At the time, most companies did not allow small investors to attend their calls. 
In December 1999, the SEC proposed Regulation FD. Although large institutional 
investors fought vigorously against the proposed regulation as they argued that fair 
disclosure would lead to less disclosure, many individual investors wrote the SEC to 
support for the regulation. In October 2000, the SEC ratified Regulation FD. 
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Reg FD was promulgated to address the issue of selective disclosure, i.e., firms 
disclosing material information to a few select investors and analysts. Through selective 
disclosure, some investors receive material information before other investors and thus 
benefit from such information. The select few analysts who receive the information in turn 
reward the firm with favourable forecasts and recommendations. Reg FD prohibits such 
disclosures. It mandates that all publicly traded firms disclose material non-public 
information to all the investors at the same time. If a firm releases material information to 
select groups, it must immediately disclose the same information publicly. Firms can 
choose different venues, such as online webcast, press release, and filing 8-K with the SEC, 
to disclose material information publicly. 
3.2.1.2 The Effect of Reg FD on Forecasts 
By forcing managers to make use of public forecasts rather than restricted 
communications, FD prohibits firms from private-only disclosure. Before FD, managers 
could keep away from publicly recanting previous optimistic forecasts by secretly 
communicating with analysts, who could decrease investor expectations with a new analyst 
forecast. After FD, managers with optimistic forecasts need either publicly confess their 
optimism by providing a new managers forecast or they must negatively surprise investors 
at the earnings announcement. This implies the importance and considerations that 
managers forecasts have obtained after FD. It also reflects the importance of the end of the 
year managers forecasts and its improvement in terms of accuracy. The reason is that by 
adjusting the previous optimistic forecast management tries to make its forecast more 
accurate or pessimistic. Heflin et al. (2011) posit that by prohibiting the manager from 
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having private communication with analysts, FD increases pessimism in management 
earnings forecasts. Heflin et al. (2011) show that FD lowered optimism in managers 
forecasts but the decreasing optimistic bias is not counterweighed by a rise in pessimistic 
bias reflecting progresses in forecast accuracy and informativeness. Heflin et al. (2011) 
conclude that FD improved firms forecast properties by making the forecasts to be less 
biased, have greater accuracy, and greater informativeness. 
This improvements in managers forecast accuracy may, in part, add to the growth 
in the informational efficiency of stock prices (Hutton & Stocken, 2009) and decrease in 
the cost of equity capital formerly documented. For example, Chen et al. (Chen, Dhaliwal, 
& Xie, 2010) and Gomes et al. (2007) suggest that FD reduced the cost of equity capital. In 
contrast, Albring et al. (2010) suggest that FD has moved financing preferences for firms 
with high public-disclosure costs toward debt. This indicates that the companies that have 
high disclosure costs will less frequently issue earnings forecasts and this will lead to 
higher information asymmetry. Similarly Eleswarapu et al. (2004), Duarte et al. (2008) and 
Sidhu et al. (2004) investigate the effect of FD on information asymmetry. They find that 
Reg FD did not deteriorate information environment for most of the firms. In addition they 
state that Reg FD has reduced the information asymmetry for some of the firms. 
Results regarding FD s effect on analysts forecasts are mixed. Canace et al. (2008) Heflin, 
Subramanyam, & Zhang (2012), Herrmann, Hope et al. (2008), Kross and Suk (2010) 
 81  
investigate the impact of FD on expectations management, which is gauged by means of 
analyst forecasts and actual earnings. They provide evidence that suggests FD decreased 
expectations management to meet or beat expectations for both U.S. and ADR10companies. 
Bushee et al. (2008) study conference calls (not management earnings forecasts per se) and 
suggest that pre-FD closed-call firms were more tending to stop or adjust the timing of their 
calls following FD. Likewise, they show larger conference-call price instability following 
FD for pre-FD closed-call firms. This indicates that after Reg FD, companies have higher 
ability to manage the analysts expectations. 
To summarize, based on Reg. FD (2000), no material information should selectively be 
disclosed. Before the Reg. FD, managers were able to selectively answer questions from 
analysts and consequently, adjust the decline in stock prices that might result from the 
issuance of any unfavourable forecasts. In addition, managers were also free to provide 
earnings guidance as a voluntary disclosure to their selected analyst. Prior researches 
detailed that countless managers utilized this backchannel extensively (Ajinkya and Gift 
1984; Hutton 2005). However, after Reg. FD, such private communication is explicitly 
prohibited, compelling managers to respond to questions from all analysts regarding 
unfavourable forecasts in a public setting.  Early evidence on Regulation Fair Disclosure 
                                                 
10American depositary receipt is a negotiable certificate issued by a U.S. bank representing a specified number of shares in a foreign 
stock that is traded on a U.S. exchange. This is a method through which U.S. investors can buy shares in a foreign company 
while realizing any dividends and capital gains in U.S. dollars.  
 82  
suggests that it greatly affects voluntary disclosure practices (Heflin et al., 2012; Hutton & 
Stocken, 2009). 
Anilowski et al. (2007) and Rogers and Bushrik (2008) discovered that the 
likelihood of issuing a bundled forecast increased after the enactment of Reg. FD. Rogers 
and Bushrik (2008) also argued that since after the Reg. FD, the management are prohibited 
from selectively answering questions regarding forecasts, and the only choice that remains 
for managers is to answer questions publicly through conference calls that are associated 
with earnings announcements. These avenues provide an opportunity for managers to issue 
and discuss forecasts, prompting an increase in bundled forecasts after the enactment of 
Reg. FD.   
However, although Reg. FD has not arrested the amount of forward-looking 
information provided by firms, Baily et al. (2003) and Irani and Karamanou (2003) found 
that it has apparently decreased the quality of such information (Bushee, Matsumoto, & 
Miller, 2004; Kross & Suk, 2012).  
Two years after the enactment of Reg. FD and as a direct consequence of Enron and 
WorldCom s scandals, Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) was ratified in 2002. Gong et al. (2003) 
stated that one of the significant effects of Sarbanes Oxley (2002) (SOX) was to limit the 
earning management of US companies. Bartov and Cohen (2003) concluded that as a result 
of SOX (2002) regulation, the intention to meet or beat the analysts expectations decreased 
post SOX period. However, Rogers and Stocken (2005) mentioned that the threat of 
litigation is less likely to deter managers from optimistic forecasting, because it is more 
difficult to successfully sue them for issuing misleading forecasts than issuing misleading 
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financial statements. The next section extensively details the inconsistency in the research 
results with regards to the reliability of managers forecasting in literature. The next section 
explains the other important regulation in the U.S. history which is Sarbanes Oxley Act. 
3.2.2 Sarbanes Oxley Act 
The Sarbanes Oxley Act was enacted as a reaction to a number of major corporate 
and accounting scandals including those affecting Enron, Tyco International, Adelphia, 
Peregrine Systems and WorldCom. These scandals shook public confidence in the U.S. 
securities markets. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) became law on 30 July 2002. It was enacted as 
emergency legislation amid high-pro le corporate scandals and is so important that then 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) chairman William Donaldson  (2009) before 
Congress said, the Act represents the most important securities legislation since the 
original federal securities laws of the 1930s. Contemporaneously, the NYSE and 
NASDAQ adopted new listing standards. 
The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) is considered one of the most important 
corporate disclosure and governance reforms in US history. As stated in the preamble of the 
Act, a primary objective of SOX is to protect investors by improving the accuracy and 
reliability of corporate disclosures . The Act covers issues such as auditor independence, 
corporate, internal control assessment, and enhanced financial disclosure. The SOX 
requires internal controls for assuring the accuracy of financial reports and disclosures, and 
mandates both audits and reports on those controls.  
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The SOX created Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). PCAOB 
is authorized to establish a registration process for public accountants, create audit 
standards, engage in inspections of public accountants, and conduct disciplinary hearings. 
SOX also prohibited an accounting firm from providing audit work for a public company 
while contemporaneously providing a host of other services. SOX required each public firm 
to have an audit committee composed of independent directors, and prohibited company 
loans to certain executives and directors. It also required attorneys for public corporations 
to report material violations of law to the corporation s chief legal or to the CEO. 
A premise underlying Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) is that improving corporate 
governance structures within firms will compel managers to act in the shareholders best 
interests. As these regulations impose  compliance costs, the results of empirical research 
into the efficacy of some of the  regulatory recommendations are likely to  be of interest to  
regulators and other  stakeholders (Bartov & Cohen, 2008).   
Several Surveys have been conducted to find whether the positive effect of SOX on 
investor confidence, reliability of financial statements, and fraud prevention outweigh its 
costs.  For example Arping and Sautner (1978) investigated whether SOX enhanced 
corporate transparency. Looking at foreign firms that are cross-listed in the US, they 
indicated that, relative to a control sample of comparable firms that are not subject to SOX, 
cross-listed firms became significantly more transparent following SOX. Rittenberg and 
Miller (2005) indicated that in the post SOX period financial statements are perceived to be 
more reliable compared to the pre SOX period.  
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Although the SOX has improved the reliability of financial statements, there have 
been some controversies regarding the relation between the reliability of financial 
statements and the development of financial markets. Anecdotal evidence (Chan, Faff, 
Mather, & Ramsay, 2012) and empirical studies (Kasznik, 1999b) suggest that SOX is a 
significant contributor to restoring investor confidence. However, The Committee on 
Capital Markets Regulation raises concerns about the effects of SOX on the global 
competitiveness of U.S. capital markets and calls for the relaxation of some of its rules 
(Chan et al., 2012).  
To test the effect of SOX on the global competitiveness of U.S. capital markets, Jain 
et al. (2005) considered the market liquidity as an index showing competitiveness of US 
equity. They investigated the possible effects of financial scandals, Congressional 
responses (SOX legislation), and related Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
regulations (SOX implementation rules) on market liquidity. They found that regulatory 
responses including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) had inconsequential short-term 
liquidity effects but highly significant and positive long-term liquidity effects. These 
liquidity improvements are positively associated with the improved quality of financial 
reports, and firm-specific variables such as size of the company (Donaldson, 2005). 
Regarding the size, previous researches document that SOX affected differently on 
small and large firms. About the effect of SOX on small firms, Kamar, Karaca-Mandic et 
al. ("Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, Interim report of the Committee on Capital 
Markets Regulation," 2006) found that SOX induced small firms to exit the public capital 
market during the year following its enactment. However, although SOX appears to have 
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had little effect on the going-private propensities of larger firms,  Linck et al. (2008) states 
that, there have been both broad-based changes and officials changes in large firms. Board 
committees meet more often post-SOX and Director and Officer (D&O) insurance 
premiums have doubled. Directors post-SOX are more likely to be lawyers/consultants, 
financial experts, and retired executives, and less likely to be current executives. Post-SOX 
boards are larger and more independent.  
Finally, they find significant increases in director pay and overall director costs, 
particularly among smaller firms (Jain et al., 2008). Linck et al. (2008)  confirms that as a 
result of SOX rms need to pay people more for the position of a director. They also 
document that the composition of the boards also changes with relatively more lawyers and 
nancial experts and relatively fewer executives from other rms. 
Investors lobbied overwhelmingly in favour of strict implementation of SOX, while 
corporate insiders and business groups lobbied against strict implementation. Hochberg et 
al. (2009) found that the companies that are facing agency problems are most affected by 
the law and are those whose insiders lobbied against strict implementation.  
3.2.2.1 The Effect of SOX on Forecasts 
Regarding the effect of SOX on forecasts, consistent with the view of opportunistic 
forecasts, Rogers and Stocken (2005) mentioned that the threat of litigation is less likely to 
deter managers from optimistic forecasting, because it is more difficult to successfully sue 
them for issuing misleading forecasts than issuing misleading financial statements. 
However, Gong et al. (2003) stated that one of the significant effects of Sarbanes Oxley 
(2002) (SOX) was to limit the earning management of US companies. Bartov and Cohen 
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(2009) concluded that as a result of SOX (2002) regulation, the intention to meet or beat the 
analysts expectations decreased post SOX period. 
However, Stunda (2008) provided empirical evidence, regarding the credibility of 
managers forecasts during pre-Sarbanes-Oxley and post Sarbanes-Oxley forecasting 
periods. His results indicate that managers exerted greater upward earnings management on 
the forecast during a pre Sarbanes-Oxley environment, but tend to exert greater downward 
earnings management on the forecast in a post Sarbanes-Oxley environment. In fact, in 
order to meet forecasts, the management shifted from upward earnings management to 
downward forecasts management. Stunda s results indicate the presence of incremental 
information content in managers forecasts in a post Sarbanes-Oxley environment. 
Likewise, Li, Pincus and Rego (2008) showed that  investors reacts more positively 
to firms with aggressive accounting when SOX legislative events occurred because SOX 
would improve the credibility of these firms financial reporting. Finally Li, Pincus and 
Rego (2008) show that, the percentage of change in forecasts revision has decreased in the 
post-SOX period. 
However, Asare (2009) argued that, US analysts presume that the quality of 
corporate governance in most US companies is relatively  low in the absence of 
independent verification. He believes that, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX 2002) has not 
changed corporate governance quality in US companies.  
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3.3 Summary 
By increasing popularity of internet usage in 1990s, individual investors became 
more aware of quarterly analyst conference calls. In 1995 to encourage the companies to 
issue forecasts SEC passed the PSLR Act. This Act lowered the expected litigation costs 
associated with unattained forecasts when accompanied by appropriate cautionary 
language. However after passage of this Act, investors, policy-makers, and regulators were 
concerned about the reliability of this forward-looking information.  
As a result of such concerns, the FD was passed in 2000. However, although Reg. 
FD has not arrested the amount of forward-looking information provided by firms, has 
apparently decreased the quality of such information content in the managers forecasts. 
In addition, in 2002, the SOX put some restrictions on upward earnings 
management for the companies. Therefore, after SOX it seems that managers have shifted 
from doing earnings management to forecasts management. 
In the next chapter, after developing the hypotheses, the research methods will be 
explained in detail.  
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Chapter 4. RESEARCH METHODS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is devoted to the framework and hypotheses of the study, where detailed 
explanations regarding the methods that are used to measure the values of the variables are 
explored. Furthermore, the procedures for empirical testing of the hypotheses are further 
explained, and the details of the sample are discussed in this chapter. Finally the chapter 
describes the data s characteristics and 
4.2 Research Framework and Hypothesis Development 
The framework and hypotheses of this study are based upon a number of assumptions, 
which are further discussed in the following sections.   
4.2.1 Relationship of Optimism/Pessimism with Efficiency and Opportunism 
The consensus in the managers earning forecast literature is that management 
choose to report forecast due to either voluntary disclosure incentives or for strategic 
manipulation of the expectations (Cormier & Martinez, 2006). 
Voluntary disclosure theory predicts that, the reason that management report 
forecast is that, the benefits to the firm (and its management) exceed the costs. A 
maintained assumption of voluntary disclosure models is that the management maximizes 
shareholder value (i.e., there are no conflicts of interest between the shareholders and the 
management). This assumption implies that managers earnings forecasts reported 
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voluntarily (but not opportunistically) are unbiased and they adjust analysts and investors 
expectations, reduce information asymmetries, reduce litigation risk, etc.  
However, the opposing (non-informative) view is that, management issues forecasts 
to strategically manipulate the stock market expectation. In other words, management 
issues forecasts to strategically signal good firm performance or to increase stock option 
compensation. 
The next section explains the relationship of managers forecast informativeness 
that is emphasized in voluntary disclosure theories, with forecasts optimism. This 
relationship will help to connect the hypotheses to the existing theories. 
4.2.1.1 Relationship of optimism with informativeness 
According to Dutta and Gigler (2002), since for growth companies issuing high 
forecasts help them in the process of their financial reporting, thus the high forecasts in the 
growth companies are considered as informative. The view of Dutta and Gigler is implicitly 
consistent with several empirical researches. 
For example, Clement, Frankel, & Miller (2003) state that, confirming managers 
forecasts are voluntary forecasts by management that corroborate existing market 
expectations about future earnings. They find that the stock market's reaction to confirming 
forecasts is significantly positive, and such forecasts decrease the cost of capital, showing 
lesser information asymmetry and thus showing informativeness of such forecasts.  Since 
growth (Buy) companies forecasts are optimistic and confirm the existing market 
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perception about the company s future performance, according to Clement et al. (2003) 
they are considered as informative.   
The next section explains the relationship of less informative view of forecast with 
the forecast pessimism. 
4.2.1.2 Relationship of Pessimism with less Informativeness 
Skinner (1994) finds that managers earnings forecasts are more likely to pre-empt 
bad news earnings surprises, consistent with managers attempting to reduce litigation risk 
by issuing preemptive forecasts to adjust investor expectations downward and not to inform 
the outsiders. 
Likewise, Rogers and Stocken (2005) find that managers earnings forecasts issued 
by distressed (non-growth) firms are less credible, since forecasts for non-growth firms are 
not associated with negative price changes (Lopez & Rees, 2002; Payne & Robb, 2000). 
Similarly, Koch (2002) examined the relation between financial distress, bias in 
managers forecasts, and the credibility of voluntary managers forecasts. His findings 
show that, in companies that are financially distressed (non-growth companies), the 
managers forecasts are biased, and are less credible than companies that are not financially 
distressed. 
The above empirical findings reveal that the forecasts that are issued by non-growth 
companies are pessimistic and therefore biased. 
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The next section explains, how the analysts recommendations which is used to 
identify the growth and non-growth companies, help to predict the forecasts pessimism. 
4.2.2 Analysts Recommendations and Pessimism 
The analysts recommendations for buying (or selling) a company s stock(s) may 
significantly outweigh the recommendations for selling (or buying) the same stocks. This 
classifies the companies stocks as either sell or buy, where buy companies are assumed to 
be inherently more profitable than sell companies (Ronen & Yaari, 2002). Since the stock 
prices of buy companies are susceptible to earnings news, the buy companies can 
effectively carry out income increasing earnings management (Ronen & Yaari, 2002). 
Doing so allows buy companies to significantly influence the investors opinions, which 
results in effective earnings management. In addition, firms rated as buy are more likely to 
engage in earnings management that leaves reported earnings equal to, or slightly higher 
than the analysts forecasts (Abarbanell & Lehavy, 2003b). However, sell companies are 
not able to carry out earnings management. This is consistent with the Dutta and Gigler 
(2002) framework about the growth and non-growth companies. 
As explained in chapter 2, assuming that both predicted and reported earnings 
influence the management s compensation, Dutta and Gigler (2002) develop the following 
framework.  
Dutta and Gigler (2002) assume that the companies are either non-growth and 
produce low profit (low type company/manager), or the companies are growth and produce 
high profit (high type company/manager). In the presence of forecasts, Dutta and Gigler 
(2002) propose optimal communication contracts, in which the non-growth companies who 
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report low forecasts are shielded from the risk associated with the accounting earnings. On 
the other hand, the optimal contract penalizes the growth companies who reports high 
forecast when such a report is followed by low accounting income. This penalty must be 
sufficiently large to ensure that the low type manager does not mimic the high type, by 
issuing a high forecast and subsequently manipulating earnings. On the other hand, this 
penalty cannot be too large; otherwise the high type manager will not have incentives to 
engage in earnings manipulation. 
4.2.3 Theoretical Model 
Based on the different forecasts management expectations for growth (buy) and 
non-growth (sell) companies, this study examines the effect of companies growth 
capability in terms of analysts recommendations (AR) on the management s incentive to 
conduct forecasts management to produce positive forecasts errors. Therefore, the 
theoretical model of this study is shown in Figure 4-1. 
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Notes: 
Buy companies are the companies that analysts recommend to buy 
Sell companies are the companies that analysts recommend to sell 
AR = Analysts Recommendations 
Diff = Difficulty (Control Variable) 
LE = Learning Effect (Control Variable) 
FE= Forecast Error 
IV= Independent Variable 
DV= Dependent Variable 
Figure 4-1. Theoretical model of the study.  
Consistent with the Dutta and Gigler (2002) framework, and the Figure 4-1the next 
two sections explain the strategies that buy and sell companies follow to avoid negative 
earnings surprises. 
Sell companies 
Buy companies 
Management Action/Decision 
Income Decreasing Forecasts 
Management [Pessimistic 
Forecasts] 
FM<0 
FE 0 
Less Income Decreasing 
Forecasts Management 
[Optimistic Forecasts] 
FM 0 
Growth Capability 
D
iff
 
LE
AR in terms of 
Income Increasing Earnings 
Management 
Less Income Increasing 
Earnings Management 
H3&H5
H5
H4&H6
H5
H1&H2
H5
Concept 
Operationalization 
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4.2.4 Analysts Recommendations and Forecast Management (H1) 
In this section, the first hypothesis regarding the relationships between the independent 
variable (AR) and dependent variable (FM) is developed. The second hypothesis is also 
developed in respect of the relationship between independent variable (AR) and second 
dependent variable (FE). Moreover, the hypotheses are drawn up to examine the effect of 
companies growth perspective in terms of analysts recommendation on management 
incentive to do FM and produce positive FE. Hypotheses 3 and 5 are about the effect of FM 
on FE in sell companies. Hypotheses 4 and 6 are about the effect of FM on FE in buy 
companies. Table 4-1 explains the difference in the behaviour of the buy and sell 
companies.
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Table 4-1. Comparison of the reporting processes of the buy and sell companies  
Analysts' 
Recommendatio
ns (AR) 
Buy (Growth) companies 
(Abarbanell and Lehavy 2003b) 
Sell (non-growth) companies 
(Abarbanell and Lehavy 2003b) 
Incentive 
Have incentive to avoid 
negative forecasts errors (to 
prevent fall of stock price) 
(Abarbanell and Lehavy,  
2003b; Dutta and Gigler, 2002) 
Have incentive to avoid negative 
forecasts errors (to prevent 
litigation, takeover, contract 
termination.) (Beniluz, 2007; 
Frost, 1997; Kim & Shi, 2011) 
Profitability 
Profitable (Abarbanell and 
Lehavy, 2003b) 
Stock price more susceptible to 
earnings news (Abarbanell and 
Lehavy 2003b) 
Have significant resources to 
manipulate earnings 
(Abarbanell and Lehavy, 
2003b) 
Less profitable (Abarbanell and 
Lehavy 2003b) 
 
Stock price is not susceptible to 
earnings news (Abarbanell and 
Lehavy 2003b) 
Don t have sufficient resources to 
manipulate earnings (Abarbanel 
and Lehavy, 2003b) 
Capability to 
Manipulate 
Profit 
Can Effectively carry out 
income increasing earnings 
management (Abarbanell and 
Lehavy 2003b, Dutta and 
Gigler 2002) 
Cannot Effectively manipulate the 
profit to increase the stock price  
Earnings management is 
potentially costly for them 
(Abarbanell and Lehavy 2003b, 
Dutta and Gigler 2002) 
Engage in downward forecasts 
management instead 
Forecasts 
Management 
(FM) 
Issue Informative/optimistic 
forecasts (Clement et al. 2003, 
Dutta and Gigler 2002) 
Manipulate the forecasts 
Downward 
(issue pessimistic/ less 
informative forecasts) (Rogers 
and Stocken 2005, Kock 2002, 
Brown et al. 2005) 
Forecasts Errors 
(FE) Meet forecasts 
Report earnings which is equal or 
higher than forecasts (create 
positive forecasts errors) 
4.2.4.1 Buy companies 
Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003b) state that, since managers of buy companies 
possess sufficient resources to effectively manage earnings they can effectively manipulate 
the profit. In addition, since the buy companies stock prices are highly susceptible to 
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earnings news (Abarbanell & Lehavy, 2003b), by reporting optimistic forecast, the 
management can positively affect the investors opinion. Therefore, the management of buy 
companies can effectively carry out income increasing earnings management at low states 
to report high profit and affect the investors opinions. Similarly, Dutta and Gigler (2002) 
state that after issuing high forecasts, management of buy companies conduct income 
increasing earnings management to meet the forecasts. 
On the other hand, the sell companies follow a different strategy to avoid negative 
FEs.  The following section explains the strategies that sell companies follow. 
4.2.4.2 Sell companies 
Sell companies are considered as low profit companies, rendering them unable to 
effectively conduct income increasing earnings management (Abarbanell & Lehavy, 2003b; 
Skinner, 1994). This assumption is due to the following reasons, firstly, since sell 
companies are less vigilantly monitored by investors, their prices are less susceptible to 
earnings news, making their earnings management ineffective in influencing investors
opinions (Abarbanell & Lehavy, 2003b). In other words, sell companies cannot effectively 
manipulate and increase low profit to increase stock prices. Secondly; sell companies are 
companies that have a meagre sum of available accounting reserves or pre-managed 
earnings to realize any relevant earnings target (Abarbanell & Lehavy, 2003b). This 
implies that sell companies do not have the sufficient resources to effectively manage 
earnings. 
Taking into account the aforementioned issues, it seems that unlike the buy 
companies, if the sell companies issue high forecasts, they are unable to conduct effective 
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earnings management to realize the forecasts afterwards. This makes it more likely for them 
to miss the forecasts. In order to prevent this from happening, sell companies prefer to issue 
low forecasts.  
For sell companies, if the economic profit is high (which rarely is the case), and 
high forecasts are issued, the management can quite simply conduct income increasing 
earnings management after the fact to reach the forecasts, as compared to the time when 
profits are low. But if profits are low, which often it is, while the management forecast high 
profits, due to inadequate resources, they are abstained from carrying out income increasing 
earnings management to reach the forecasted profit. Since for sell companies, the 
susceptibility of stock price to earnings news is low, the management will not be goaded 
into issuing high forecasts reflecting positive news. In addition, their inability to effectively 
manage earnings prevents management of sell companies from issuing high forecasts. The 
failure of sell companies, in realizing forecasts exposes the management to several risks, 
namely, litigation risk, contract termination risk and takeover risk (Beniluz, 2007; Frost, 
1997; Kim & Shi, 2011). Therefore, consistent with Dutta and Gigler s (2002) proposition, 
it is optimal to make earnings management potentially costly for management of sell 
companies. 
Therefore, if the company is in the sell position, the management may issue lower 
forecasts in order to dampen the expectation of outsiders (Li, Wasley, & Zimmerman, 
2010). Since such pessimistic forecast does not convey the management s true expectation 
to the market, it is considered as an opportunistic action, according to literature. Based on 
the result of the firm s ordinary operation, the management would then report an earning 
 99  
which is equal to or higher than the forecast (report positive forecast error), as doing so will 
raise the bids for the company s stocks, and subsequently, increase the company s stock 
price.  
This prediction for sell companies is consistent with several empirical findings. For 
example, Stunda (2003) found that that the management of companies that meet the  
forecasts are more likely to issue estimations that they could actually reach.  Additionally, 
Ivkovi & Jegadeesh (2003) found that the content of information and the resultant 
negative price effect of downward forecast revision near earnings announcement is 
insignificant. Therefore, the first hypothesis would be: 
H1: Sell companies issue more pessimistic forecasts than buy companies. 
4.2.5 Analysts Recommendations and Frequency of Forecast Errors (H2) 
Prior researches have confirmed that since negative FE could cause a negative 
shock in the stock market and deteriorate management (company) status, the management 
engage in FM to avoid negative FEs (Choi et al., 2006; Stunda, 2008; Sun & Xu, 2012). 
This is done because the management perceives the negative price effect of producing 
downward biased forecast is less than the future positive price effect of positive FE 
(Cormier & Martinez, 2006; Payne & Robb, 2000).  
Buy companies are growth companies and enjoy high profit. Missing the forecasts 
in the buy companies lead to decrease in the stock price. However, sell companies suffer 
from an unsatisfactory stock market, the management s motivation to conduct downward 
forecast management is expected to be higher. This is due to the fact that sell companies 
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usually suffer from poor earnings performance, which would be a glaring evidence of 
managerial incompetence (Abarbanell & Lehavy, 2003b). Missing the forecasts for sell 
companies would cost managers the support of stockholders and potentially their very own 
jobs (Bowen et al., 1995; Shan, Taylor, & Walter, 2012).  
Since failure in realizing forecasts exposes the sell companies to severe risks, 
namely, litigation risk, contract termination risk and takeover risk (Beniluz 2007, Frost 
1997, Kim & Shi 2011), sell companies are more expected to meet their forecasts and avoid 
the negative FEs. Thus, it is expected that sell companies have higher frequency of positive 
FEs (earnings surprises) than buy companies, therefore, the second hypothesis would be:  
H2: Sell companies have higher frequency of positive forecasts errors than buy companies. 
The Figure 4-2 simplifies the operationalization of the H2.  
Figure 4-2. Operationalization of the second hypothesis. 
In the sell companies, management often decreases the forecast to produce positive forecast 
error.  
Forecast Error = Reported EPS Management Forecast of EPS
Sell 
Companies
Management 
Forecast  -
Forecast 
Error +
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4.2.6 Forecasts Management and Positive Forecasts Errors (H3 and H4) 
Brown and Caylor (2002) state that investors unambiguously reward firms for 
reporting earnings that meet their forecasts and penalize firms for reporting earnings that 
miss their forecasts. This is because investors use heuristics cut-offs, such as earnings 
forecast, to determine the terms of transactions with a firm. The use of heuristics often 
arises as a response to the information s costs in economic models (Conlisk, 1996). When it 
is costly for stakeholders to retrieve and process detailed information on earnings for all 
firms with which they deal with (explicitly and implicitly), it is assumed that certain 
stakeholders use heuristic cut-offs such as zero or positive forecasts errors. According to 
Bird et al. (2000), Ivkovi and Jegadeesh (2004), Choi, Myers et al. (2006) and King et al. 
(1990), such heuristic cut-off could be managers forecast error. 
Consistent with this, the prospect theory postulates that decision-makers make 
decisions based on the potential value of losses and gains rather than the final outcome, and 
such gains and losses are based on reference points, like managers forecasts (Choi et al., 
2006; Ivkovi & Jegadeesh, 2004; King et al., 1990), rather than from the company s real 
outcome. It is also suggested that the value function is defined on deviations from a 
reference point and is normally concave for gains (implying risk aversion), commonly 
convex for losses (risk seeking) (S-shaped) and is generally steeper for losses than for gains 
(loss aversion) (Arya et al., 1998). In other words, the value functions are steepest around 
wealth reference points. Thus, for a given increase in wealth, the corresponding increase in 
value is greatest when the increase in wealth shifts the individual from a loss to a gain 
relative to a reference point.  
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This provides enough incentives for sell companies to decrease their forecasts in 
order to create future positive forecasts errors, because taking into account the S-shaped 
value function in Burgstahler and Dichev (1998), they can invariably avoid the market 
punishment. 
The companies that analysts recommend to sell (sell companies) are the companies 
that does not have high growth capabilities and suffer from poor performance, which would 
be a glaring evidence of managerial incompetence (Abarbanell & Lehavy, 2003b).  These 
companies are already affected by the unsatisfactory condition of the stock market. If they 
miss forecasts, they risk further deterioration of the market state. However, unlike the buy 
companies, the sell companies do not possess enough resources and have less accounting 
flexibility to manipulate the profit and meet their forecasts. Hence, sell companies seek to 
find an alternative method to meet the forecasts. 
Therefore, if the company is in the sell position, the management may issue lower 
forecast in order to dampen the expectation of outsiders  (Li et al., 2010). Based on the 
result of the firm s ordinary operation, the management would then report an earning which 
is equal to or higher than the forecast (report positive forecast error), as doing so will raise 
the bids for the company s stocks, and subsequently, increase the company s stock price.  
Thus, if FM in sell companies is effectively conducted to achieve positive FE, then 
companies that meet the forecasts should have conducted higher income decreasing FMs 
than the companies that miss the forecasts. Following this logic, the following hypotheses 
should be supported in the context of sell companies. 
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H3: In sell companies, those that meet forecasts are more likely to do income decreasing 
FM than those that do not meet forecasts.  
For buy companies, it is important to meet the forecasts and negative forecasts 
errors cause negative shock in the stock price. Buy companies have high profitability and 
therefore have enough resources to manipulate the earnings (Abarbanell & Lehavy, 2003b; 
Dutta & Gigler, 2002).  Therefore, buy companies can efficiently manage the earnings to 
meet their forecasts. Thus, in the buy companies, companies that meet forecasts do not 
necessarily do income decreasing FM to meet forecasts11. Thus, the present study expects 
the fourth hypothesis for the buy companies to be supported. 
H4: There is no significant difference in income decreasing FM between buy companies 
that meet forecasts and those that do not meet forecasts. 
4.2.7 Analysts Recommendations, Positive Forecast Errors and Unmanaged vs. 
Issued Forecast (H5 and H6) 
In order to develop a more robust test for FM among the companies that meet or do 
not meet forecasts; H5 and H6 were formulated. 
                                                 
11 However, According to Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003b), and Dutta and Gigler (2002) the buy (growth) companies are likely to do 
income increasing earnings management to meet forecasts and produce positive earnings surprises. 
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The reason more robust tests are required is the fact that it is possible, despite the 
companies meeting forecasts produce downward biased forecasts, the income decreasing 
FM might not aim for positive FE; instead, it might be due to other reasons such as 
corralling the analysts expectations downward (Baginski & Hassell, 1990). 
FE is calculated as the difference between forecasted EPS and reported EPS. 
Similarly, pre-managed/unbiased forecast can be used instead of forecasted EPS to 
calculate FE (Chin, Kleinman, Lee, & Lin, 2006). 
If forecasts management in sell companies is only conducted to realize positive FEs, 
then the frequency of positive FEs that are calculated by unmanaged forecasts should be 
significantly lower than the frequency of positive FEs that are calculated by managed 
(issued) forecasts. Following this, the fifth hypothesis is accurate for sell companies. 
H5: For sell companies, the frequency of positive forecasts errors is expected to decrease 
when forecasts errors are based on unmanaged rather than issued forecasts. 
The income decreasing FM by the sell companies are conducted to achieve positive 
FEs, whereas buy companies forecasts are optimistic and they supposedly do not have 
income decreasing FM. Thus, in buy companies, the frequency of positive FEs that is 
calculated by unmanaged forecasts should not be different from frequency of positive 
FEs that is calculated by managed (issued) forecasts. Therefore, contradicting my 
prediction for sell companies, the prediction of forecasts management and forecasts errors 
should not hold for buy companies. The sixth hypothesis is formulated to test the FEs and 
FM for buy companies. The sixth hypothesis is accurate for buy companies. 
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H6: The frequency of positive forecasts errors for buy companies is not expected to 
decrease when forecasts errors are based on unmanaged rather than issued forecasts. 
The next section describes the procedure employed to test the hypotheses.  
4.3 Methods 
Research is a complex process and complicated by a variety of expectations. Given 
this complexity, it may not be surprising that scholars build their endeavours on differing 
beliefs about how research should be done and what the results of the study should achieve 
(Krauss, 2005). These differing beliefs are categorized under three paradigms, namely, 
positivist, interpretivist and critical research (Krauss, 2005). Accordingly, the methodology 
employed should match the particular paradigm (Krauss, 2005). Generally, there are three 
dominant paradigms in accounting research, the positivist, interpretivist and critical (Chua, 
1986). In this study, the positivist paradigm is most appropriate to reflect the research 
objectives as explained below. 
In the positivist paradigm, the object of research is independent of researches including 
facts are determined by taking apart a phenomenon to examine its component parts and 
knowledge is found out and verified via direct measurements of phenomena (Healy & 
Perry, 2000; Krauss, 2005). Positivist researcher usually utilizes quantitative data (Darke, 
Shanks, & Broadbent, 1998; Krauss, 2005; Landry & Banville, 1992). In addition, in 
positivist paradigm, researchers develop hypotheses, and then try to disprove these assumed 
relationships by concentrating on the null hypotheses (Krauss, 2005). In positivist 
paradigm, data is collected using quantitative data and analysed using statistical methods 
(Krauss, 2005). In positivist paradigm, another researcher should be able to conduct the 
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same study in the same way and achieve with comparable results (Darke et al., 1998). 
Therefore, according to the above discussion, this study uses deductive reasoning 
beginning with the theoretical framework and moving towards real empirical evidence 
using the quantitative method to identify a set of universal laws that can be used to 
predict general systems of human activity (Krauss, 2005; Landry & Banville, 1992).  
In general, this study explains laws that can be predicted by using quantitative 
methods, hence this is consistent with the positivist paradigm, whereas an interpretivist 
paradigm focuses on the context and singular occurrences to obtain meaning and making 
sense, naturally utilizing quantitative approaches (Krauss, 2005; Lincoln & Guba, 2000; 
Trauth & Jessup, 2000). Therefore, it is not appropriate to meet the objectives of this study.  
Therefore, this study used the empirical method to obtain a large sample so that 
results can be generalizable to a larger context. The main objective of this section is to 
explain the process of how data is collected, how the sample is determined, how the 
variables are measured and how the data is analysed in order to test the hypotheses 
developed to meet the research objectives. This research used the secondary data.  
4.3.1 Independent, Dependent, Moderating and Control Variables 
In general, research is a procedural process of getting information with the purpose 
of findings a solution to specific problems. In the empirical study, the variables should 
examine the properties, and are employed to test the hypotheses that are identified at the 
first stage of the study (Cooper, Schindler, & Sun, 2003). There are four types of variables 
such as independent, dependent, and control variables, investigated in this study. The 
independent variable is the analysts recommendations, while the dependent variables are 
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the managers forecasts management and the managers forecasts errors. Hence, all the 
measurement items were generated from prior studies. The measurements of the variables 
are discussed in the next sections. 
4.3.1.1 Independent Variable Analysts Recommendations 
Following Heidle and Li (1998) and Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003b), it is  believed that the 
perception of the companies future growth is reflected in the analysts recommendations. 
Analysts recommendations fluctuate less than bid and ask spread (Frankel et al., 1995), 
and ask and bid prices (Darke et al., 1998). So they are less affected by market sentiments 
and they are more reliable in capturing the company s growth perspective. 
Analysts recommendations come in five forms, namely (i) strong buy, (ii) buy, (iii) 
hold, (iv) sell and (v) strong sell. The rating assigned to each recommendation is displayed 
in Table 4-2. 
Table 4-2. Recommendations and their assigned ratings 
Recommendations Strong 
buy buy hold sell
Strong 
sell 
Rating 1 2 3 4 5 
Following Abarbanell and Lehavy (Abarbanell & Lehavy, 2003b), this research 
uses the outstanding average (consensus) recommendations at the end of each day in the 
first, middle, and last three weeks of the first month of the fourth quarter. The average 
recommendation for firm , on date is assumed to be . 
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Each observation is placed in one of three portfolios. The first portfolio consists of 
firms for which (denoted Buy stocks), the second portfolio includes firms for 
which ( Hold stocks), and the third contains the least favourably 
recommended firms, for which ( Sell stocks). 
The number of buy and sell company years and the criteria for dividing them is 
shown in the Table 4-3. 
Table 4-3. The number of buy, hold and sell company years which is calculated on the basis of consensus analysts 
recommendations  
BUY HOLD SELL 
Consensus analysts 
recommendations = 3
No of companies in each 
category 817 1204 2468 
In order to compare means (ANOVA tables) in section 5.3.3.1.2 (on page156) and 
for the contingency table in section5.2.3.1.1 (on page 155), since the extreme growth (buy) 
and non-growth (sell) companies are taken into account, the hold companies are omitted. 
The next sections explain the methods for measuring the dependent variables. 
4.3.1.2 Dependent Variables Forecast Management 
Forecast Management is measured using several procedures. The procedures are 
clarified as follows. 
The management may issue forecast at the start of a new fiscal year. During the 
year, as a result of obtaining new information, the management may increase, decrease or 
remain unchanged in their initial forecasts. This increase or decrease in the managements 
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forecasts is dubbed the forecast revision (Matsumoto 2002, Burgestahler and Eams 2005). 
The following computation is used for the determination of Forecast Revision (FR): 
) 
Following Wang (2003), Matsumoto (2002) and Burgestahler and Eams (2005), 
forecasts revision is the first measure that is taken as an indicator of forecasts management. 
Wang (2003), Matsumoto (2002) and Burgestahler and Eams (2005) argue that forecasts 
issued early in the fiscal year can be considered as forecasts that exclude forecasts 
management during the latter part of the year. Therefore, they consider the difference 
between the late and early annual forecasts as a proxy for forecasts management occurring 
between the early and late forecast periods. The first proxy for forecast management, which 
is the difference in the last and first forecast horizons, captures the forecast management 
occurring between the designated periods. 
As Wang (2003), Matsumoto (2002) stated, forecast revision is not an absolute 
measure of forecasts management, as forecasts revision could also result from new 
information, as well as forecast management. 
Thus, Forecast Revision ( ) comprises of two components, namely New 
Information , and Forecast Management . To measure , the effect of 
must be excluded from . The mathematical modelling of this argument is as 
follows: 
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Where, 
represents the company. 
By regressing on , the estimated residual can be assumed to be 
Forecast Management (Wang, 2003). In other words, supposing that there is a reliable 
measure for , the following regression can be used for estimating the value of 
forecasts management. In order to eliminate the effect of new information 
from , equation (4-3) will be estimated in Eviews:  
Where: 
C is a constant. 
The residuals is generated, and considered as . 
Considering regression (4-3), although the data for is readily available, the issue 
is the measurement of . Prior researches have used a number of methods to 
explain the new information.  
This study refers to Wang (2003) to measure the management s forecast revisions. 
In order to measure the analysts forecasts management, she uses the change in the reported 
income from first to third quarter as a proxy for new information. She excludes the 
information on the fourth quarter s income in order to avoid an endogeneity problem. She 
also argues that the reason for this is that if it is used, then both (sum of forecast 
management in the fourth quarter and the new information) and income changes will be 
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under the effect of unobservable new information in the fourth quarter. This method has its 
weaknesses which include missing vital information that might be present in the fourth 
quarter. Furthermore, the method assumes income recognition as annually constant, which 
blatantly contradicts common occurrences in certain industries. 
To overcome the restrictions prior return is used as a proxy for new information. 
However, Wang (2003) did not use prior return as a measure of new information because 
she measured the analysts forecasts management instead of management s forecasts 
management. The problem with using prior return is that the prior return is a function of 
both forecast management and new information. This essentially brings about a tautology, 
or in econometric terminology, an endogeneity problem in the regression (4-3). 
However, the focus of this research is in measuring the management s forecasts 
management, rendering the endogeneity problem negligible. This is due to the fact that 
managers forecasts, which are mostly issued with the fourth/final quarter, do not affect the 
prior new information in the first three quarters that were actually present before the 
forecast issuance time. Therefore, it is assumed that the return, prior to the time of the 
fourth quarter forecasts announcement or prior to the time of third quarter s earnings 
announcement, is a good measure of new information (Matsomoto 2002). 
The prior return is measured using the following formula: 
Where, 
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is the stock price at the end of quarter 3 for firm 
is the stock price at the beginning of quarter 1 for firm 
The reason why I do not include the fourth quarter s price in the return formula is 
that its price would most probably be determined after the issuance of the management s 
forecast. Hence, the stock price of the fourth quarter could be well affected by the fourth 
quarter s managers forecast. This leads to a correlation of new information, and its residual 
(forecast management), which fails under the preview of endogeneity problem.   
In contrast, such problem is non-existent if the price at the end of third quarter is 
used as an index for new information, since forecasts management is only embedded in the 
forecast issued in fourth quarter. 
One important assumption in using return as an indicator of the management s new 
information of reported earnings is that the change in price (return), which reflects the new 
information that the investors in the stock market obtain during the year, is a proxy for new 
information that the management obtains throughout the year.  This assumption is 
imperative, due to the fact that in efficient markets; the management and investors have 
similar expectations regarding future earnings. 
However, in order to use the most accurate measure of forecasts management, 
another method, which is an instrumental variable method, developed by Wang (2003), is 
also utilized. In this method, as shown earlier, consists of two parts; forecasts 
management and new information which are represented by in the following 
formula.  
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(4-5)
Where, 
represents forecasts management of firm in the period 
represents new information of firm in the period . 
Wang (2003) argues that the forecasts management portion of the variable 
is firm specific. So, this variable is sensitive to the factors related to the company s 
characteristics such as litigation costs, shareholder lawsuits and long run reputation of the 
company. Forecasts management portion of the variable is persistent throughout the 
years, in contrast to new information, which varies annually. 
Due to the existence of firm specific characteristics regressing to 
results in the following:  
(4-6) 
should not be equal to zero. If is not equal to zero, then it is confirmed 
that has one persistent portion, and that is forecasts management. 
In addition, assuming that is positive satisfies two conditions of a 
valid instrumental variable. The first condition is that is highly correlated 
with meaning is a positive function of 
also satisfies the second condition of being a valid independent 
variable, by being uncorrelated to . Assuming that , and 
assuming that is uncorrelated with , and previous new information is uncorrelated with 
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the current new information, then . These assumptions are well 
grounded, as the arrival of new information is a purely random event, which means that it is 
uncorrelated to both across time and forecasts management. In short, Wang (2003) has 
determined a reliable instrument that correlates with , via forecasts management.  
The fitted value from the equation above is utilized as another measure of forecasts 
management, which is dubbed . 
The other proxy for forecasts management is the one developed by Matsumoto 
(2002), and later used by Burgstahler and Eames (2002).  
Following Burgstahler and Eames (2002) and Matsumoto (2002),another proxy for 
forecasts management is measured as follows: 
                                 (4-7) 
where, 
Subscripts refer to firm , industry code , quarter , and year , and  
= earnings per share changes between the current quarter and four quarters 
prior. 
= price per share of common equity, and  
= cumulative daily excess returns from three days after the four quarters 
prior earnings announcement to 20 days before the current quarter earnings announcement. 
and = the coefficients of the regression. 
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Similar to Matsumoto (2002), first the model for each firm-year is estimated by 
using all firm quarters of the year from the same industry, except those from firms for 
which the parameters are estimated. Second, I include only firm-years with 10 or more 
firm-quarters of data in the same industry in the estimation. Third, observations with 
variable values in the top and bottom half per cent of the respective distributions are deleted 
in order to lessen the impact of extreme values on the parameter estimates. Then, the 
parameter estimates that were obtained were used to determine the expected earnings 
changes from the prior firm year s fourth quarter: 
(4-8) 
This expected change is added to earnings per share from the same quarter in the 
prior year in order to obtain the expected forecast of the current quarter's earnings: 
                                                                   (4-9) 
Consequently, to obtain the expected forecast of annual earnings, I estimated the 
fourth quarter expected earnings (from Equation 4-9), and add the prior three quarters of 
earnings realizations. Istook into account the differences between the last reported forecast 
and the model-derived expected forecast as a proxy for forecasts management. 
The next section explains how to determine the measure of forecast management 
that is appropriate for the purpose of testing the hypotheses. 
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4.3.1.3 Choosing the Appropriate Measure of Forecasts Management 
Burgstahler and Eames (2006) argue that the benefit of forecast management to a 
firm should increase the amount of forecast management, however, forecast management 
also imposes an unduly cost to the firm. If there is a sudden drop in the marginal benefit at 
the point just to the right of the zero-surprise point for many firms, then zero surprise is the 
optimal level a firm should achieve by conducting forecast management. In reality, there 
might indeed be a sudden drop in the marginal benefit for many firms. The benefit to firms 
of just (barely) meeting expectations is much larger than that for firms that just fail to meet 
expectations by a small margin, whereas the benefit to firms that beat expectations is only 
marginally larger than that of firms that just (barely) meet expectations. This argument 
implies that firms that just (barely) meet expectations are more likely to conduct forecast 
management than firms that just fail to meet expectations and firms that just beat 
expectations.  
Based on the above arguments, the appropriate measure of forecasts management is 
examined by plotting the distribution of forecasts management measures against earnings 
surprises. The plot involves all firms, and consistent with the findings of Burgstahler and 
Eams (2002), the plots of forecast management measured against earnings surprises, which 
resulted in a small V shape around zero FE. This shows that a significant number of firms 
manage forecasts downward in order to just (barely) meet expectations. Therefore, it is 
assumed that an appropriate measure of forecasts management can capture this effect. The 
next section presents the plot of the distribution of forecasts management against earnings 
surprise. 
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4.3.1.4 The relationship of forecasts management and forecasts Errors 
Figure 4-3 shows four different forecasts management measures against earnings 
surprises. It can be surmised from the figure that firms manage forecasts downward to meet 
or beat expectations. 
 118    
Figure 4-3. Plot of forecasts management models against forecasts errors, 
All forecasts management measures are multiplied by 10 for ease of presentation  
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Figure 4-3 indicates that the plots of FM for and are decreasing from 
negative to positive forecasts errors. In other words, when the larger distance around zero-
earning surprise is considered, the value of and is substantially lower at the 
right side of the zero-earnings surprise. Figure 4-3shows that there is constant decrease in 
the value of the FM_lag when the forecasts errors increase. 
However, the plots for and show only a sharp 
decrease at zero forecast errors, and are relatively flat on the far left and far right side of 
zero-earnings surprise. The plot for 
 
and are consistent with 
the findings of Burgstahler and Eams (2002); the plots of forecast management against 
earnings surprises which forms a small V shape around zero earnings surprise is evidence 
of a significant number of firms managing downward forecasts to just meet the 
expectations. Therefore, it is assumed that an appropriate measure of forecasts management 
is capable of capturing this effect. As evident in Figure 4-3, the plot of 
and culminated in a V shape at zero-earnings surprise. This V shape is 
deeper for .  
If firms manage downward forecasts just to meet or beat expectations, then firms 
with zero or small earnings surprises should have relatively large negative forecasts 
managements. This is evident in Figure 4-3. There is a small "V" shape around zero-
earnings surprise point for and , and the bottom of the "V" 
is at zero-earnings surprise. Even though the decrease in forecasts management at the right 
of zero-earnings surprise (in the form of "V" shape) is very small, such a small V shape is 
consistent with Matsumoto (2002) prediction that firms having zero and small earnings 
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surprises are more likely to manage downward forecasts than firms in the immediate 
neighbourhood of zero surprise, or firms with slightly larger or smaller earnings surprises. 
In Figure 4-3, the value of FM for FM_Matsumoto at the right side of zero forecasts 
error is considerably lower than the value of FM_Matsumoto at the left side of the zero 
forecast error. It is possible that the reason for managing downward forecasts is to reach 
positive forecasts errors. Based on this assumption, and because the issue of managing 
downward forecasts to produce positive earnings surprises is consistent with previous 
findings (Matsumoto 2002), where the management manage the downward forecasts to 
produce positive earnings surprises
In both the and graphs of forecasts management 
against earnings surprises, it is observed that there is a decrease in the value of forecasts 
management on the right side of zero earnings surprise. Therefore, by taking into account 
two measures of forecasts management of and , it is observed 
that companies do downward forecasts management to reach zero or small positive 
earnings surprises, which is consistent with previous findings (Matsumoto 2002, 
Burgestahler & Eams 2005, Kasznik 1999). The plots of , measured 
against earnings surprises (Figure 4-3), provide at least some weak evidence that a 
significant number of firms manage forecasts in order to just meet expectations. 
Therefore, to avoid confusion, the results of the tests with FM_lag, FR and 
FM_Return are disregarded, and only the results of the tests with are 
reported. 
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The following section explains the measurement of the next dependent variable 
which is managers forecasts errors. 
4.3.1.5 Dependent Variable - Forecasts Errors 
According to Fang (2009), Rogers and Stocken (2011) and Xu (2010),Managers 
Forecast Error (FE) is the difference between the company s (management s) predicted 
(forecasted) and the reported earnings per share. The allocated formula is presented below: 
4-10) 
4.3.1.6 Unbiased forecast error 
Forecast errors (FE) are calculated as the difference between forecasted EPS and reported 
EPS deflated by the share price of the company at the end of 4th quarter. Similarly, reported 
EPS and pre-managed/unbiased forecast of EPS can be used to calculate forecast errors. 
The unbiased forecast is obtained by deducting forecast management from the reported 
forecast (Felleg, Moers, & Renders, 2012): 
I calculate two forecast errors. First, I calculate forecast errors based on deviations 
between reported forecast of EPS (without any revisions) and actual earnings, and I term it 
forecasts errors based on reported forecast (refer to Section 4.3.1.5).  
Second, I calculate forecast error based on unbiased forecasts of EPS and reported 
EPS, and denote this forecast error based on unbiased forecast . It signifies the magnitude 
of forecast errors in the absence of forecasts management.  
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(4-12) 
The next section explains the control variables.  
4.3.2 Moderating/Control Variables 
4.3.2.1 Measuring Learning Effect (Moderating/Control Variable) 
Previous researches (Ahmed, Billings, & Morton, 2004; Dye, 1988) show that the 
practice of forecast management is influenced by either positive market responses to 
meeting or beating market expectations or negative responses associated with a failure to 
do so. 
However, the market can learn from a firm's forecast management behaviour over a 
period of time. Although the market cannot immediately provide new information from 
forecast management, it will determine the difference(s) over time. New information can be 
verified when the market subsequently learns more. If the market can identify new infor-
mation from history, then it is also capable of identifying forecast management. If the 
market discerns from a firm's history that it has habitually engaged in downward forecast 
management, it may expect a behavioural repeat from that particular firm than from firms 
with a clean history. Consequently, market expectations will be weakly affected by the 
current forecast management, and the market will react less to an earnings surprise from 
such firms (Wang 2003, Rogers and Stocken 2005). 
Because the market becomes less sensitive to a firm's downward forecast manage-
ment, and the subsequent positive earnings surprise when a firm manages forecasts 
downward frequently, a rational firm may find it in its interest not to manage forecasts 
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downward frequently. More specifically, because the cost (benefit) of forecast management 
increases (declines) with the number of times it has been used in previous periods, the more 
number of times a firm has biased forecast downward in the past, the less likely it will do 
so in the current period (Rogers & Stocken, 2005; Wang, 2003).  
As Wang (2003) states, the more forecast management a firm conducts in its 
history, the less likely it will conduct one in the current period. In accordance with Wang 
(2003), in order to include the learning effect in the relationship of analysts 
recommendations and forecasts management, I use a moderating variable, which reflects 
the frequency of forecasts management (FREQ). Depending on the number of times the 
firm has had downward FM in four previous periods, this variable can have the value of 1, 
2, 3, or 4. The FREQ variable is used and moderating variable in the equation (4-13). 
However, it will be used as control variable in the equation (4-14). 
4.3.2.2 Measurement of Difficulty (Control Variable) 
Rogers & Stocken (2010) say that managers' incentives to misrepresent their 
information caused by the threat of litigation is a function of the difficulty market 
participants experience in detecting manager misrepresentation. Similarly, It is 
hypothesized that Managers' incentive to misrepresent their information caused by the stock 
transaction status is a function of the difficulty market participants experience in detecting 
manager s misrepresentation. Managers' incentive to offer biased forecasts as result of 
market incentives is attenuated by the market's ability to detect misleading forecasts. 
Difficulty reflects the degree of the market participants' ability to assess the 
credibility of a management s forecasts. The more difficult it is for managers to forecast 
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accurately, the harder it is for the market to assess the credibility of the management s 
forecasts. According to Rogers and Stocken (2005), there are several variables (indicators) 
that capture the difficulty of forecasting earnings accurately, and by using these variables, I 
use factor analysis to identify the difficulty construct. It is assumed that the indicator 
specific variances are uncorrelated across variables. Consistent with the goal of predicting 
forecast management, all variables are measured prior to the release of the forecasts. 
The following indicator variables generate a measure of forecasting difficulty 
(Rogers & Stocken, 2005):  
When earnings are difficult to predict, it is expected that analysts to disagree 
with the forthcoming earnings. The standard deviation of analyst forecasts is 
outstanding when the managers forecast is released, and STD_AF measures 
the lack of analyst consensus. 
If the difficulty the analysts are experiencing in forecasting earnings is 
correlated with time, then the variability of the previous analyst forecast 
errors is positively associated with the current difficulty of forecasting 
earnings. The standard deviation of the previous analysts forecasts errors, 
scaled by price for five years prior to the forecast release, STD_AFE, 
proxies for the difficulties analysts experienced when predicting earnings. 
It is more difficult to forecast a firm's earnings when the firm is unprofitable 
compared to when it is profitable. To recognize this asymmetry, the 
indicator Lagged-Loss equals 1 when a firm s quarterly earnings report 
preceding the forecast is negative, and 0 if otherwise. Also, the indicator of 
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Predict-Loss equals to 1 when the managers forecast of earnings is 
negative, and 0 if vice versa. 
It may be more difficult to forecast a firm's earnings when its "true" earnings 
are more volatile. "True" earnings are regarded as those that would be 
reported in the absence of the strategic manipulation or smoothing of 
earnings. Volatility in the firm's "true" earnings are positively associated 
with volatility in a firm's stock price, measured as the standard deviation of 
the daily stock price for 120 days before the forecast date; denoted as 
STD_RET.  
A firm's bid-ask spread is associated with a market specialist's perception of 
information asymmetry in the market, which is expected to increase with 
uncertainty regarding the firm's forthcoming earnings announcement (see 
Coller and Yohn 1997). 
The difficulty variable is used and moderating variable in the equation (4-13). However, it 
will be used as control variable in the equation (4-14). The next section explains the process 
used for building the variable difficulty. 
4.3.2.3 Factor Analysis for Difficulty 
4.3.2.3.1 Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) 
In multivariate statistics, exploratory factor analysis (EFA) is a statistical technique 
used to reveal the fundamental formation of a fairly big set of variables. EFA is a method 
within factor analysis whose main goal is to recognize the fundamental associations among 
measured variables (Baginski et al., 2011). It is normally used by academics when 
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developing a scale and serves to identify a set of latent constructs underlying a battery of 
measured variables (Baginski & Hassell, 1990). It should be applied when the researcher 
has no a priori hypothesis about factors or patterns of measured variables (Emami et al., 
2012). Measured variables are any one of numerous features that may be seen and gauged. 
Scientists should vigilantly study the number of measured variables to incorporate in the 
analysis (Baginski & Hassell, 1990). EFA techniques are more precise when every feature 
is denoted by several measured variables in the study. There should be as a minimum 3 to 5 
measured variables per factor (Emami et al., 2012). 
4.3.2.3.2 Fitting procedures 
Fitting procedures are utilized to guess the factor loadings and unique variances of 
the model (Factor loadings are the regression coef cients among items and factors and 
measure the in uence of a shared factor on a computed variable). There are a number of 
factor analysis matching techniques to select from, nonetheless there is not much evidence 
on each of their strengths and flaws. Principal axis factoring (PAF) and maximum 
likelihood (ML) are two extraction techniques that are commonly suggested. In general, 
ML or PAF provide the finest outcomes, subject to whether numbers are normally-
distributed or if the notion of normality has been infringed (Baginski & Hassell, 1990). 
4.3.2.3.3 Maximum Likelihood 
The maximum likelihood technique has several advantages in that it permits 
scientists to calculate of an extensive range of indexes of the goodness of fit of the model, it 
lets scientists to examine the statistical importance of factor loadings, compute relationships 
amongst elements and calculate confidence intervals for these factors (Knauer & 
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Wömpener, 2011). ML is the finest selection when data are normally distributed since it 
permits for the calculation of a wide variety of indexes of the goodness of fit of the model 
and allows statistical significance testing of factor loadings and correlations among factors 
and the calculation of confidence intervals (Knauer & Wömpener, 2011). ML should not be 
employed if the data are not normally distributed. 
4.3.2.3.4 Principal axis factoring (PAF) 
Called principal axis factoring since the first factor accounts for as much shared 
variance as feasible, then the second factor next most variance, and so on. PAF is a 
explanatory technique so it is finest to use when the emphasis is only on your sample and 
you do not intend to generalize the outcomes further than your sample (Fabrigar, Wegener, 
MacCallum, & Strahan, 1999). A benefit of PAF is that it can be employed when the 
supposition of normality has been disrupted (Knauer & Wömpener, 2011). Another benefit 
of PAF is that it is less probable than ML to make wrong answers (Emami et al., 2012).  
Following Rogers and Stocken (2005),the Difficulty latent variable is estimated by 
using the Principal Axis Factoring (PAF). The reason for using PAF is that some of the 
variables for estimating difficulty are dummy and therefore do not follow the normal 
distribution. 
By using a number of indicators that represent the difficulty in forecasting, factor 
analysis was used to calculate the difficulty. Table 4-3 reports result of the factor analysis 
when the continuous indicators of forecast difficulty are winsorized at 1 and 99 per cent 
levels
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Table 4-3. Correlation matrices and factor 
loadings for forecast difficulty measure 
Panel A: Correlation Matrix for Forecast Difficulty Indicators
STD-
AF STD-AFE Lag-loss 
Predict-
loss 
STD-
Ret Spread 
STD-AF 0.001 0.033* 0.052* 0.330** 0.001 
STD-AFE -0.001 -0.031 -0.075 0.970** 0.320** 
Lagged-loss -0.014 0.144** 0.104** -0.036 0.051* 
Predict-loss 0.077** 0.050 0.104** -0.054 -0.050 
STD-Ret 0.330** 0.954** 0.171** -0.029 0.954** 
Spread 0.019 0.740** 0.188** 0.160** 0.748**  
Panel B: Factor Loadings 
Indicator
STD-
AF STD-AFE Lag-loss 
Predict-
loss 
STD-
Ret Spread 
Factor Lording 0.065 0.997 0.015 -0.021 0.997 0.118 
Standardized 
Factor Score 0.039 0.958 0.112 -0.39 0.954 0.854 
Panel C: Test of appropriateness of factor analysis 
Total Variance Explained 68.30% 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Chi-
Square 50690 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
Measure 
of Sampling Adequacy
0.620 Sig. 0.000** 
*, ** Significant at 5% and 1% level respectively.  
All of the significant correlations among the indicators have their expected sign.  
The Standard factor analysis heuristics (e.g., scree-plots and eigenvalues) suggested three 
factors, and after considering the sign and the magnitude of the factor loadings (shown in the 
appendix i), I extract the first factor as a amount of forecast complexity. 
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The values for difficulty ranges from -0.58 to 0.84, where the lower values of the variable 
characterize less difficulty, whereas higher values characterize a greater difficulty. 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling sufficiency is utilized to evaluate the 
extents of the seen correlation coefficients regarding the extents of the incomplete correlation 
coefficients. Large KMO amounts are pleasant as correlations between pairs of variables (i.e. 
partial factors) can be explained by the other variables. According to the Kaiser (1974) KMO 
values which are above 0.5 are acceptable. 
Bartlett s test of sphericity is used in factor analysis to determine whether the correlations 
between the variables, examined simultaneously, do not differ significantly from zero. Factor 
analysis is usually conducted when the test is significant indicating that the correlations do differ 
from zero. 
To see the appropriateness of the factor analysis Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy have been calculated and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity have been performed. As 
reported in panel C of Table 4-3, the Bartlett s test of sphericity is significant at 0.000 level, 
which indicates that the factor analysis is appropriate (Bartlett, 1954). The KMO index is 0.620 
(higher than 0.50), which indicates that the factor analysis is appropriate. 
The next section presents the logistic regression models that test the relationship of 
analysts recommendations and FM (H1), and the analysts recommendations and FEs (H2). 
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4.3.3 Models 
4.3.3.1 The relationship of analysts recommendations and forecast management (H1) 
The first hypothesis will be tested by running the regression of FM on AR, including 
moderators (Learning effect and Difficulty) and several control variables that the reason for 
using and measurement process of them are explained in the following paragraphs.  
Prob(Down=1)= F( 0+ 1 AR+ 2AR×Difficulty + 3AR×FREQ+ 4 LMV+ 5 MB+ 6 Hightech 
+ 7 Lag_Loss+ 8Year+ )                                                                        (4-13) 
Where, 
AR= the Analysts recommendations that takes the value of 1 to 5 (table 4-1) 
Difficulty to asses the credibility of managers forecasts. 
FREQ Frequency of FM in the previous four years as index of learning effect 
Logarithm of market value 
Market to Book value 
1 if the firm is in one of the high technology industries such as 
pharmaceuticals, aircraft and spacecraft, medical, precision and optical instruments, radio, 
television and communication equipment, office, accounting and computing machinery, or zero 
otherwise. 
1 when a firm s quarterly earnings report preceding the forecast is negative 
and 0 otherwise. 
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= 1 if the firm-year is in 2010 and 0 otherwise. 
Taking a page out of Rakow (2010), I converted LMV, MB and indicator variables that 
are set to one, if the value of the original variable is greater than or equal to the sample median, 
or zero otherwise. 
Other control variable is the threat of litigation. Soffer et al. (2000) state that firms in a 
litigious environment want to prevent a large disappointment in the earnings announcement date 
(see Soffer et al. 2000), and this might be better accomplished by providing a less optimistic or 
even pessimistic forecast shortly before the earnings release date. 
Kasznik and Lev (1995) posit that firms in high-tech industries face higher risk of 
litigation as they experience, larger price fluctuations, which might translate into potential losses 
to investors. Similarly, Baginski et al. (2002) uses high-tech industries to control potential firm-
specific litigation risk. The earnings of high-tech firms are more volatile and inherently carry 
greater risks of inaccurate forecasts; all these factors could affect a firm s cost of capital. 
Therefore, a negative coefficient is predicted vis-à-vis high-tech, implying that high technology 
firms issue less optimistic forecasts. 
Using dummy variables instead of continuous variable allows in equation (4-13) to be 
interpreted as the effect of independent variable when the dummy variable is equal to zero, while 
through can be interpreted as the effect of each variables when the dummy variable is equal 
to one. 
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For improving the robustness of the results, additional tests will be conducted, which 
includes tests such as ANOVA in order to compare difference of means of both buy and sell 
companies. 
H2 is tested by running the following logit regression: 
Prob(meet=1)= F( 0+ 1 AR+ 2 FREQ+ 3 Difficulty + 4 LMV+ 5 MB+ 6DA + 7 Hightech+ 8 
Lag-loss+ 9 Year + )                                                                                   (4-14) 
Where, 
is represented by variable, which equals 1 if a firm's actual earnings meets or 
exceeds the management s forecasts, or 0 otherwise.  
is the firm's ability to manipulate earnings, as reflected by its discretionary accruals, 
which makes it ideal as a control. I use a version of the cross-sectional modified Jones model 
which is used by Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) to estimate discretionary accruals. Other 
independent and control variables are similar to what was explained for equation (4-13). 
For testing H3 and H4, the ANOVA will be used to test the difference of mean value of 
FM between the companies that meet or miss forecasts in the buy and sell companies separately. 
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For testing H5 and H6, after removing  (deducting) value of forecasts management from 
the issued forecast12, forecasts errors are calculated using nonbiased forecasts and reported 
forecasts. Then, chi-square test will be used to test the differences in the occurrences of positive 
FEs between FEs that are calculated by using unbiased forecasts (unmanaged FEs) and FEs that 
are calculated by using issued forecasts. 
4.3.3.2 Analysis of Variance 
One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) is a technique used to compare means of two or 
more samples (Howell, 2012). The ANOVA tests the null hypothesis that samples in two or 
more groups are pulled from populations with the identical mean values. To do this, two 
estimates are got of the population variance. The ANOVA creates an F-statistic, the ratio of the 
variance calculated amongst the averages to the variance inside the samples. If the group means 
are pulled from populations with the same mean values, the variance among the group means 
would be lesser than the variance of the samples, following the central limit theorem. A upper 
ratio therefore suggests that the samples were drained from populations with dissimilar mean 
values (Howell, 2012). These estimates rely on various assumptions. 
                                                 
12Following the methodology of (Gleason & Mills, 2008) the reported forecast is decomposed into the management and unmanaged component. 
The unmanaged forecast is defined as the difference between the reported forecast and the managed component (Felleg et al., 2012).   
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Response variable are normally distributed (or approximately normally 
distributed).  
Samples are independent.  
in order to obtain better comparison of forecasts management (H1) between buy and sell 
companies, the differences of means of forecasts management measure ( ), 
between buy and sell companies are tested in section 5.2.3.1.2. 
4.3.4 Data and Sample 
4.3.4.1 Unit of Analysis 
Unit of analysis explains the level of analysis where information regarding the research is 
collected (Zikmund, 2003). Although determining the unit of analysis is very simple, it is very 
critical to ascertain the unit of analysis on the threshold of the study. The reason is that the 
determination of the variables for the theoretical model, sample size, suitable data collection 
approaches are reliant on the unit of analysis (Zikmund, 2003). This study chose the firm-year as 
the unit of analysis.  
4.3.4.2 Data Collection 
The company s stock trading information, along with the forecast data, is collected from 
the Bloomberg database. The potential market that was considered for data collection is 
companies in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 
The analysts provide financial information to investors, contributing to the efficiency of 
the market. In smaller stock exchanges, there are comparably less analysts, and therefore useful 
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information is less available to investors. Numerous analysts analyse companies in NYSE. 
According to Li and Ding (2010), Castura et al. (2010), and Correia et al. (2005), the NYSE is 
semi-strongly efficient. Since this research considers stock characteristics as an incentive that 
affects the quality of accounting information, semi-strong efficiency is a prerequisite for testing 
the hypotheses, and since NYSE is a relatively large and efficient market, it will be taken into 
account in this research.  
The other reason for considering NYSE is that many analysts are active in the NYSE 
market. This creates large samples of analysts recommendations, which makes the 
generalization of the result of this research more convenient. 
The years of 2009-2010 are chosen for sample period. The reason the sample was not 
extended to previous years is that the year 2008 was not an optimum year for most equity 
investors (Longstaff, 2010). Although most financial analysts had anticipated the appreciation in 
stock, and subsequently derivative markets, they unexpectedly experience depreciation in the 
markets. In fact, the financial/credit crisis caused a downturn in consumer and business spending 
in the year, which were subsequently reflected in equity markets.  
According to Longstaff (2000) the subprime crisis brought about an almost complete halt 
to the fledgling structured-credit market, a serious credit crunch for both individuals and 
financial institutions, and a major decline in the liquidity of debt securities in virtually every 
market. Longstaff (2010) explains the stages over which the shocks in the credit market spill 
over into the stock market. He explains that when contagion occurs the negative returns in the 
credit market affect subsequent returns in other markets like the stock market. 
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For example, some of the effects on the stock market were that, due to the external and 
internal economic events, US indices abruptly declined in the year. The Dow Jones Index (DJI) 
experienced a decline of around 35%, and the S&P 500 and tech laden Nasdaq (IXIC) indices 
dropped to near 40% during the year. Following the stock market crash and dramatic decline (s) 
in stock prices, the Business Week Journal (Mandel 2008) on October 10, 2008, described the 
existing market condition as the stock market meltdown, and called it the "Panic of 2008". 
Therefore, the sudden fall in stock prices in 2008 resulted in significant losses for the markets 
participants. This downward trend of US stock market was to some extent, reversed in the year 
2009.  
4.3.5 The Crisis Effect 
The reason the sample was not extended to previous years is that, due to credit crisis 
there was uncertainty in the U.S. financial market. Such uncertainty would have affected the 
quality of both managers forecasts (which acts as my dependent variable) and the quality of the 
analysts recommendations (which acts as my independent variable). Such effects will be 
explained in the following sections. 
4.3.5.1 How the Crisis Affect the Managers Forecast 
Shivakumar, Urcan, Vasvari, & Zhang (2011) explain that, how the credit crisis increased 
the information uncertainty in the stock market. Kim, Pandit & Wasley (2012), examine the role 
macroeconomic uncertainty plays in influencing managers decision to issue management 
earning forecasts as well as the characteristics of the forecasts that get issued. They find that, the 
level of market-wide uncertainty affects the characteristics of forecasts. Managers shift to 
earnings preannouncements and to shorter-horizon, but more precise forecasts. In addition, they 
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find that firms with higher litigation risk increase earnings guidance when market uncertainty is 
high, presumably to shield themselves from legal liability.  
In addition, Kim, Pandit, & Wasley (Xu, 2010) find that during periods of high market-
level uncertainty, managers tend to issue more neutral news forecasts and they reduce bad news 
forecasts. Similarly, Shivakumar et al. (2011), present that, the significance of managers 
forecasts to credit markets is chiefly altered in periods of high insecurity, as experienced during 
the recent credit crisis. The reason might be that, according to Epstein & Schneider (2008), Lang 
(1991), Shivakumar et al. (2011) and Veronesi (1999) market reactions to information vary 
depending on the level of information uncertainty. 
The following section explains the effect of crisis on the analysts recommendations. 
4.3.5.2 How the Crisis Affect the Analysts Rrecommendations  
According to Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012) and Hong and Kacperczyk  (2010),there have 
been significant amount of both broker closures and broker mergers during the financial crisis. 
Such broker closures and broker mergers cause analysts to be terminated and analyst coverage to 
decrease for the firms hitherto covered by these analysts. 
In addition, Derrien & Kecskés (2013) shows that decrease in analyst coverage increases 
information asymmetry. Therefore, as a result of reduction in analyst following stock prices 
decrease substantially and thus the cost of capital would be increased. Such increase in the cost 
of capital increases the cost of external funding both in absolute terms and in relation to the cost 
of internal funding, the ideal extent of external financing decreases as well. In summary, a 
decrease in analyst coverage leads to a reduction in investment and financing. Thus, the decrease 
in analyst following causes firms to switch to funding that is less subtle to information 
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asymmetry such reduction in the investment and funding will considerably influence the 
corporate reporting policies.  
To avoid the noise of meddling of the effects of financial crises, the sample was not 
extended to the previous years13. On the other hand, since Matsumoto (2002) documented that 
the tendency of avoiding negative earnings surprises tend to increase over time, the most recent 
available data was chosen for analysis in order to avoid obsolete/unusable results. Therefore, I 
expect to discover significant results by concentrating on the available data of latest years (i.e. 
2009-10). The total number of companies that traded their stocks on AMEX in NYSE is 2833. 
Due to the difficulty in interpreting their accruals (Desai, Rajgopal, & Venkatachalam, 2004; 
Riley, 2007), the financial companies will be omitted from the sample. 
4.4 Characteristics of the Data 
The Bloomberg database is used to identify 5666 annual financial statements that are 
released between January 2009 and December 2010. From this number of companies, the AR for 
4489 companies were available (table 2). The sample selection procedure is summarized in Table 
4-4. 
                                                 
13In order to evaluate the reliability of the results on longer time periods, the researcher tested the hypotheses using all firm years between 2005 
and 2010. The results showed that except for the second hypothesis that was accepted, there are no significant difference between the crisis and 
the non-crisis periods. However, since the sample of 2009 and 2010 firm-years are big enough and are on the safe side, we present the 
interpretations on the basis of the results of the years 2009 and 2010 in order to avoid distorting the effect of crisis. The results of the analysis on 
the basis of longer time periods (2005-2010) are available based on requests.  
 139   
Table 4-4. Sampling procedure 
Number of all company-years in NYSE (2009-10)  5666 
Less: Companies that their AR are not available (1177) 
Number of the companies for which AR is available (Table 4-3)  4489 
Less: Utilities, transportation or financial service 423   
Forecasts are not available 285   
Forecasts issued less than one month prior to the end of fiscal year 580   
Insufficient data to calculate standard deviation of analysts forecasts 192   
Missing data for control variables on Bloomberg 104   
Insufficient time-series data on Bloomberg 237   
Forecasts that are not in quarter 4 92    
(1913) 
Sample company-years for testing hypotheses 2576 
  
Since firms in regulated industries are more likely to have different incentives than non-
regulated firms (Matsumoto, 2002), regulated industries including utilities, transportation 
companies, and financial services companies are excluded from the sample. 
There are a total of 285 company-years with unavailable forecast in the Bloomberg 
database, while there are 580 company-years with forecasts issued within a month prior to the 
fiscal year end. These company-years were dismissed to avoid including preannouncements 
(Rogers and Stocken 2005).  
For 192 company-years, few analysts are actually following the information of the firms, 
which renders the determination of the analysts forecasts standard deviation unreliable. For 104 
of the company-years, data for calculation of control variables are unavailable. Two hundred 
thirty seven Companies with insufficient data for earnings managements calculation, which is 
another control variable, are also excluded. Finally, among the remaining company-years for 92 
companies, the forecasts for the fourth quarter are unavailable.  
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Among the remaining company-years, the Bloomberg database was searched for 
management earnings estimates, and actual (realized) earnings. The database was also searched 
for data regarding the analysts recommendations, along with other relevant financial data 
pertaining to this work. 
Based on the availability of the aforementioned data and in order to conduct prediction 
tests that involve examining forecasts reactions to analysts recommendations, a subsample of 
2576 forecasts was used.  
4.4.1 Multivariate Assumptions 
Multivariate analysis needs several suppositions to be met. Breaches from assumption 
can lead to a number of difficulties which ranges from mistaken results of significantly wrong 
and biased coefficients predications of the hypothesized associations (Hair, Black, Babin, 
Anderson, & Tatham, 2006). 
4.4.1.1 Normality 
Normality is applied to define a curve that is bell-shaped and symmetrical. The maximum 
score frequency is shown in the midpoint with lower frequencies near to the edges. 
Normality can be settled by measuring the variables levels of skewness or kurtosis. According to 
Hair et al. (2006), if the value of skew or kurtosis (ignoring any minus sign) is more than twice 
the standard error, then the distribution is meaningfully different from a normal distribution. 
However, concern of non-normality should not be any problem here because of the study's large 
sample size (n>200). Hair et al. (2006) highlighted that for sample sizes of 200 or more, the 
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"detrimental effect of non-normality" is negligible (p. 80). However, for purpose of realizing the 
extent to which normality distribution is assumed in the sample, results are analysed. 
4.4.2 Outliers 
Outliers are instances that have out-of-range values as compared to the bulk of other 
instances. The existence of outliers in the data may mislead statistical test result. Outliers can be 
detected from the residual scatter plot. However, a small number of outliers in big samples are 
common and most of the time, taking any action is not required (Hair et al. 2006). 
Following Rogers and Stocken (2005) to avoid the effect of outliers, the data was 
winsorized at the top and bottom 1 per cent.  
4.4.3 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity mean there is extreme intercorrelations amongst the independent 
variables. In examining relationships between independent and dependent variables, the 
incidence of Multicollinearity can produce several problems including imprecise outcomes of 
regression coefficient approximation. One of the ways to check for the incidence of 
multicollinearity in the data is by measuring the tolerance and the variance inflation factor. 
Tolerance is a value that measures the degree of the independent variables variability that is not 
explained by the other independent variables in the model. Variance inflation factor (VIF) is the 
opposite of Tolerance and is computed merely by overturning the tolerance value. An sign of 
multicollinearity is when the value of Tolerance is less than 0.10 and VIF is more than 10 (Hair 
et al., 2006). 
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As suggested by Hair et al. (2006), multicollinearity among independent variables can be 
assessed by the VIF values caused from the analysis of standard multiple regressions among the 
independent and dependent variables. Remedies for multicollinearity troubles should be taken if 
the VIF value shows more than 10.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, and following the previous literature, control 
variables are included in the analysis of the relationship between analysts recommendation, 
forecasts management and forecasts errors in the following sections to analyse the relationship in 
the presence of difficulty and frequency.  
4.5 Summary 
In this chapter, following Abarbanell and Lehavy(2003b) and Dutta and Gigler (2002), it 
was hypothesised that the stocks recommended by analysts to sell (sell companies) presented 
non-growth companies that are unable to conduct earnings management, and therefore, in order 
to produce positive earnings surprise, they subscribed to downward biased forecasts strategy. 
However, the stocks that analysts recommend to buy (buy companies) are representing growth 
companies that possesses profitable investment opportunities, and their future news are highly 
followed by investors, which can effectively conduct income increasing earnings management. 
Furthermore, after explaining the procedures that have been used to calculate the research 
variables, the chapter discussed the statistical techniques that are used to test the hypotheses. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with explaining the data and sample of the research.   
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Chapter 5. FINDINGS 
5.1 Introduction 
The discussion of the findings in this study will be presented in this chapter. Firstly, 
this chapter presents the descriptive statistics of the variables. After presenting the 
descriptive statistics that are related to the sample, this chapter presents the analysis of the 
results related to the relationship of analysts recommendation and forecasts management. 
On top of that, the initial tests on the relationship, as per the analysts recommendations, 
forecasts management and forecasts errors will also be presented. Finally, the logistic 
regression is used to include control and moderating variables of the learning effect and 
difficulty. All hypotheses testing are conducted in the two samples collected from all 
companies involved, and also from the companies that have near-zero forecasts errors. To 
remind the reader, the following paragraphs restate the research questions, hypotheses that 
fit into them and the statistical procedures that applied to answer each question. 
The analysis of the relationship of analyst s recommendation and forecasts 
management is in relation to the first research question which states Does the management 
of sell companies produce more downward biased forecasts than the management of buy 
companies?
In relation to the first question, the hypothesis 1 (H1) states that, buy companies 
issue less pessimistic (i.e., more informative) forecasts than sell companies . In other 
words, sell companies issue more pessimistic (less informative) forecasts than the buy 
companies. 
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In order to answer the first research question and test the H1, chi-square is used to 
test whether sell companies issue more pessimistic forecasts than buy companies. In 
addition, the analysis of variance is used to test the difference in the mean of forecasts 
management of the buy and sell companies. Finally, in the logistic regression analysis, a 
number of control variables are included to test the relationship of analysts 
recommendations and forecasts management. 
The second research question is Does the management of sell companies have 
higher positive forecasts errors than the management of buy companies? To address the 
research question 2, Hypothesis 2 (H2) states that, Sell companies have higher frequency of 
positive forecasts errors than buy companies.  
To answer the second research question, chi-square is used to test the differences in 
frequency of positive forecasts errors between buy and sell companies. In addition, analysis 
of variance is used to test the difference of the mean forecasts errors between the buy and 
sell companies. Finally, in the logistic regression analysis, a number of control variables are 
included to test the relationship of the analysts recommendations and forecasts errors.  
The rest of the chapter answers the third research question which states Does the 
management of sell companies produce more downward biased forecasts to achieve 
positive forecasts errors than the management of buy companies?
Hypothesis 3 (H3) states that, in sell companies, those that meet forecasts are more 
likely to do income decreasing FM than companies that do not meet forecasts. 
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To test the hypothesis 3, analysis of variance is used to test the significance of 
difference in mean FM for companies that meet the forecasts and the companies that miss 
the forecasts in the sell companies. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4) states that, there is no significant difference in income decreasing 
FM between buy companies that meet forecasts and those that do not meet forecasts. 
To test the H4, analysis of variance is used to test the significance of difference in 
mean FM for companies that meet the forecasts and the companies that miss the forecasts 
in the buy companies. 
Hypothesis 5 (H5) states that, For sell companies, the frequency of positive 
forecasts errors is expected to decrease when forecasts errors are based on unmanaged 
rather than issued forecasts. 
To test the hypothesis 5, chi-square is used to test the frequency of positive 
forecasts errors between forecasts errors that are calculated using unmanaged and issued 
forecasts in the sell side companies.   
Hypothesis 6 (H6) states that, for buy companies, incidence of positive forecasts 
errors is not expected to decrease when forecasts errors are based on unmanaged rather 
than issued forecasts.  
To test the hypothesis 6, contingency table is used to test the frequency of positive 
forecasts errors between forecasts errors that are calculated using unmanaged and issued 
forecasts in the buy side companies. 
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The next section presents the characteristics of the data. 
5.2 Findings 
Descriptive statistics such as minimum, maximum, means, standard deviation, 
median, skewness and kurtosis were obtained for the interval-scaled dependent and 
independent variables. The software of SPSS Statistics 18.0 was employed for this purpose.  
The descriptive statistics for forecasts revisions, errors, management and analysts 
recommendations are shown in Table 5-1.  
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Table 5-1. Descriptive statistics for independent variable, proxies for incentives to 
avoid negative earnings surprises, and control variables 
Variables Mean  
Standard 
deviation  
1st
Quartile  Median  
3rd
Quartile  Skewness  Kurtosis 
Dependent Variables 
   
FE -0.00011  0.000915  -0.00019  -0.00001  0.00003  -0.00122  0.00137 
FM_Matsumoto -0.00951  0.001049  -0.00408  -0.00182  -0.00052  0.000246  -0.00147 
Independent Variable 
       
AR 3.816  0.527  3.444  3.857  4.200  -0.615  0.813 
Control Variables 
 
Diff -0.02087  0.055673  -0.03485  -0.01702 0.01735  -0.06846  0.08356 
Freq 0.726535  0.663353  0  1  1  -  - 
LMV 9.100301  0.792907  8.536527  9.172754  9.634178  -0.01133  0.50345 
MB 1.547844  0.476359  1.15  1.720001  2.860003  -0.33807  0.580851 
STD_Ret 9.947587  1.562583  8.879559  9.881865  11.03039  -0.43207  2.86390 
STD_AF 0.260425  0.443315  0.029829  0.102065  0.290273  0.62355  0.93246 
DA -0.00887  0.161277  -0.04403  0.000984  0.039199  -0.21503  0.241915 
Spread 0.016223  0.31589  0.000044  0.000212  0.001128  0.03638  0.004513 
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As proven in Table 5-1, the mean and the median of the measure of forecasts 
management (FM_Matsumoto) are negative. That is in line with the findings of Kasznik 
(1995), which state that companies generally engage in negative forecast management for 
the purpose of meeting or beating the forecasts. 
The first and third quartiles value of -0.004082 and-0.000525 explains that most of 
the companies have negative forecast management. The skewness value of 0. 0
proves a positive skew of distribution to the right. Furthermore, the negative kurtosis value 
of -0.001476 points to a curve that is less peaked than the normal distribution. Accordingly, 
it can be concluded that distribution is reasonably normal. 
The mean and median value for the variable FE are -0.00011and -0.00001 
respectively (Table 5-1) which indicates that the overall extent of negative forecasts errors 
is larger than positive forecasts errors, while the standard deviation is 0.000915. The third 
quartile value of 0.00003 shows that there are some companies which have positive 
forecasts errors. The negative value of skewness-0.00122 shows a negligible skew of 
distribution to the left. In addition, the positive value of kurtosis 0.00137 is a sign of a 
curve that is faintly more peaked than the normal distribution. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that distribution is logically normal. 
The analysts recommendations vary from 1 to 5. The mean analysts 
recommendation is 3.816, and the median of the analysts recommendation is 3.875, which 
indicates that the greater percentages of the companies are sell side companies. 
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5.2.1 Initial Tests 
Before reporting the findings of the main tests of hypotheses, the findings of initial 
tests, including tests of correlations and graphs of forecasts management are duly reported.  
As explained in the previous chapter, the measure of forecasts management which is 
used in this study is . Table 5-2 presents the correlation coefficients 
among management s forecasts management measure ( ), management s 
forecasts errors (i.e. the difference between managers forecasts and actual earnings), and 
the analysts recommendations. In the correlation table, the measure is considered as a 
binary variable, in which if and 
otherwise. Similarly, FE is also considered as binary variables, in 
which if FE is either zero or positive and otherwise. As it is evident in Table 
5-2, there are positive correlations between FE and the measure of FM ( ).  
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Table 5-2. Correlations matrix.  
Pearson correlations appear below diagonal for all companies, 
above diagonal for the companies in small distance around zero 
forecast error 
AR  FE  FM_Matsumoto  Difficulty  Freq  AR*Difficulty  AR*Freq  
AR   -0.104** 0.131** 0.041 0.005 0.008 0.187**  
FE  -0.108  0.242** 0.352** -0.429** 0.324** 0.000  
FM_Mutsomoto 0.077** 0.030*  0.074* 0.114** 0.049 -0.074** 
Difficulty  -0.47 0.000 -0.016  -0.701** 0.969** -0.663**  
Freq  0.084 -0.248** -0.14 -0.061**  -0.684** 0.957**  
AR*Difficulty  -0.033* 0.001 -0.013 0.699** -0.139**  -0.683**  
AR*Freq  0.354** -0.201** 0.042** -0.055** 0.914** -0.139**   
*.**: Significant at 0.05 and 0.01  
AR = Analysts Recommendations. 
FE = is the forecast Error. 
FM_Matsumoto = is the measure of forecasts management which is calculated through using parameters that are obtained 
from prior firm-years. (FM_Matsumoto is set to 1 if FM measure (FM_Matsumoto) is negative and 0 otherwise) 
Difficulty = Reflects how much it is difficult for the market participants to assess the credibility of management s 
forecasts 
FREQ= is the frequency of forecasts management in the previous years  
According to Burgestahler and Eams (2002), due to the management considering 
the cost of managing forecasts to be exorbitantly high, they limit the magnitude of forecasts 
managements to a small level. In addition the benefit of beating forecasts by a high extent 
and producing large positive FE is only marginally higher than just meeting the forecasts 
and producing small positive FE. Therefore, hypotheses testing were conducted on two 
subsamples of all of the companies (first subsample) and the companies that have small 
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positive FEs (second subsample). Table 5-2 presents the correlation of the variables in two 
subsamples of all of the companies, and second for the companies that have near-zero FEs. 
The negative correlation of with (Analysts recommendations) is consistent 
with the work reported by Dutta and Gigler (2003) and Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003b), 
who believe that buy-companies conduct income increasing earnings management to meet 
or beat forecasts. The significant positive correlations between and 
confirms that sell-companies do income-decreasing forecasts management. 
Pallant (2005, p. 150) suggests that a commonly used cut-off points for determining 
the presence of multicollinearity  is a tolerance value of less than 0.1, or a Variance 
Inflation Factor  (VIF) value of more than 10. The VIF for the independent variables are 
indicated in Table 5-3, which indicates an absence of high correlation between independent 
variables.  
Table 5-3. Variance Inflation Factor for the companies near zero FE 
Variables AR_Freq AR_Diff Lag_loss Year AR LMV High_Tech MB Mean VIF 
VIF 2.87 2.78 1.27 1.21 1.19 1.1 1.02 1.01 1.56 
5.2.1.1 The relationship of analysts recommendations and forecasts management  
Figure 5-1 represents measure of forecasts management (FM_Matsumoto) against  . 
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Figure 5-1. The graph of on Analysts Recommendations (AR). 
All measures are multiplied by 10 for ease of presentation. The analysts recommendations vary from 1 
to 5 whereas 5 = Strong sell, 4= Sell, 3= Hold, 2= Buy and 1 = Strong buy.  
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Figure 5-1shows that sell-companies perform more downward forecasts revision 
than buy-companies. The graph shows that most of the companies do downward 
forecasts revision, which is consistent with the theories discussed by Wang (2003) and 
Lim (2001); when there is long horizon, managers are initially optimistic and manage 
their forecasts downward afterward.  
According to graph in Figure 5-1, sell companies do more 
downward forecasts management compared to buy companies. However, a number of 
more accurate techniques will be used to test the differences of between 
buy and sell-companies. The next sections present some more accurate techniques that 
have been used to test the differences in the measures of and in the buy and sell 
companies. 
The next sections describe the findings of the hypotheses testing. 
5.2.2 Main Tests 
Burgstahler and Eames (2002) argued that the benefit of forecast management to a 
firm may increase of the amount of forecast management, i.e. there may be incremental 
benefits to beating rather than just meeting analyst forecasts. However, forecast 
management also imposes a cost on the firm. Among such costs would be management bad 
reputation for inaccurate reporting (Graham et al., 2005; Hair et al., 2006). For example 
Ettredgeet al. (2011) state that forecast bias will cause the management to lose reputation. 
Such loss of reputation could be a kind of cost that management incurs as a result of doing 
forecasts management. 
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If there is a sudden drop in the marginal benefit at the point just to the right of the 
zero surprise point for many firms, then zero surprise is the optimal level a firm should 
achieve by conducting forecast management. Realistically, this scenario is entirely possible. 
The benefit(s) to firms to just meet expectations is much larger than that for firms just 
failing to meet expectations by a small margin, whereas the benefit to firms that beat the 
expectations is only marginally larger than that of firms that just meet the  expectations. 
This argument implies that firms that just meet expectations are more likely to conduct 
forecast management compared to firms that just fail to meet expectations and firms that 
just beat expectations. 
Therefore, the main statistical tests are divided into two parts. In the first part, the 
hypotheses are tested by taking into consideration all of the involved company-years (first 
subsample). In the second part, the hypotheses are tested by considering the company-years 
that are in the vicinity of zero forecasts errors (second subsample).  
The first subsample was 2576 company-years. The second subsample was 1303 
company-years.  
5.2.3 Analysis of First Subsample 
5.2.3.1 Relationship of Analysts Recommendation and Forecasts Management (H1) 
Sell companies are expected to have more pessimistic (less optimistic) forecasts 
management. Therefore, the research hypothesis is presented as follows: 
H1: Sell companies issue more pessimistic forecasts than buy companies.  
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The study tests the proposed relationship of analysts recommendations and 
forecasts management by using the contingency table. 
5.2.3.1.1 Contingency table 
Contingency table is essentially used to analyse and record the relationship between 
two or more categorical variables. A categorical forecast is a forecast of the happening or 
not happening of a particular incident, which should be openly described. In this test, I am 
interested in predicting whether or not the forecasts management is downward 
(FM_Matsumoto is negative) or forecasts management is upward (FM_Matsumoto is 
positive), the downward forecasts management will really happen or not. This leads to four 
possibilities as laid out in the Table 5-4. The values of the table are achieved by checking 
the number of times each of the four likely patterns of forecast and observed category 
happened. 
In order to provide evidence that the analysts recommendations do capture the incentive to 
conduct downward forecasts management to avoid negative earnings surprises, I examine 
the relation between: (1) the analysts recommendations, and (2) the forecasts management 
(DOWN). Table 5-4 presents the Chi-square test
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Table 5-4. Association between analysts recommendations and 
downward forecasts managements for all of the companies. 
Contingency table classifying firm-years based on (1) stock 
transaction status, and (2) sign of forecasts management  
proxies for forecasts management 
FM_Matsumoto 
Positive 
(Down =0) 
Negative 
(Down=1) 
Number of firm-years (% 
of firm years conditional 
on Buy or Sell 
Sell 27.38% 674 
72.62% 
1792 
Buy 32.11% 255 
67.89% 
564 
Pearson Chi-square  2= 4.2P=0.041 
The third and fourth columns summarize the relation between stock transaction status and 
forecasts management . The Chi-square analysis showed that, the sell-companies 
have higher frequency of negative compared to buy companies, with the 
differences being significant at 0.05 levels. The Chi-Square value is 4.2. Table 5-4 indicates 
that sell-companies have higher frequency of negative forecasts management compared to 
buy companies. This supports the H1.  
5.2.3.1.2 Analysis of Variance 
In order to make sure that the assumptions of ANOVA hold, I explain them in the 
following paragraphs.  
According to Hair et al. (2006), if the value of Skew or Kurtosis (ignoring any 
minus sign) is larger than twofold the standard error, then the distribution considerably 
varies from a normal distribution. Nevertheless, concerns of non-normality is not a concern 
at this point due to the study's big sample size (n>200). Hair et al. (2006) highlighted that 
for sample sizes of 200 or more, the "detrimental effect of non-normality" is insignificant 
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(p. 80). However, for aim of comprehending the degree to which normality distribution is 
supposed in the sample, results regarding the distribution of the sample are analysed. 
As reported in Table 5-1, it is evident that the measures of Skewness and Kurtosis 
are -0.00122 and 0.00137 for FE and 0.000246 and -0.0147 for FM_Matsumoto 
respectively. According to Table 5-1, the standard deviation for the FE and FM_Matsumoto 
are 0.000915 and 0.001049 respectively. Since none of the values of Skewness and 
Kurtosis for FE and FM_Matsumoto are higher than twice of their respective standard 
deviations, it is concluded that the distribution of FE and FM_Matsumoto are normal. 
Therefore, the first assumption for ANOVA is met. The second assumption for Analysis of 
Variance is also met as the sample of buy and sell companies are independent.  
Next, in order to obtain better comparison of forecasts management (H1) between 
buy and sell companies, the differences of means of forecasts management measure 
( ), between buy and sell companies are tested. 
 158   
Table 5-5. Test of comparison of means of among companies that have been 
classified into the groups of buy and sell, according to their value of (for all 
companies)   
           N (Mean) 
                   FM_Matsumoto
Minimum 
(Maximum) 
FM_Matsumoto
STDEV 
FM_Matsumoto
Sell  2465(-0.01026)
-0.03649
(0.0374) 0.00515 
Buy 809 (-0.00258) 
-0.02647 
(0.0259) 0.00701 
All  3274(-0.00836)
-0.0365
(0.0374) 0.00606 
Buy vs. sell F sig.0.859 0.354
In Table 5-5the difference of measure of forecasts management is not significant 
between the groups of buy and sell. The Table 5-5 indicates that, there is no significant 
difference in the forecasts management of the buy side and sell side companies. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, and following the previous literature, control 
and moderator variables are included in the analysis of the relationship between analysts 
recommendation, forecasts management and forecasts errors in the following sections to 
analyse the relationship in the presence of difficulty and frequency. The next section 
explains running the regression in presence of the control variables.  
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5.2.3.1.3 Control Variables for Testing the Relationship of Analysts Recommendations and 
Forecasts Management 
Based on the findings of previous researches, a number of control variables should 
be considered when regressing forecasts management as dependent variable(s). This section 
explains the control variables that have been previously stated to significantly affect the 
management incentive to conduct forecasts management, while the moderator variables 
will be explained in the next section. 
In addition to the incentives that are publicly observable, managers face the 
incentives to misrepresent their information that are indirectly observable, but are implicitly 
revealed through their forecasting behaviour; for instance, a manager's performance 
contract, which often is not publicly observable, may induce biased forecasting (Kim & 
Shi, 2011). 
Numerous researches discover that forecast behaviour is related with a firm s size 
(Baginski and Hassell 1997; Bamber and Cheon 1998). The natural log of the firm's market 
capitalization one day earlier to the forecast; its denoted , is utilized as a proxy for a 
firm s size. Bamber and Cheon (1998) documented that expansion prospects influence a 
firm's forecasting behaviour. They use a firm's market value to book value of equity ratio, 
M/B, as a measure of a firm's growth opportunities. M/B is computed as the share of the 
firm's market capitalization one day earlier to the forecast, divided by the preceding year's 
book value of equity. In addition, I included the lagged losses (Hayn 1995; Basu 1997). 
The other control variable is the threat of litigation. Soffer et al. (2000) stated that 
that firms in a litigious environment want to prevent a large disappointment in the earnings 
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announcement date (see Soffer et al. 2000). This goal might be better accomplished by 
providing a less optimistic or even pessimistic forecast, shortly before the earnings release 
date. 
Kasznik and Lev (1995) posit that firms involved in the high-tech industries face 
greater risks of litigation, as they face larger price fluctuations that might result in potential 
losses to investors. Similarly, Baginski et al. (2002) uses the high-tech industry to control 
for potential firm-specific litigation risks. High-tech firms have added unpredictable profits 
and larger risk of imprecise predictions; all of these issues could influence a firm s cost of 
capital. Hence, a positive coefficient on High-tech is predicted, which means that most of 
the time, high-technology firms issue less optimistic (more pessimistic) forecasts. 
In order to test the relationship of the analysts recommendations and forecasts 
management in the presence of the aforementioned control variables, logistic regressions 
were used to regress measure of forecast managements against the analysts 
recommendations.  Table 5-6 reports the results for the logistic regression analysis of the 
FM (Equation 4-13).  
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Table 5-6. Results for the managers forecast bias hypothesis (Hypothesis 1). 
Logistic regression results for the first subsample.  
Model  Prob(Down=1)= F( 0+ 1AR+ 2AR×Difficulty+ 3AR×Freq+ 4LMV+ 5MB+ 6Hightech+ 7Lag_loss+ 8Year)  
Dependent Variable: (Down=1) if FM_Matsumoto is negative and  (Down=0) otherwise  
Variable 
Predicted 
sign Coefficients p-values Marginal effects
Dependent FM_Matsumoto FM_Matsumoto FM_Matsumoto 
Independents 
Constant  ? 1.034 0.276 -
AR  0.689 0.010** 1.993
Moderating Variables
AR  
*Difficulty  3.250 0.003
*** 2.577 
AR*Freq  -0.115 0.114 0.891
Control Variables
LMV  + 0.155 0.422 1.167
MB  - -0.006 0.654 0.994
High_Tech -0.180 0.399
0.044** 
0.000*** 
0.835
1.647 Lag_Loss  
Year 
+
- 
0.499
-1.162 0.145 
 
Log 
Likelihood   564.693 Hosmer Lemeshow  
Chi-square   57.602 
Pearson 
Chi 510.36 
P-value  0.000 Prob  0.243 
*, **,*** Significant at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively based on one-tailed tests for signed predictions, two-
tailed tests otherwise.  
Control Variables: 
LMV: the natural log of the firm's market capitalization one day preceding to the forecast 
MB: firm's market value to book value of equity ratio 
High_Tech: equals one, if the firm is in high technology industry and zero otherwise. 
Lag_loss: indicates whether the company experienced loss in the previous period (Lag_loss=0) or not (Lag_loss=1). 
Year: Indicates whether the firm-year belongs to 2010 (year = 1) or belongs to 2009 (year = 0) 
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According to regression 4-13 which is restated on the top of Table 5-6, the 
interaction term of and historical frequency of earnings management ( ) is used 
to measure the effect of learning from historical forecasts management on the 
relationship of AR and forecasts management. Thus, the algebraic expression for H1 is 
that a1is positive. However, the algebraic expression of learning effect is that a3 is 
negative and significant. In this specification, the coefficient of forecasts 
management to should be a1 + a3 Freq. Specifically, the coefficient of 
forecasts management to for a zero-time downward forecast management firm 
is exactly . However, the coefficient of forecasts management to for a one-
time downward forecast management firm is , and for a two-time downward 
forecast management firm, it is 2, while for a three-time downward forecast 
management firm, it is 3. 
A similar analysis is derived for difficulty. The coefficient of forecasts 
management to for a non-difficult firm is exactly . However, the coefficient of 
forecasts management to AR for a difficult firm is . 
Considering the content of Table 5-6, the coefficient of is positive and 
significant at a 0.05 level. The coefficients on is significantly 
positive. Thus, as a result of the significance of the coefficients of , it is concluded 
that is an independent variable. The difficulty moderates the relationship of AR and 
FM_Matsumoto. This result is consistent with the managers strategically manipulating 
their forecasts downward, when it is more difficult for the markets to assess the 
truthfulness of their disclosure. The coefficients of is not significant.  
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Regarding the control variables, the coefficients of is significantly 
positive, meaning that the companies that are experiencing lagged loss do more 
downward forecasts management compared to other companies. The coefficient of the 
year is also significantly negative. This means that in 2009, the companies do more 
downward forecasts management than in 2010. The coefficients on the remaining 
control variables are insignificant. 
The Hosmer and Lemeshow test were used to test the fitness of the models. The 
test result shown in the lower part of Table 5-6 is insignificant, which confirms the 
goodness of fit of the model.  
The VIF statistics for my variables are indicated in Table 5-7, which indicates no 
sign of high correlation between independent variables.  
Table 5-7. Variance Inflation Factor for all of the companies 
Variables AR_Freq AR_Diff Lag_loss Year AR LMV High_Tech MB Mean VIF 
VIF 1.7 1.45 1.28 1.14 1.11 1.05 1.01 1 1.22 
5.2.3.2 Relationship of Analysts recommendations and Forecasts Errors (H2) 
Sell companies are expected to have higher rate of positive forecasts errors than 
buy companies. Therefore, the second hypothesis would be presented as: 
H2: Sell companies have higher rate of positive forecasts errors than buy companies. 
The study tests the proposed relationship of analysts recommendations and forecasts 
errors by using the chi-square. 
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5.2.3.2.1 Contingency Table 
In order to provide evidence that the analysts recommendations do capture the 
incentive to conduct downward forecasts management to avoid negative forecasts 
errors, I examine the relation between: (1) the analysts recommendations, and (2) the 
signs of forecasts errors (Meet). Table 5-8 presents contingency table
Table 5-8. The contingency table that report the 
association between analysts recommendations and 
positive forecasts errors for all of the companies. 
Contingency table classifying firm-years based on (1) 
stock transaction status, and (2) sign of forecasts errors 
forecasts errors
positive
(Meet=1)
Negative
(Meet =0)
Number of firm-years (% of firm 
years conditional on Buy or Sell 
Sell 52.75%1302
47.24%
1166
Buy 49.13%411
50.87%
406
Pearson Chi-square  2=1.36P=0.243
The third and fourth columns summarize the relation between stock transaction 
status and forecasts errors ( ). More than fifty per cent of the firm-quarters that are 
categorized as sell exceed management s expectations ( = 1), compared to 49.13 
per cent of the firm-quarters categorized as buy. The Chi-square test indicates that the 
association is insignificant ( 2= 1.36, p > 0.243). Table 5-8 indicates that there is no 
difference in the frequency of positive forecasts errors between buy and sell-companies. 
This shows that H2 is not supported. 
5.2.3.2.2 Analysis of Variance 
Next, in order to obtain better comparison of forecasts errors (H2) between buy 
and sell companies, the differences of means of forecasts errors between buy and sell 
companies are tested. 
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Table 5-9. Test of comparison of means of FE among companies that 
have been classified into the groups of buy and sell, according to their 
value of (for all of the companies)   
      N (Mean)
Minimum 
(Maximum) STDEV
  FE FE FE  
Sell 2468(-0.00021)
-0.008
(0.009) 0.003 
Buy 817(-0.0040)
-0.008
(0.007) 0.00294 
All 3285(0.00115)
-0.00885
(0.00974) 0.00298 
Buy vs. sell F 1.117 
sig. 
0.291  
In Table 5-9 the difference of measure of forecasts errors is not significant 
between the groups of buy and sell. The Table 5-9 indicates that, there is no significant 
difference in the forecasts errors of the buy and sell companies.  
5.2.3.2.3 Control Variables for testing the relationship of analysts recommendations 
and forecasts errors 
Several control variables are included in testing the effect of AR on Forecasts 
errors. First, earnings management can affect forecast errors because managers can 
manipulate the reported earnings (McNichols 1989; Kasznik 1999) to create positive 
forecasts errors. Kasznik (1999) discovered evidence that is consistent with managers 
issuing earnings forecast, and then manipulating earnings in order for it to fall aligned 
with the forecast. Thus, the firm's ability to influence earnings, as revealed by its 
discretionary accruals is incorporated as a control. A version of the cross-sectional 
modified Jones model is used to estimate discretionary accruals. Other control variables 
are the similar to those explained in the previous section (5.2.3.1.3). 
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To examine the relationship between the analysts recommendations and 
forecasts errors, analogous to Matsumoto (2002), regression (4-14) is estimated (firm 
and time subscripts have been suppressed): 
Results of the logit regression are indicated in Table 5-10.         
Table 5-10. Logit Analysis of the probability of meeting or exceeding 
management forecasts 
Model  Prob(meet=1)= F( 0+ 1 AR+ 2FREQ+ 3 Difficulty + 4 LMV+ 5 MB+ 6DA 
+ 7Hightech + 8Lag_loss + 9 Year+ )
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Coefficient P-valueb Marginal Effect
Intercept ? -1.694 0.046 -
Incentive to avoid  
negative earnings  
surprises: 
 
AR + 0.374 0.136 1.235
Control Variables 
Freq - -0.981 0. 002*** 0.375
Difficulty + 0.832 0.001*** 8.879
LMV + 0.147 0.344 1.159
MB + 0.004 0.596 1.004
DA + 0.000 0.590 1.000
Hightech + 0.345 0.121 1.412
Lag_loss + 0.555 0.077* 1.742
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Year - 0.571 0.015** 1.771
Log Likelihood 544.183 Hosmer Lemeshow  
Chi-square 170.837 Pearson Chi 4726.44
P-value 0.000 Prob 0.3028
a The dependent variable equals 1 if a firm's actual earnings meets or exceeds the managers 
forecasts, 0 otherwise.  
b. p-values are one-tailed.  
*, **, *** P-values are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level. 
In Table 5-10, columns 3 through 5 represent the results of the regression in the 
companies. The coefficient on is positive but insignificant, suggesting that sell 
stocks are unlikely to meet forecasts. The coefficient of is negative and significant 
at 1%, consistent with Rogers and Stocken (2005), discovering that managers have 
fewer incentives to avoid negative surprises when the frequency of downward forecasts 
management from previous years is high. In addition, the coefficient on Difficulty is 
positive and significant, consistent with the Rogers and Stocken (2006) notion that 
managers have more incentives to avoid negative surprises when the recognition of 
forecasts management is more difficult for investors. Also consistent is the conjecture 
that those firms with low value-relevance of earnings have less incentive to avoid 
negative earnings surprises, while firms with lagged losses ( ) are more likely 
to meet or exceed their expectations. The positive but insignificant coefficient of 
implies that firms with relatively higher litigation prospects appear to be 
marginally more likely to avoid negative earnings surprises.  
Column 5 reports the marginal effects of each variable. The marginal effects are 
similar to the slope s coefficients in an OLS regression (Kelly & Ljungqvist, 2012). The 
marginal effect for frequency is 0.375, suggesting that moving from the first to the third 
quartile of Freq decreases the probability of meeting, or exceeding analysts' 
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expectations by approximately 62.5 per cent. The marginal effect for difficulty equals 
8.879, indicating that an increase in the difficulty of predicting future profits increases 
the probability of meeting or exceeding the analysts' expectations by 780 per cent. The 
marginal effect for is 0.742, indicating that in firms that reporting losses in the 
previous period, the probability of meeting or exceeding the analysts' expectations is 
lower by 26 per cent. 
Thus, according to the logistic regression, there is no significant relationship 
between forecasts errors and analysts recommendations (H2 is not supported). 
5.2.3.3 Comparing FM between the companies that have positive and negative forecasts 
errors (H3 and H4) 
It is expected that, the companies that meet forecasts are more likely to produce 
downward biased forecasts than the companies that do not meet forecasts. Therefore, 
the research hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H3: In sell companies, companies that meet forecasts are more likely to do income 
decreasing FM than companies that do not meet forecasts. 
In order to test the third hypothesis, the difference of mean forecasts 
management of the companies that possess positive FE, and the companies that possess 
negative FE in sell group are duly tested. The results of the test are shown in Table 
5-11. 
Table 5-11. Test of difference in mean forecasts management for the companies 
that meet managers forecasts and the companies that miss forecasts in the sell 
(H3) companies.  
Sell 
No. Mean FM_Matsumoto STDEV FM_Matsumoto 
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Positive or zero 
FE  1300 -0.0157 0.105 
Negative FE  1165 -0.0042 0.12 
 
ANOVA s F Sig.
0.098 0.756 
Testing the difference of the means of measure of forecasts management 
( ) between companies that meet the forecasts, and the companies that 
miss forecasts in the group of Sell companies showed that there is no significant 
difference in the means of forecasts management between them. Therefore, the 
hypothesis H3 is not supported, which generally means that there is no significant 
difference in the means of forecasts management between the companies that meet or 
miss forecasts in the sell companies. 
If the buy companies do not have downward forecasts management, then in the 
buy companies, companies that meet forecasts are not likely to do income decreasing 
FM to meet forecasts. Thus I expect the fourth hypothesis for the buy companies will 
note supported. 
H4: There is no significant difference in income decreasing FM between buy companies 
that meet forecasts and those that do not meet forecasts. 
In order to test the fourth hypotheses, the difference of mean forecasts 
management of the companies that possess positive FE, and the companies that possess 
negative FE in buy group is duly tested. The results of the test are shown in Table 5-12. 
Table 5-12. Test of difference in mean forecasts management for the companies that 
meet managers forecasts and the companies that miss forecasts in the buy (H4) 
companies.  
Buy
No. Mean FM_Matsumoto STDEV FM_Matsumoto
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Positive or 
zero FE  408 -0.0032 0.0968 
Negative FE  401 -0.00195 0.1128 
ANOVA s F Sig.
1.222 0.274 
*, **: Significance at 0.1 and 0.05 
Testing the difference of the means of measure of forecasts management 
( ) between companies that meet the forecasts, and the companies that 
miss forecasts in the groups of Buy companies showed that there is no significant 
difference in the means of forecasts management between them. Therefore, the 
hypothesis H4 is supported, which generally means that there is no significant 
difference in the means of forecasts management between the companies that meet or 
miss forecasts in the buy companies. 
5.2.3.4 Test of difference in positive forecasts errors using unmanaged and issued forecasts 
(H5 and H6) 
In order to see whether sell companies produce downward biased forecasts to 
achieve positive forecasts errors, the fifth hypothesis was formulated.  
H5: For sell companies, incidence of positive forecasts errors will decrease when 
forecasts errors are based on unmanaged rather than issued forecasts. 
Table 5-13 reflect the frequency of positive forecasts errors when forecasts 
errors are calculated using unmanaged and issued forecasts. Table 5-13 focuses only on 
the forecasts errors of the sell-companies. 
Table 5-13. Comparison of the frequency of positive forecasts errors between 
forecasts errors that are calculated using unmanaged and issued forecasts in the 
sell companies (first subsample)  
proxies for forecasts management 
FM_Matsumoto 
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Positive Negative 
Number of firm-years (% of firm 
years) conditional on FE with 
Unmanaged and issued 
forecasts 
FE with 
Unmanaged 
forecasts  
50.58% 
1246 
49.42% 
1217 
FE with issued 
forecasts  
52.72% 
1300 
47.27% 
1165 
Pearson 
Chi-square 
2 = 2.28
P = 0.131 
As indicated by Table 5-13, the frequency of forecasts errors that are calculated using 
unbiased forecasts are lower than the frequencies of positive forecasts errors that are 
calculated by using issued forecasts. However the significance of the difference between 
the frequencies of positive forecasts errors is not as strong. Thus, Table 5-13 only 
represents weak evidence that supports the fact that in sell companies negative 
forecasts management causes the positive forecasts errors. This finding however, 
weakly supports H5. 
To see whether in buy companies, the negative forecasts management is conducted to 
achieve positive forecasts errors the sixth hypothesis was formulated.  
H6: For buy companies, the frequency of positive forecasts errors is not expected to 
decrease when forecasts errors are based on unmanaged rather than issued forecasts. 
As a result of running the same frequency test in the buy companies, Table 5-14 reflects 
the frequencies of positive forecasts errors when the forecasts errors are calculated by 
using unmanaged and issued forecasts. Incidentally, Table 5-14 only focuses on the buy 
companies. 
Table 5-14. Comparison of the frequency of positive forecasts errors between 
forecasts errors that are calculated using unmanaged and issued forecasts in the 
buy companies (first subsample)  
proxies for forecasts 
management 
FM_Matsumoto 
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Positive negative 
Number of firm-years 
(% of firm years) 
conditional on FE with 
Unmanaged and 
issued forecasts 
FE with 
Unmanaged 
forecasts  
44.76% 
370 
55.23% 
439 
FE with issued 
forecasts  
50.43% 
408 
49.56% 
401 
Pearson 
Chi-square 
2 = 3.49
P = 0.06 
As indicated by Table 5-14, the frequency of positive forecasts errors when 
using issued forecast is not (significantly) higher than the frequency of forecasts errors 
issued by unbiased forecasts. Therefore, in contrast to the sell companies, when the buy 
companies do forecasts management, they will not have higher positive forecast errors 
compared to when there is no forecasts management.  Thus, H6 is supported. 
Therefore, although the negative forecast management in sell companies is 
higher than the negative forecasts management in the buy companies, based on the 
sample of all companies, I discovered weak evidence that among the buy and sell 
companies, the companies issue negative forecasts management to achieve positive 
forecasts errors. 
As previously stated, it is expected that firms that just meet the expectations are 
more likely to conduct forecast management compared to firms that just fail to meet 
expectations, along with the firms that just beat the expectations. However, based on the 
sample of all of the companies, the findings failed to support this argument. Moreover, 
based on Burgestahler and Eams (2006) and Matsumoto (2003) allegations, it is 
expected that the negative forecasts management occur in the companies that possess 
small forecasts errors. Keeping such an expectation in mind, the next section tests the 
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hypotheses by taking into account the companies that are within the small distance 
around zero forecasts errors.  
5.2.4 Analysis for the Companies with Small Positive or Negative Forecasts 
Errors 
Burgstahler and Eames (2006) and Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003b) argued that 
the benefit of forecast management to a firm is the increase of the amount of forecast 
management, however, forecast management also imposes an unduly cost on the firm. If 
there is a sudden drop in the marginal benefit at the point just to the right of the zero 
surprise point for many firms, then zero surprise is the optimal level a firm should 
achieve by conducting forecast management. Realistically, there might indeed be a 
sudden drop in the marginal benefit for many firms. The benefit to the firms just 
meeting expectations is much larger than that for firms that fail to meet the expectations 
by a small margin, whereas the benefit to firms that beat the expectations is only 
marginally larger than the benefit to firms that just meet expectations. This argument 
implies that firms that just meet the expectations are more likely to conduct forecast 
management compared to firms that just fail to meet expectations and firms that beat 
expectations.  
Based on Burgstahler and Eames (2002) positions, the hypotheses will be 
retested only by accounting for the companies that are in a small distance around zero 
forecasts errors. The distance of a 0.5 standard deviation of forecasts errors on the left 
and right side of zero forecast error is taken as small distance around the zero forecasts 
error. The distance of 0.5 standard deviation is chosen due to the fact that it is small and 
also a considerable number of companies exist in this sphere. 
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5.2.4.1 Relationship of Analysts Recommendation and Forecasts Management (H1) 
Sell companies are expected to have more pessimistic (less optimistic) forecasts 
management. Therefore, the research hypothesis is presented as follows: 
H1: Sell companies issue more pessimistic forecasts than buy companies. 
The study tests the proposed relationship of analysts recommendations and 
forecasts management by using the chi-square test. 
5.2.4.1.1 Contingency table 
Similar to section 5.2.3, chi-square tests have been used to test for the difference 
in the frequency of negative forecasts management in the buy side and sell side 
companies. The following contingency table (Table 5-15) shows the result of the test of 
difference in incidence of negative forecasts management in buy and sell companies. 
Table 5-15. Association between analysts recommendations and 
downward forecasts managements for the companies that have near 
zero forecasts errors. 
Contingency table classifying firm-years based on (1) analysts 
recommendations, and (2) sign of forecasts managements 
proxies for forecasts management 
FM_Matsumoto
Positive Negative
Number of firm-years (% of 
firm years conditional on Buy 
or Sell 
Sell  28.12% 253 
71.87% 
646 
Buy  36.72% 112 
63.27% 
193 
Pearson  
Chi-square  
2=- 6.74 
P=.0009 
As Table 5-15 indicates, sell companies have a significantly higher incidence of 
negative compared to buy companies.  
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5.2.4.1.2 Analysis of Variance 
To see whether there is a significant difference between the buy and sell 
companies in their practice of conducting forecasts management, the difference in the 
mean of the forecasts management between the buy and sell companies was tested.  
Table 5-16 shows the comparison results of the means of forecasts management 
measure ( ) between buy and sell companies. 
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Table 5-16. Test of comparison of means among companies that have 
been classified into the groups of buy and sell, according to their value of 
(for the companies that have near zero forecasts errors)    
N (Mean)
Minimum 
(Maximum) STDEV
 
FM_Matsumoto  FM_Matsumoto  
Sell  899 (-0.00244) 
-0.00250 
(0.00312) 
0.00085 
Buy  305 (0.000257) 
-0.00029 
(0.00472) 
0.00075 
All  1204 (-0.00194) 
-0.00250 
(0.00472) 
0.00079 
Buy vs. 
sell 
F 
8.900 
sig. 
0.003**  
As Table 5-16indicates, there is a significant difference between the mean of 
forecasts management between buy and sell, considering, . The sign of 
differences with regards to measure confirms the first hypothesis, due 
to the fact that there is a lower mean for forecasts management for sell companies than 
for buy companies.  
5.2.4.1.3 Control Variables for Testing the Relationship of Analysts Recommendations 
and Forecasts Management 
Including the control variables in the relationship between analysts 
recommendations and forecasts management logistic regression has been used. In the 
logistic regression forecasts management, measures are used as dependent variables and 
the analysts recommendations act as independent variables. Table 5-17 shows the result 
of the logistic regression.  
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Table 5-17. The results of logistic regression for the second subsample. 
Model  
Prob(Down=1)=F( 0+ 1AR+ 2AR×Difficulty+ 3AR×FREQ+ 4LMV+ 5MB+ 6 
Hightech + 7 Lag_Loss+ 8Year) 
Dependent Variable: down=1 if is negative and down=0 otherwise  
Variable 
Predi
cted 
sign Coefficients p-values Marginal effects
Dependen
ts 
FM
(Matsumoto)
FM
(Matsumoto)
FM
(Matsumoto)
Independents: 
Constant ? -1.750 0.892 -
AR + 0.699 0.000*** 2.012
Moderating Variables:   
AR×Diffic
ulty + 2.662 0.021
** 
14.323
AR×Freq - -0.151 0.019** 0.860
Control Variables:   
LMV + 0.353 0.023** 1.424
MB - -0.003 0.686 0.995
Hightech + -0.181 0.102 0.834
Lag_Loss + +0.739 0.098* 1.538
Year - -1.223 0.000*** 0.294
Log 
Likelihood 564.435 Hosmer Lemeshow
Chi-square 59.383
Pearson 
Chi 510.13 
P-value 0.000 Prob 0.246
*, **,*** Significant at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively based on one-tailed tests for 
signed predictions, two-tailed tests otherwise. 
According to Table 5-17, the coefficients of are positive. This indicates that 
when the for the company is high (i.e. the company is in sell position), the 
companies produce more downward biased forecasts than when the is low (the 
company is in buy position). On the other hand, the coefficient of is 
significantly negative. This shows that frequency of previous year s forecasts 
management plays a moderating role in the relationship of AR and forecasts 
management. The coefficient of is significantly positive, indicating 
that when it is more difficult for analysts and investors to forecast the company s profit, 
the company will produce more downward biased forecasts.  
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The marginal effects are analogous to the slope coefficients in an OLS 
regression (Kelly & Ljungqvist, 2012). The marginal effect for AR is 2.012, suggesting 
that moving from the first to the third quartile of AR causes the probability of meeting or 
exceeding the expectations increases by approximately 101per cent.  
The coefficient of is positive and significant, indicating that 
it is more difficult for investors to recognize the credibility of the managers forecasts, 
the more management will produce downward biased forecasts. It is important to 
remember that according to the factor analysis in section 4.3.2.3, the values for 
difficulty ranges from -0.58 to 0.84, where the lower values for this variable represent a 
lesser difficulty, while a higher value represents a higher difficulty. Since the scale for 
the difficulty is relatively small, it might not be surprising to have greater numbers for 
the marginal effect of difficulties. The value of the marginal effects of 
is 14.323, showing that the most for the most difficult firm, the probability 
of forecasts management is approximately 1 .3 times compared to the least difficult 
firms. Also, the coefficients of and are significant, and contain their 
expected values.  
5.2.4.2 Relationship of Analysts recommendations and Forecasts Errors (H2) 
Sell companies are expected to have higher rate of positive forecasts errors than buy 
companies. Therefore, the second hypothesis would be presented as: 
H2: Sell companies have higher rate of positive forecasts errors than buy companies. 
The study tests the proposed relationship of analysts recommendations and 
forecasts errors by using the chi-square test. 
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5.2.4.2.1 Contingency Table 
In order to provide evidence that the analysts recommendations do capture the 
incentive to conduct downward forecasts management to avoid negative forecasts 
errors, I examine the relation between: (1) the analysts recommendations, and (2) the 
signs of forecasts errors (Meet)). Table 5-18presents contingency test
Table 5-18. Association between analysts recommendations and 
positive forecasts errors for the companies that have near zero 
forecasts errors. 
Contingency table classifying firm-years based on (1) 
analysts recommendations, and (2) sign of forecasts errors 
forecasts errors  
Positive Negative 
Number of firm-years (% 
of firm years conditional 
on Buy or Sell 
Sell 53.06% 480 
46.96% 
424 
Buy 59.22% 184 
40.78% 
123 
Pearson  
Chi-square  
2= 4.28
P=0.038 
As Table 5-18 indicates, sell companies have a significantly less incidence of positive 
forecasts errors than the buy companies. 
5.2.4.2.2 Analysis of Variance 
To see whether there is a significant difference between the buy and sell 
companies in their practice of conducting forecasts management to meet forecasts, the 
difference in the mean of the forecasts errors between the buy and sell companies was 
tested. It is expected that the reason that the sell companies do more downward 
forecasts management compared to buy companies is to meet their respective forecasts. 
Table 5-19shows the comparison results of the means of forecasts errors between buy 
and sell companies. 
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Table 5-19. Test of comparison of means FE among companies that have 
been classified into the groups of Buy and sell, according to their value of 
(for the companies that have near zero forecasts errors)    
N (Mean)
Minimum 
(Maximum) STDEV 
  
FE  FE   FE 
Sell  904 (0.000111) 
-0.0084 
(0.0092) 0.0003 
Buy  307 (0.0000784) 
-0.0085 
(0.0068) 0.00029 
All  1211 (0.000106) 
-0.00854 
(0.00923) 0.0003 
F sig.  
Buy vs. sell 1.121 0.291 
As Table 5-19indicates, there is not a significant difference between the mean of 
forecasts errors between buy and sell. Therefore the second hypothesis was not 
supported 
5.2.4.2.3 Control Variables for testing the relationship of analysts recommendations 
and forecasts errors 
For testing the relationship of and by including control variables in small 
distance around zero forecasts errors, the logit regression of the probability of meeting 
or exceeding the forecasts against the AR was ran. The results of the logit regression are 
shown in Table 5-20. 
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Table 5-20. Logit Analysis of the probability of meeting or exceeding managers 
forecasts and the incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises for the second 
subsample. 
Model 
Prob(meet=1)= F( 0+ 1 AR+ 2 Freq+ 3 Difficulty + 4 LMV+ 5 MB+ 6Hightech 
+ 7Lag_loss+ 8 Year+ )
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient P-valueb Marginal Effect
Intercept  ? -1.217 0.198 - 
Incentive to avoid  
negative earnings  
surprises: 
AR  + -0.381 0.032 0.464 
Control Variables 
Freq - -0.890 0.002*** 0.411 
Difficulty + 0.960 0.001*** 2.117 
LMV + 0.200 0.355 1.221 
M/B  + 0.003 0.540 1.003 
DA  + 0.021 0.816 0.899 
High-tech + 0.288 0.117 1.334 
Lag_loss - -0.573 0.028** 0.459 
Year  - 0.561 0.016** 1.762 
Log Likelihood 544.018 Hosmer Lemeshow
Chi-square  171.032 Pearson Chi 639.78 
P-value 0.000 Prob 0.6263
No. of observations 
Meet/Exceed 740
Did not meet  563  
Total 1303
*, **,*** Significant at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels 
a. The dependent variable equals 1 if a firm's actual earnings meets or exceeds the managers 
forecasts, 0 otherwise.  
b. p-values are one-tailed. 
Contradicting the expectations, in small distances around zero forecasts error, 
sell companies do not have higher positive forecasts errors. The positive coefficient of 
indicates that the more difficult it is for the market to predict a company s 
profit, the more the company will experience positive forecasts errors. The negative 
coefficient of frequency is consistent with Rogers and Stocken (2005), indicating that 
when the company contain a high frequency of downward biased forecasts in the 
previous years, the probability of having positive forecasts errors decreases in the 
current year. 
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The coefficient of is negative and significant, indicating that the companies that 
have lagged loss have lower positive forecasts errors. In addition, the coefficient of 
is positive and significant, indicating that in 2010, the companies have higher 
positive forecasts errors compared to the previous year.  
5.2.4.3 Comparing FM between the companies that have positive and negative forecasts 
errors (H3 and H4) 
It is expected that, the companies that meet forecasts are more likely to produce 
downward biased forecasts than the companies that do not meet forecasts. Therefore, 
the research hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H3: In sell companies, companies that meet forecasts are more likely to do income 
decreasing FM than companies that do not meet forecasts. 
In order to test for H3 and H4 again by using the companies that have small forecasts 
errors, the analysis of the variance is utilized to test the difference in the means of 
forecasts management between the companies that possesses positive and negative 
forecasts errors. Table 5-21 presents the results of the tests of the means of forecasts 
management between the companies that meet the forecasts, and companies that do not 
meet forecasts in the buy and the sell groups (H3 and H4). The test is conducted on the 
companies in the subsample near zero forecasts errors. 
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Table 5-21. Test of significance of difference in mean FM for the 
companies that meet the forecasts and the companies that miss the 
forecast in the sell groups for the companies that have near zero 
forecasts errors.  
Sell 
No. Mean 
FM_Matsumoto
STDEV 
FM_Matsumoto
Positive or zero FE 467 -0.00499 0.0080 
Negative FE  432 0.00068 0.0115 
 
ANOVA"s 
F 
Sig.  
5.1830 0.023**     
  
*, **: Significance at 0.1 and 0.05 respectively. 
Table 5-21showed that when focusing on the companies that are within small 
distance around zero forecast error, there is a significant difference in the means of FM for 
companies that meet forecasts, and companies that miss forecasts in sell groups (H3 
supported). In group of sell companies, the companies that meet forecasts have lower mean 
forecasts management than the companies that miss forecasts.  
If the buy companies do not have downward forecasts management, then in the buy 
companies, companies that meet forecasts are not likely to do income decreasing FM to 
meet forecasts. It is expected that the fourth hypothesis for the buy companies will not be 
supported. 
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H4: There is no significant difference in income decreasing FM between buy companies 
that meet forecasts and those that do not meet forecasts. 
In order to test for H4 again by using the companies that have small forecasts errors, the 
analysis of the variance is utilized to test the difference in the means of forecasts 
management between the companies that possesses positive and negative forecasts errors. 
Table 5-22 presents the results of the tests of the means of forecasts management between 
the companies that meet the forecasts, and companies that do not meet forecasts in the buy 
group (H4). The test is conducted on the companies in the subsample near zero forecasts 
errors. 
Table 5-22. Test of significance of difference in mean FM for the 
companies that meet the forecasts and the companies that miss the 
forecast in the buy group for the companies that have near zero 
forecasts errors.  
Buy 
No. Mean FM_Matsumoto STDEV 
FM_Matsumoto
Positive or zero FE 180 -0.00499 0.00958 
Negative FE  125 0.00246 0.01038 
 
ANOVA"s F Sig. 
2.7457 0.098* 
*, **: Significance at 0.1 and 0.05 respectively. 
Table 5-22showed that, in group of buy companies, the companies that meet 
forecasts have lower mean forecasts management than the companies that miss forecasts. 
However, the difference of FM for companies that meet forecasts and companies that miss 
forecasts in the buy group is not significant at a 0.05 significance level (H4 is supported). 
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5.2.4.4 Test of difference in the frequency of positive forecasts errors using unmanaged and 
issued forecasts (H5 and H6) 
In order to see whether sell companies do downward forecasts management to 
achieve positive forecasts errors, the fifth hypothesis was formulated.  
H5: For sell companies, incidence of positive forecasts errors will decrease when forecasts 
errors are based on unmanaged rather than issued forecasts. 
The Chi-square tests have been utilized to compare the differences in the frequency 
of positive forecasts errors using unmanaged and issued forecasts. Table 5-23 reflects the 
frequency of positive forecasts errors when the forecasts errors are calculated using 
unmanaged and issued forecasts. The table only use the forecasts errors of the sell 
companies that have small forecasts errors. 
Table 5-23. Comparison of the frequency of positive forecasts errors 
between forecasts errors that are calculated using unmanaged and issued 
forecasts. For the sell companies that have near zero FE  
proxies for forecasts management 
FM_Matsumoto 
Positive negative  
Number of firm-years 
(% of firm years 
conditional on FE with 
Unmanaged and 
issued forecasts 
FE with 
Unmanaged 
forecasts  
43.03% 
387 
56.95% 
511 
FE with issued 
forecasts  
51.94% 
467 
48.05% 
432 
Pearson Chi-square 
2 = 13.92
P = 0.0001 
As indicated by Table 5-23, the frequency of positive forecasts errors that are 
calculated using unbiased forecasts is lower than the frequency of positive forecasts errors 
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that are calculated using issued forecasts. Thus, it is obvious that on the sell companies, the 
negative forecasts management caused the positive forecasts errors. Thus, H5 is duly 
supported. 
To see whether in buy companies, the negative forecasts management is conducted 
to achieve positive forecasts errors the sixth hypothesis was formulated.  
H6: For buy companies, the frequency of positive forecasts errors is not expected to 
decrease when forecasts errors are based on unmanaged rather than issued forecasts. 
Table 5-24 reflects the frequencies of positive forecasts errors when forecasts 
managements are calculated using unmanaged and issued forecasts. Table 5-24 only 
focuses on the buy companies that have small forecasts errors. 
Table 5-24. Comparison of the frequency of positive forecasts errors 
between forecasts errors that are calculated using unmanaged and issued 
forecasts for the buy companies that have near zero FE   
proxies for forecasts management
FM_Matsumoto
Positive negative 
Number of firm-years 
(% of firm years 
conditional on FE 
with Unmanaged 
and issued forecasts 
FE with Unmanaged 
forecasts  
51.11% 
156 
48.85% 
149 
FE with issued 
forecasts  
59.01% 
180 
40.98% 
125 
Pearson Chi-square 
2 = 3.35
P = 0.067 
Table 5-24
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5.2.5 Summary of the Findings 
To summarise the findings in accordance to the frequency table and ANOVA in 
Table 5-15 and Table 5-16, it is discovered that negative forecasts managements in sell 
companies are higher than the negative forecasts managements in buy companies. 
However, there is no difference in the incidences and means of positive forecasts errors 
between the buy and sell companies. In addition, the logistic regressions of Table 5-17 
shows that, sell companies produce more downward biased forecasts compared to buy 
companies. Tests of the difference in means of forecasts management between the 
companies that meet or do not meet their forecasts shows that in sell companies, the 
companies that meet forecasts have higher negative forecasts managements compared to 
the companies that miss forecasts. However, this result does not apply for the buy 
companies. In addition, as a result of testing whether the negative forecasts management in 
the sell companies lead to positive forecasts errors, the test of frequency (Table 5-23) 
shows that in the sell companies, the negative forecasts management directly result in a 
positive forecast error. However, in the buy side companies, the negative forecast 
management does not lead to positive forecasts errors. Therefore, the findings can be 
summarised as in the sell (buy) companies the companies do (not do) negative forecasts 
management to achieve positive forecasts errors. Table 5-25. summarizes the findings.  
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Table 5-25. Summary of the findings   
 
All companies Small distance around zero FE
Tables
Chi-
square
Analysis 
of 
variance
Logistic 
regression
Chi-
square
Analysis 
of 
variance
Logistic 
regression
H1 S N S S S S
H2 N N N N N N
H3 N S
H4 S S
H5 N S
H6 S S
S= Supported , N= Not supported 
For the companies that are in small distance around zero forecast errors, all of the 
tests support H1. When considering all of the companies only in case of analysis of 
variance do not support H1. Therefore, since in the subsample near zero forecasts errors, all 
of the tests support H1, and for all of the companies, 2 out of 3 tests support H1, and the 
overall findings firmly support H1.  
None of the tests in any of the samples support H2, which makes H2 untenable. 
This means that sell companies do not possess higher positive forecasts errors. The reason 
might be that buy companies might have used income increasing earnings management 
strategy to meet the forecasts. In order to produce positive forecasts errors, the income 
increasing earnings management in buy companies might have been more efficient than 
income decreasing FMs in sell companies.  
With regards to H3, while the findings of analysis of variance support H3 in small 
distance around zero forecasts errors, when all companies are considered, there is no 
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support for H3. Therefore, only considering the small distance around zero forecasts errors, 
H3 is supported. This means that in sell companies of subsample 2, the companies that 
meet or beat forecasts possess more downward FM than companies that fail to meet their 
forecasts. Thus, in this subsample, H3 is supported. 
Regarding the findings of Analysis of Variance, there is support for H4 in small 
distance around zero FE. Additionally, H4 is supported for all of the companies. Therefore, 
the findings support H4. 
The chi-square test supports H5 in a subsample of companies that have near zero 
forecasts errors. However, when all of the companies are taken into the chi-square test does 
not support H5. Thus, considering the subsample near zero forecast errors, H5 is staunchly 
supported. This shows that, in the sell companies, the negative forecasts management 
caused the positive forecasts errors. 
The chi-square test support H6 in the subsample of all the companies, and the 
companies that have near zero forecasts errors. So, H6 is supported. 
The findings show that while sell companies produce more downward biased 
forecasts, and such downward biased forecasts lead to positive forecasts errors. However, 
sell companies do not have higher positive forecasts errors compared to buy companies.  
Overall, the results reveal that while H1, H3, H4, H5 and H6 are supported, H2is not 
supported. The next chapter interpret these findings in detail. 
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Chapter 6. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
6.1 Introduction 
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 1 (introduction) and Chapter 2 (review of 
literature), this research is about the effect of analysts recommendations, in terms of 
buy (growth companies) and sell (non-growth companies) recommendations, on 
forecasts management. Keeping in line with this theme, Chapter 3 viewed the methods 
of the study and the tests that were ran on two subsamples of all the companies, and the 
companies that are in small distance near zero forecasts errors.  
The first part of Chapter 4 reported the statistical results based on all of the 
companies. The findings from the first part showed a significant, but weak relationship 
between the analysts recommendations and forecasts management. In other word, when 
all of the companies are considered, sell companies reported significantly higher 
pessimistic forecasts compared to their buy counterparts (H1 supported).However, such 
negative forecasts management does not create higher positive forecasts errors (H3 and 
H5 supported). Similarly, in the buy companies, the negative forecasts management 
does not lead to positive forecasts errors (H4 and H6 are supported). In addition, there is 
no significant difference in the frequency of positive forecasts errors in the buy and the 
sell companies (H2 not supported). 
Consistent with the notion that companies that just meet forecasts are more 
likely to conduct forecast management than companies that just fail to meet forecasts 
and firms that beat forecasts (Burgstahler and Eams 2006, Abarbanell and Lehavy 
2003b), the second part of Chapter 4 has been dedicated to the statistical findings based 
on the companies that are in small distance near zero forecasts errors. The findings 
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discussed in the second part shows that sell companies have higher pessimistic forecasts 
than buy companies (H1 supported). In addition, in the sell [buy] companies group, the 
companies that have positive forecasts errors [do not] issue higher pessimistic forecasts 
(H3 and H4 supported). Such pessimistic forecasts [do not] lead to higher positive 
forecasts errors (H5 and H6 supported). However, the ration of positive forecasts errors 
does not differ between the buy and sell companies (H2 not supported).  
This chapter summarizes the results and findings discussed in the preceding 
chapter. It also contains recommendations for future studies, and highlights the practical 
and theoretical implications of the findings for policy makers, along with investors. This 
will be followed by a description of the limitations of the research. The chapter finishes 
with a brief conclusion of the study. 
6.2 Discussion: Overview of the Findings 
Back to the research objective in chapter one, the main objective of this research 
is to examine the effects of analysts recommendations representing the growth and 
non-growth companies on the managers decisions towards forecasts management. The 
main objective was divided into the following three sub objectives: 
6.2.1 Research Objective 1: To examine whether sell companies tend to actively 
engage in producing downward biased forecasts compared to buy 
companies. 
To achieve this objective, in the previous chapter, the effect of the analysts 
recommendations on forecasts management was shown by regressing forecasts 
management on analysts recommendations. Additional tests on the relationship of 
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analysts recommendations, and forecasts management were conducted by dividing the 
companies into groups of buy and sell, according to the analysts recommendations, and 
examining the ratio of positive to negative forecast errors in buy and sell companies. It 
was shown that, although in general there is weak difference between the buy and sell 
companies in terms of downward forecasts management, in the companies that are 
within small distance around zero forecasts errors, there is higher frequency of 
downward forecasts management in the sell companies compared to the buy companies. 
6.2.2 Research Objective 2: To examine whether sell companies are more likely to 
achieve positive forecasts errors than buy companies. 
To achieve this objective, the effect of analysts recommendation on forecasts 
errors was shown by regressing forecasts errors on analysts recommendations. 
Additional tests on the relationship of analysts recommendations and forecasts errors 
were conducted by dividing companies into groups of buy and sell according to the 
analysts recommendations, and examining the ratio of positive to negative forecasts 
errors in buy and sell companies. It was shown that, there is not higher frequency of 
positive forecast errors in sell companies compared to buy companies. 
6.2.3 Research Objective 3: To examine the effect of the analysts 
recommendations on management s decisions in producing downward 
biased forecast to reach positive forecasts errors. 
In addition, based on the test result of the relationship of the forecasts 
management and forecasts errors for the companies that possess small forecasts errors, 
it was determined that in the sell companies group, companies having positive forecasts 
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errors have higher means of negative forecasts management. However, such results are 
inapplicable for buy companies. This finding implies that sell companies conduct 
negative forecasts management to realize positive forecasts errors. Moreover, in the sell 
group, the frequency of positive forecasts errors that are calculated using unmanaged 
forecasts is significantly lower than the frequency of positive forecasts errors that are 
calculated by using reported forecasts. This provides additional evidence, and confirms 
that sell companies produce more downward biased forecasts just in order to avoid 
negative forecasts errors.  
6.3 The Moderating Effect 
6.3.1 Frequency 
Studies have examined the effect of prior managers forecast accuracy on 
investor expectations (Hirst et al. 1999) and managers forecast as warnings in the face 
of earnings surprise (Kaznik and Lev 1995). Hirst et al. (1999) provide evidence that 
investor expectations are influenced by prior management's forecast accuracy 
interacting with the forecast form. 
Following the previous findings stipulating that the market does learn from a 
company s history of forecast management, it is found that companies adjust their 
forecast management behaviours to be consistent with the learning effect. Although 
forecasts management can be predicted via the analysts recommendations, the accuracy 
of the predictability is reduced in tandem with a company managing its forecasts 
downward during the previous years. Moreover, because of market learning, the more 
the companies managed their forecasts downward in the previous periods, the less able 
will be in meeting forecasts in the current period.   
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The findings in this research is consistent with Park and Stice (2000) who show 
that investor beliefs about the usefulness of a forecast are a function of both the 
accuracy and length of the prior forecasting record. Hutton and Stocken (2009) adopt 
Chen et al. s (2005) Bayesian model to apply to investors learning of managers 
forecast accuracy. They realize that the stock price reaction to managers forecast news 
is rising in prior forecast precision and also in the size of a company s forecasting 
record. 
6.3.2 Difficulty 
Managers make both good and bad news forecasts. Studies have shown that the 
difficulty in assessing the credibility of managers disclosures may induce bias 
involuntary disclosures (Hui, 2012). For example, Penman (1980) and Lev & Penman 
(1990) reveal that, managers are aware of how they are observed by investors and 
analysts and the effect of forecasts on their status.  Dambara (2012) state that, as 
the difficulty of verifiability rises, managers' misrepresentation turn out to be harder to 
notice with any degree of confidence, thereby rising the bias in forecasts (Dambra, 
Wasley, & Wu, 2012). 
In addition, Rogers and Stocken (2005) obtained evidence to propose that management's 
motivation to release biased forecasts tends to be subject on the complexity for investors 
to perceive the bias. The findings of this research are consistent with the notion of 
Rogers and Stocken (2005), Hui (2012) and Dambra (2012) that present that managers 
are more expected to bias their earnings forecasts in circumstances where the market 
has greater complexity identifying distortion (Rogers, Van Buskirk, & Zechman, 2011). 
In fact, the findings show that when the recognition of biased forecasts by investors is 
difficult, the relationship between analysts recommendations and forecasts 
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management will be strengthened. In other words, sell companies do more downward 
forecasts management to realize positive forecasts errors.  
In addition, the findings are consistent with the notion of Hui (2012), Cheng (2013) and 
Xu (2009) in showing that, difficult companies are more likely to achieve positive 
forecasts errors.  
Similar to Cheng (2013) this study believes that managers are more expected to 
strategically choose forecast precision when investors have greater difficulty in 
evaluating the precision of their information.  
To summarize, it is assumed that the investors will react more strongly to the 
forecasts issued by managers when the investors have greater difficulty assessing the 
business (Yang, 2012), which will consequently affect the bias in the managers 
forecasts. 
6.4 Implications of the Findings 
The main result of this study is that the strategy that the companies undertake in 
order to avoid just missing the forecasts is strongly related to the recommendation 
position of the companies, which purports that market status generates serious 
incentives for management to conduct forecast management that creates positive 
forecast errors. One likely reason for such findings is that sell companies manage 
forecasts downward in order to be able to meet or beat their respective forecasts. By 
beating forecasts, they can generate positive forecasts errors (Brown, 2001; Matsumoto, 
2002; and Burgstahler and Eames, 2006), or avoid the negative consequences of missing 
forecasts (Baginski & Hassell, 1990; Dye, 1983; Pinello, 2004). Such behaviour of sell 
companies can be explained by the prospect theory, which was explained in chapter 2. 
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Furthermore, there is a significant difference in the mean of forecasts 
management between the companies that possesses positive and negative forecasts 
errors in sell groups. However, this difference is less significant for the companies that 
are on the buy group. This implies that sell companies issue pessimistic forecasts to 
produce positive forecasts errors. Such implication is strengthened by further findings, 
which indicates that when forecasts managements are removed from managers 
forecasts, there is a significant decrease in the rate of occurrences of positive forecasts 
errors for the sell companies (H5 supported), whereas the frequency of positive 
forecasts errors is not significantly affected for buy companies (H6 is supported). That 
is without negative forecasts management sell companies, are incapable of producing 
positive forecasts errors. In other words, the negative forecasts management in the sell 
companies is merely done to produce positive forecasts errors. This finding 
complements the result of Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003b), which suggests that instead 
of producing downward biased forecasts, buy companies engage in income increasing 
earnings management to meet or beat the analysts forecasts. This study discovered that 
sell companies engage more in producing downward biased forecasts to create meetable 
or beatable forecasts. The reason might be that by having positive forecasts errors, first, 
the management of sell companies are more likely to manage the stock market 
expectations; and second, the management of sell companies are more likely to avoid 
the unfavourable and utility minimizing consequences that usually occur after missing 
forecasts such as the loss of reputation, litigation or takeovers. The findings, which fit in 
the framework, are summarized in Figure 6-1. 
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This research adds to the literature by searching for an additional factor that 
affects management decisions toward issuing forecasts. It has been found that the 
companies growth status that is represented by the analysts recommendations 
influences the management s decision to conduct forecasts management. This is 
supported by the finding that sell companies do downward forecasts management to 
realize positive forecasts errors (H3 and H5 supported), whereas buy companies do not 
(H4 and H6 are supported).  
Following the framework that was developed by Dutta and Gigler (2006), where 
the provision of forecast prevent the manager from managing earnings, which renders 
the earnings forecasts to assist in the process of transparent financial reporting, this 
research investigated the hypothesized effects of the analysts recommendations on 
forecast management. This is consistent with the framework of Dutta and Gigler (2006), 
while Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003b) shows that buy companies do income increasing 
earnings management to avoid negative forecasts errors, sell companies produce more 
downward biased forecasts to avoid negative forecasts errors, and its consequent market 
punishments that unfavourably affects the management s utility.  
The next two sections explain the behaviour of buy and sell companies. 
6.5.1 Behavior of the Buy Companies 
Burgstahler & Eames (2002) provided an insight into why forecast management 
is more evident for sell firms than it is for buy firms. They argued that, since there may 
be incremental benefits to beating rather than just meeting the forecasts, such benefit to 
a firm should increase the amount of forecast management. However, forecast 
management also imposes an unavoidable cost on the firm. The reason why sell 
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companies do downward forecasts management to reach positive earnings surprise is 
that, the cost of negative forecasts management for sell firms is less than the cost of 
negative forecasts management for buy firms. Since stock price of the sell firms are less 
susceptible to earnings news (Abarbnell and Lehavy 2003b), the downward forecasts 
management of sell firms have less undesirable consequences on stock price than the 
downward forecasts management of the buy firms. On the other hand, the downward 
forecasts management of the sell firms help them to prevent experiencing the negative 
consequences of missing the forecasts which comes in the form of litigation, takeover, 
or contract termination (Beniluz, 2007; Frost, 1997; Kim & Shi, 2011). Therefore, the 
negative forecasts management of sell firms should be higher than the negative forecasts 
management for buy firms. 
Furthermore, since the buy firms possess favourable forecasting records, 
investors are more responsive to their forecasted news, such firms would like to have 
their private information more fully impounded into their stock prices, and 
consequently, are more capable of reducing information asymmetry and enjoy lower 
cost of capital (e.g., King, Pownall, and Waymire 1990; Coller and Yohn 1997; 
Verrecchia 2001). In addition, buy companies are able to do income increasing earnings 
management in order to meet forecasts. Therefore, they need to do less income 
decreasing FM than the sell companies.  
Consistent with the expectation adjustment hypothesis, and assuming that the 
management seeks to align market expectations with their own (see Ajinkya and 
Gift1984), it is especially true when the management have extremely promising news to 
convey (Riley, 2007),and therefore, a favourable track record is most helpful for 
enhancing the forecast credibility of buy companies. This might be due to the fact that 
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by conveying true information regarding their favourable records, buy companies
private information, which is usually promising, is fully impounded into their stock 
prices, and consequently, they are more capable of reducing information asymmetry to 
enjoy a lower cost of capital. This might be interpreted as buy companies conveying a 
less pessimistic forecast to the market (figure 5-1). 
6.5.2 Behavior of Sell Companies 
The findings of logistic regression, contingency table and analysis of variance 
for H1 showed that the sell companies produce more downward biased forecasts than 
buy companies (H1 supported).However, despite my previous expectation for 
hypothesis 2, the sell companies do not have higher positive forecasts errors than buy 
companies (H2 not supported). The reason for the downward forecasts management of 
the sell companies might be that they either like to manage analysts forecasts (Cotter et 
al., 2006), or they are likely to avoid the unfavourable utility minimizing consequences 
of missing forecasts. 
Following the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, that proves to 
be more onerous for plaintiffs that are trying to prove misrepresentation (Rogers and 
Stocken 2005), companies have more space to choose whether to report imprecise 
forecasts. In addition, Stunda (2008) provides evidence that after SOX (2002) 
regulation, companies tend to exert greater downward forecasts management. There 
have been many researches that show the management issues imprecise forecasts to 
guide the analysts forecasts downward (Libby, Hunton, Tan, & Seybert, 2008); (Cotter 
et al., 2006), or to favourably affect the stock price (Athanasakou et al., 2009; Kim & 
Shi, 2011). This might be explained for observing not for a higher rate of positive 
forecasts errors in sell companies compared to buy companies, despite the fact that they 
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produce more downward biased forecasts compared to their buy counterparts. The 
reason for downward forecasts management of sell companies might be that they want 
to manage the analysts forecasts downward. 
However, the findings of H3 and H5 show that forecasts errors that are 
calculated using unbiased forecasts are more negative than forecast errors that are 
calculated by using issued forecasts. The implications of the findings about H3 and H5 
are that sell companies not only do downward forecasts management to guide the 
analysts forecasts downward, but they also do downward forecasts management to 
avoid market punishments that results from missing forecasts (Beyer, 2006; Li & Ding, 
2008). The reason for this is that as mentioned in Chapter 2, sell companies do not 
usually enjoy high economic profit. Therefore, the pessimistic forecasts of sell 
companies are to avoid market punishments, rather than being opportunistic. Such 
behaviour by the sell companies could be consistent with the notion of the prospect 
theory, in which instead of scrutiny in the company s financial information, investors 
use heuristics measures, such as earnings forecasts errors to analyse the financial 
information of the company.  
On the other hand, according to Dutta and Gigler (2002) framework, the 
pessimistic forecasts of the sell companies might not be because of opportunism. Such 
pessimism makes their reporting process consistent with the efficiency perspective that 
corresponds with the revelation principle. Therefore, consistent with Dutta and Gigler s 
(2006) proposition, conducting income increasing earnings management is potentially 
costly for sell (non-growth) companies. Hence, they do not report delusive optimistic 
forecasts (see proposition 3 of Dutta and Gigler (2006)). The heavy costs of issuing 
optimistic forecasts and consequently losing those forecasts come in the form of 
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litigation, contract termination and takeover (Beniluz, 2007; Frost, 1997; Kim & Shi, 
2011). 
6.5.3 Interpreting the Optimistic and Pessimistic Forecasts 
As was mentioned earlier in Chapter 1, there are two different approaches 
regarding forecast issuance. The first approach is that management s forecasts consist of 
biased signals, and the management will use earnings and forecasts management as 
tools to create positive earnings surprise that will lead to a temporary stock price 
appreciation or prevent stock price depreciation. This view corresponds with the 
opportunistic perspective of the positive accounting theory. The second approach 
believes that by providing accurate forecasts, the management provides the correct 
information to the market, therefore, their forecasts are truthful. This view corresponds 
to the efficiency perspective of the positive accounting theory. 
According to Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003b),buy companies conduct income 
increasing earnings management, whereas sell companies do not possess enough 
resources and have less accounting flexibility to do that (Su, 2005). The finding of this 
research for H1 is that buy companies issue less pessimistic (or more optimistic) 
forecasts than sell companies. The finding of this research for H1 is consistent with 
Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003b) framework, in which buy (growth) companies issue 
optimistic forecasts and conduct income increasing earnings management to reach 
forecasts and produce positive earnings surprises.  
In addition, the findings of this research for H1 show that sell companies issue 
more pessimistic (less optimistic) forecasts than buy companies. Based on Dutta and 
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Gigler (2002) proposition, since missing the forecasts unfavourably affects the 
management utilities, both buy and sell companies avoid doing so.  
Furthermore, the findings of this research for H3 show that, in sell group 
companies, the companies that meet forecasts have higher negative forecasts 
management than the companies that miss forecasts.  
Since sell companies do not have enough resources, which makes them 
constrained in effectively manipulating the profit (Howell, 2012), it is predicted that sell 
companies produce downward biased forecasts (issue pessimistic forecasts) in order to 
avoid missing forecasts. Producing downward biased forecasts in sell companies was 
further examined by testing the difference in the frequency of negative/positive 
forecasts errors between the forecasts errors that are calculated by using the 
unmanaged and issued forecasts (H5). The findings support (H5). The findings of the 
test state that the forecasts errors that are calculated by using unmanaged forecasts are 
more negative than the forecasts errors that are calculated by using issued forecasts. 
This shows that the sell companies only do downward forecasts management to reach to 
forecasts and produce positive forecasts errors.  
The difference in the forecasts management of the buy and sell companies might 
explain the difference in approaches for efficiency (non-pessimistic) and opportunistic 
(pessimistic) forecasts.  
Following the framework that was developed by Dutta and Gigler (2002), in 
which earnings forecasts assists in the process of transparent financial reporting, this 
research investigated the hypothesized effects of the analysts recommendations on the 
forecast management. Consistent with the framework advocated by Dutta and Gigler 
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(2002) and Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003b),this research shows that buy companies 
conduct income increasing earnings management to avoid negative forecasts errors, 
while sell companies produce downward biased forecasts (H1 supported) to avoid 
negative earnings surprise (H3 and H5 supported), and its consequent market 
punishments that unfavourably affects the management s utility. This research adds to 
the literature by finding an additional factor that affects the management s decisions 
toward issuing forecasts. It has been found that companies growth status represented by 
analysts recommendations can affect the management s decision to conduct forecasts 
management.  
Therefore, consistent with Dutta and Gigler s (2002) proposition for sell 
companies, it is optimal to make earnings management potentially costly for managers, 
so that they do not have delusive optimistic forecasts (see proposition 3 of Dutta and 
Gigler 2002). 
6.6 Interpretations of the Findings 
In this research, even though it is discovered that the managers of sell companies 
use downward forecast management (H1 supported) to produce positive forecasts errors 
(H3 and H5 supported), Wang (2003) suggests that this would only have a short 
increasing effect on the market, as investors will learn of this fact from the past financial 
statements of the company. And if a manager repeats such an action for a number of 
times, the investors will lose their trust in the company. But as far as short term benefit 
is concerned, the management perceives the increases quite favourably, and this 
scenario will hold. 
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The results agree with those from other researches in forecasts management and 
forecasts errors contexts. The results extends previous researches with regards to the 
effect that financial reporting has on the market value (Lev & Zarowin, 1999). It is 
suggested that not only the financial information affects the market value of the 
company, but the market perception about the company will invariably affect the 
accuracy of voluntary information disclosure. This was accomplished by seeing that sell 
and buy companies have different strategies toward precision of managers forecasts. 
Moreover, the findings of this study is consistent with the result of Feng and Koch 
(2010),which shows that the company that possesses large analysts forecast error 
increases the frequencies of forecasts in order to decrease information asymmetry.  
The result is consistent with Matsumoto (2002), who suggests that the stock 
market can function as an incentive that affect forecast management. In addition, the 
results also complement Abarbanell & Lehavy (2003b) framework, in which the market 
incentives affect the motivation of managers to conduct earnings management. The 
Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003b) shows that buy companies do income increasing 
earnings management to reach to forecasts and produce positive forecasts errors. Since 
the buy companies have ample resources to manipulate the profit, there is less 
communication restriction for them and the revelation principle holds for them (Dutta 
and Gigler 2002).   
However, Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003b) suggest that the sell companies do 
not have enough resources to do income increasing earnings management. The 
restrictions of the resources come in the form of lack of new products, and lack of 
profitable investment opportunities. In addition, sell companies face restrictions in 
manipulating the profit, as they do not seem to have new markets and high prospective 
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return. Furthermore, the sell company s stock price sensitivity to earnings news is not 
high (Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003b).  
Such obligations restrict the sell companies from communicating the full 
dimensionality of their information set to the market. If unmanaged earnings contain 
noises that the manager can observe, it is difficult for them to take action and 
manipulate the profit and to remove the noises. Thus, the lack of resources will render 
the sell companies unable to communicate the full dimensionality of their rich 
information set to investors through the manipulation of reported earnings.  
Therefore, the communication restrictions that the sell companies have, relate to 
the ability of the manager to correctly communicate their information. For that reason, 
sell companies are expected to have different approaches in conveying information to 
investors compared to buy companies. Thus, according to Evans and Sridhar (2010), in 
case of the sell companies, it is possible for non-truthful reporting to occur. This study 
adds to this framework by suggesting that, when the company does not have enough 
resources to conduct earnings management (Su 2005), it will pursue forecasts 
management instead. 
According to Dye (2008), Evans and Sridhar (2009), and Demski (1998) since in 
case of sell companies the agent is unable to perfectly communicate their private 
information, they might commit to less truthful reporting. 
The overall empirical evidence also complements the implication in Kasznik 
(1999a) and Matsumoto (2002) by suggesting that the incentive to manage earnings and 
forecasts may not be identical in all companies. The empirical evidence suggests that 
discontinuities around zero in the forecasts errors distributions is driven by forecasts 
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management, is, at least partly, under the influence of companies financial situation, 
which is presented by the analysts recommendations. 
The findings about the relationship of forecasts management and forecasts errors 
in buy and sell companies is consistent with the findings of Savov (2006),which suggest 
that companies that are overvalued present a stronger influence of fundamental earnings 
over reporting bias. This is true because, while I showed that sell companies produce 
downward biased forecasts to meet forecasts and produce positive forecasts errors, 
Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003b) showed that buy companies do income increasing 
earnings management to reach to the forecasts and produce positive earnings surprises. 
Therefore, since buy companies are usually overvalued, their reporting is more biased 
toward increasing the profit.  
6.7 Importance of the Findings 
The findings are consistent with the result of previous researches, in that 
managers anticipate that the market will react differently when the forecasts are missed, 
versus when they are (just) met, and that the management undertake actions to meet the 
forecasts in order to boost the stock market status of the company (McVa, Nagar, & 
Tang, 2006). The importance of these findings is that they show analysts 
recommendations in terms of buying or selling of the stocks might have informational 
value that can be used by individual investors to assess the quality of managers 
forecasts. In addition, the results obtained here would be useful for future theory 
development. 
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6.8 Contribution of the Study 
The contribution of this study is that it tests the framework that was developed 
by Dutta and Gigler (2002). An important attribute of this framework is that the 
revelation principle holds. The following paragraphs explain both the theoretical and 
practical contributions of the findings. 
6.8.1 Theoretical Contributions of the Study 
Previous findings indicate that the management manages the forecasts 
downward, so that reported earning meets them, and causes positive earnings surprises 
(Bartov et al., 2002; Downing & Sharpe, 2003). On the contrary, other researchers 
contend that the undesirable consequences of producing downward biased forecasts 
(like share price decline that follows the reduce in forecasts) is stronger than the 
desirable effects of positive earnings surprises (Bernhardt & Campello, 2007). It is 
suggested that ignoring the financial situations of the companies is the main reason 
behind the controversy between undesirable and desirable consequences of producing 
downward biased forecasts. When the stocks recommendations are on the buy or on the 
sell, implications are abound on whether the management is motivated enough to 
produce downward biased forecast by meeting forecasts produce positive earnings 
surprises. However, as per Bernhardt and Campello (2005) suggestion, it is perceived 
that for buy companies, the negative effect of producing downward biased forecasts is 
far greater than the positive effect of meeting forecasts. So, the companies that are 
classified as the Buy conduct income-increasing earnings management instead of 
producing downward biased forecast. 
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The findings of this research add to the literature by proving that not only the 
buy companies (which are supposed to be growth companies) engage in income 
increasing earnings management to achieve positive forecast error (Burgstahler & 
Dichev, 1997; Libby et al., 2008; Watts & Zimmerman, 1990), but sell (non-growth) 
companies engage in negative forecast management to accomplish the same goal as 
well. Fitting to the framework of Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003b),where buy companies 
engage in income increasing earnings management to meet or beat forecasts and 
consistent with Brown (2001) and Burgstahler & Eames (2002) and Matsumoto (2002), 
this study shows that sell companies produce downward biased forecasts in order to 
meet or beat the forecasts. In addition, the findings suggest that studying forecasts errors 
along with forecasts management might be more illustrative than studying forecasts 
errors and forecasts management separately. 
The secondary contribution of the findings of this study is that it examines the 
consistency of several forecasts management measurement models, including those 
developed by Wang (2003), Burgestahler and Eams (2005) and Matsumoto (2002). 
Since I observed a negative kink in the distribution of forecasts management on the 
right side of the positive forecasts errors, and since there is justifiable relationship 
between the forecasts management and forecasts errors, it can be surmised that 
Burgestahler and Eams (2005) and Matsumoto (2002) forecasts management 
measurement models are consistent. On top of that, since the findings fit in to the 
framework developed by previous researches in the case of direction of forecasts and 
earnings management (Conlisk, 1996; Demski, 1998; Kaiser, 1974; Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1990), it provides a solid evidence that Burgestahler and Eams (2005) and 
Matsumoto (2002) models are viable and valid. 
 210  
This study helps to understand the mixed findings in the managers forecasts 
literature. While the previous studies suggested that managers forecasts are 
opportunistic, and the management uses the forecasts to manage the analysts forecasts 
(Cotter et al., 2006; Desai et al., 2004) and affect the stock prices (Athanasakou et al., 
2009),  there are several other studies that show that since the management s forecast 
conveys insider information to the outsiders, it helps decrease information asymmetry, 
hence decreasing the costly litigation of stockholders versus the company (Beyer, 2006; 
Li & Ding, 2008). It also helps the company to have transparent and clear financial 
reporting (Bartov & Cohen, 2008; Hirst et al., 1999). This study adds to the mixed 
findings in the literature, by showing that management s forecasts contain bias that is 
predictable, considering the analysts recommendations about the company. In other 
words, sell companies forecasts are more pessimistically biased than buy companies 
forecasts.  
The findings introduce analysts recommendation as a new variable that can 
predict the direction of forecasts management. The findings of this study indicate that 
the opportunistic forecasts are more likely when the company is in the sell 
recommendation. The relationship between the analysts recommendations and 
forecasts management has not been thoroughly investigated in previous literature. 
This study addresses the need for research regarding the interaction between 
elements of the financial reporting such as earnings and forecasts management. This 
need was brought up in a literature review article (Hirst et al., 2008; Riley, 2007). I 
interpret the results as the growth and non-growth companies pursuing different 
strategies to meet forecasts and produce positive earnings surprises. When the 
companies are in a growth situation, they issue optimistic forecasts and pursue income 
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increasing earnings management to achieve those forecasts afterward (Abarbanell and 
Lehavy 2003b). On the other hand, when the companies are in a distressed situation, 
they issue pessimistic forecasts so that they can avoid the undesirable consequences of 
negative earnings surprise at the earnings announcement date. 
6.8.2 Practical Contributions of the Study 
This research is practically useful, as it addresses the need for further research 
on the characteristics of the forecasts that was highlighted by Hirst et al. (2008). The 
findings extend the existing knowledge regarding the information content of the 
forecasts that affect the financial information of the users decisions. This study also 
helps to provide a better understanding of the role that forecasts management plays in 
decreasing forecasts errors. The findings warn investors to carefully evaluate the 
management and analysts 14 forecasts before they form their expectations about the 
company. This is especially imperative when there is great temptation in the market for 
the sale of the company s stocks.  In addition, the implications for standard setting is 
that the forecasts of buy and sell companies possesses different levels of credibility. 
Models that included is closure choices along with other (real) choices or effort 
allocation provide us a improved perception concerning how the companies disclosure 
records influence not only market estimates, but also companies other (real) choices 
                                                 
14 According to Baginski et al. (2011) and Choi et al. (2010) analysts forecasts are highly under the influence of management 
forecasts. The reason is that, the main source of the analysts to form expectation about the companies future profit is the company's 
own earnings' predictions or "guidance (Williams 1996; Burgstahler and Eames 2006; Baginski and Hassell 1990; Hutton et al. 
2012; Cotter et al. 2010). 
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and cash flows, along with the wellbeing of diverse shareholder groups (Kanodia, 
2007). Obviously, including such actual choices in voluntary disclosure models adds a 
further level of complication. However, the understandings that can possibly be 
achieved regarding the interdependencies among disclosures, cash flow distributions, 
and the welfare of stakeholders make such models worth the attempt (Riley, 2007). 
6.9 Suggestions 
6.9.1 Practical Suggestions 
This study cautions investors and analysts to carefully evaluate the managers 
forecasts before using it to form their expectations vis-à-vis the company s future 
performance, especially when there is great temptation in the market for the sale of the 
company s stocks. 
The information about the analysts recommendations might contain important 
implications for forecasts management, as they might convey a great informational 
value that can be used by researchers or even investors, and carry clues for interpreting 
the invisible implications of the stocks.  
It is suggested that standard setters and regulators pay great attention to the 
implications of the analysts recommendations and keep greater surveillance, via stricter 
restrictions, over earnings projections of the companies that do not have a satisfactory 
stock market status. 
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6.9.2 Suggestions for Future Research 
The findings of this research is in contrast with the result of Campello (2010), 
who found that the negative influence of downward forecast revisions on stock price 
overlooks the stock price rise after the earnings announcement. Further researches need 
to be conducted to see whether price reduction effect of producing downward biased 
forecasts will outweigh the positive price effect of meeting and beating forecasts. If it is 
true, then the future researchers should addressthe situations that make the negative 
consequences of producing downward biased forecasts to outweigh the future positive 
effects of meeting or beating forecasts, and why the management conduct downward 
forecast management in such situations.  
6.10 Limitations 
The limitations that this study dealt with are explained as follows: 
There are a number of disadvantages in using the analysts recommendations as 
an indicator for market growth. First, according to Stickel (1995), the reaction of 
investors to analysts recommendations, and consequently, its effect on stock prices, are 
influenced by several factors such as the size of the brokerage firm, the size of the 
recommended company, the reputation of the analysts and the magnitude of the change 
in recommendation, the strength of the recommendation, and the marketing ability of 
the brokerage house issuing the recommendation. However, when consensus analysts 
recommendations are considered, such influences and their abnormal effects will be 
alleviated.  
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The second disadvantage of the analysts recommendations is that some analysts 
maintain on-going relationships with specific companies (e.g. conducting investment 
banking for the companies (Dugar & Nathan, 1995; Feng & Koch, 2010; Matsumoto, 
2002). For example, Michaely and Womack (1999) show that the recommendations by 
an underwriter analysts showed a significant evidence of bias. Moreover, to some 
extent, the investors understand this bias, and they place more value on the information 
released by independent analysts (Chang, Ng, & Yu, 2008), and as a result of this, the 
analysts recommendation and the real market trend might not be completely similar 
(Jegadeesh & Kim, 2010). Problems such as these are growing, especially with the fact 
that some small companies are followed by only a small number of analysts . In 
addition, the analysts recommendations includes some analysts optimism anomaly, 
which were documented by Francis and Philbrick (1993). However, by considering 
consensus analysts recommendations, such influences and their abnormal effects are 
minimized. In addition, by excluding the information of the companies that are followed 
by only a few analysts from the sample the abnormal effects of analysts bias is 
minimized.  
The other limitation is that the study sampling covers only the years 2009 and 
2010,which are after immediate recovery from financial crises. The financial situation 
of the companies just after recovery could possibly affect the management s behaviour.  
Finally, since Matsumoto proposed measure of forecasts management as a 
measurement tool for the analysts forecasts, if market is inefficient, then the 
information of the analysts and management might differ. Therefore, the model might 
not fully capture the management's forecasts management. However, as Li & Ding 
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(2008), Castura et al. (2010), and Correia et al. (2010) documented, since NYSE stock 
market is efficient, it might not cause serious problem to the reliability of the results. 
Other models of measuring forecasts management might not be as efficient. Although 
they are tried to be comprehensive and included all of the known components of 
managers forecasts, some of the hidden effects might have been missed entirely. 
6.11 Conclusion 
This chapter briefly summarized the research objectives and the overall results 
of the study. In line with this, the strategies of the management have been viewed vis-à-
vis reporting earnings forecasts, aided by theories that have been presented in the 
theoretical framework (Chapter 2). The practical and theoretical implications of the 
study have also been highlighted, and recommendations were made to improve the 
accuracy of the managers forecasts, along with how investors and analysts could adjust 
the optimism and pessimism of managers forecasts. 
This thesis highlights previous findings related to the concepts of forecasts 
optimism and pessimism. It has also fills the probable gaps regarding characteristics of 
managers forecasts that highlighted by Hirst et al. (2008) and lack of research about 
determinant of management precision (optimism/pessimism) that was highlighted by 
(Hong & Kacperczyk, 2010),that have existed along the way. Investigating the effect of 
analysts recommendations on the accuracy of managers forecasts did this. 
In addition, the discrepancies that existed between the previous and current 
findings have been duly clarified. The discrepancy was the lack of consistency in the 
result of past researches, regarding the producing downward biased forecasts to produce 
positive earnings surprises. Some researches emphasize that, the undesirable stock price 
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decline consequences of producing downward biased forecasts overweight the positive 
stock price effect of producing positive earnings surprises (Su, 2005). On the other 
hand, other researches claim that management does downward forecasts management to 
produce positive earnings surprises (Matsumoto, 2002; Burgstahler and Eams, 2006). In 
this study, I showed that, although for buy companies the undesirable stock price 
decline consequences of producing downward biased forecasts overweight the positive 
stock price effect of producing positive earnings surprises, since the stock price of the 
sell companies is less susceptible to earnings news, the undesirable price consequences 
of producing downward biased forecasts is not high for sell companies. Therefore, sell 
companies do downward forecasts management to produce positive earnings surprise. 
Consequently, the researcher believes that the results of the present work 
contribute to a better understanding of the reliability of managers forecasts that has 
attracted a lot of researchers in recent years. Much of the research has attempted to 
caution against the employment of pessimistic forecasts in many contexts, and to argue 
in favor of optimistic forecasts.  
However, the results of this study showed that when the company is non-affluent 
and where the management faces difficulties in manipulating the reported profit, they 
tend to manipulate the forecasts in order to avoid the negative earnings surprises. The 
results of the study also show that in the present state of affairs, pessimistic forecasts 
may not necessarily reflect the opportunism, and it could be fitted into the framework, 
in which forecasts as voluntary disclosure and reported profit as mandatory disclosure 
could contribute to a more efficient financial reporting. According to Dutta and Gigler 
(2002) as long as communication restrictions such as regulatory limitations do not 
restrict the management to follow different earnings management or forecasts 
management strategies to meet their own forecasts, earnings and forecasts management 
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could be beneficial. An implication of the present study is that, ideally, depending on 
the financial affluence of the company, both the optimistic and pessimistic forecast 
could contribute in conveying richer information to the market. Where pessimistic 
forecast has more to contribute to convey a bad situation of the company and optimistic 
forecast has more shares in conveying the good news of the company. It is hoped that 
the results will prove useful to all stakeholders involved in voluntary disclosure. 
While the present study reveals some significant points in terms of reliability of 
managers forecasts, the findings should neither be overestimated nor underestimated. 
Gathering data from different markets and from different time periods may shed more 
light on the issue of reliability of managers forecasts.    
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX I 
Table of rotated component matrix for calculation of the variable Difficulty by using the five 
items of Lag_loss, Predict_loss, STDAF, STDAFE, Spread, STD_RET. The first component is 
used as measure for difficulty.  
Rotated Component Matrix
Component
1 2 3
Lag_loss 0.180 0.106 0.780
Predict_loss -0.58 0.896 0.060
STDAF -0.51 0.107 -0.669
STDAFE 0.963 -0.005 0.089
Spread 0.838 0.554 -0.159
STD_RET 0.960 -0.041 0.090
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